Abstract
In the debate between moral realists and anti-realists in metaethics, one of the perennial and recurring issues revolves around the problem of language, particularly the meaning of ethical
terms. This paper examines the role of language in the moral realism/anti-realism controversy. It argues that the semantic approach (that focuses on the meaning of moral terms) is still a fertile ground in the debate that requires further investigation for the following reasons: (i) it is not yet well explored as much as the ontological and epistemological approaches; (ii) the question of semantic challenge arising from the linguistic ambiguity charged against moral realism still persists; and (iii) the ontological and the epistemological approaches in the debate rest on the semantic nature of moral terms. Basically, the main objective of this paper is to examine how the unguarded ontological usage of language by the moral realists put moral anti-realism in a more defensible position in the debate. In the final analysis, the paper concludes that despite moral realists’ ontological claim about moral facts, and their epistemological explanations about how moral facts can be known, the linguistic confusion inherent in their claims suggest how and why
moral anti-realism appears more consistent with reality.
Keywords: Anti-realism; Moral Facts; Moral Realism; Language, Semantic Approach.
File