

# WIT(H)NESS OF DASEIN

## Disclosure of Dasein in *Being and Time*

[DASEIN'İN İLE-TANIKLIĞI: *Varlık ve Zaman*'da Dasein'in Açıklanışı]

Sercan ÇALCI

Ph.D. Candidate, Mimar Sinan Güzel Sanatlar Üniv., Felsefe Bölümü  
[sercan.calci@yahoo.com](mailto:sercan.calci@yahoo.com)

### ABSTRACT

In this paper I will develop the concept of *wit(h)ness* in the context of Heidegger's fundamental ontology in *Being and Time* by making a distinction between observer and witness: Observer is not witness. For he remains at the strain of subject-object relationship and at the distance of knower-known dichotomy. So, who is witness? Sure, it is the potentiality of becoming-witness; or more precisely, it is the wit(h)ness of Dasein who is characterized by being-with without falling into the stream of the subject-object distance. In short, in this text I will deal with the witness of Dasein in Heidegger's *Being and Time*. From my perspective, the concept of wit(h)ness does not refer to a trivial wordplay but to the fundamental composition of Dasein. Regarded profoundly, wit(h)ness is linked to the question of *conscience* in the Heideggerian sense of the term. I will examine the thematics of conscience, guilty, anxiety, call and the situation in Heidegger's philosophy in order to develop the basic characteristics of the concept of wit(h)ness. Also I will try to compare the analytical axis which constitutes the thematics of conscience with the possibility of witness. In order to do so, problematics of anxiety and guilty will be brought into question after examining the disclosure modes of Dasein.

**Keywords:** With, witness, wit(h)ness, conscience, Dasein, call, disclosure.

## ÖZET

Bu yazıda gözlemci ile tanık arasında bir ayırım yaparak Heidegger'in *Varlık ve Zaman*'daki fundamental ontolojisi bağlamında *ile-tanıklık* kavramını geliştireceğim: Gözlemci tanık değildir. Çünkü o, özne-nesne ilişkisinin geriliminde ve bilen-bilinen ikiliğinin mesafesinde kalır. Peki kimdir tanık öyleyse? Kuşkusuz o, tanık-oluş potansiyelidir ya da daha kesin bir dille söylersek, özne-nesne mesafesinin akımına kapılmadan ile-oluş olarak karakterize edilen Dasein'in ile-tanıklığıdır. Kısacası bu yazıda Heidegger'in *Varlık ve Zaman*'ında Dasein'in tanıklığını ele alacağım. Benim bakış açımdan ile-tanıklık kavramı anlamsız bir kelime oyununa değil Dasein'in fundamental kompozisyonuna işaret etmektedir. Derinlemesine bakıldığında, ile-tanıklık, terimin Heideggerci anlamıyla *vicdan* sorununa bağlıdır. İle-tanıklık kavramının temel özelliklerini geliştirmek için vicdan, vecibe, kaygı, çağrı ve durum gibi Heidegger felsefesindeki kimi temalarını inceleyeceğim. Ayrıca vicdan tematiğini meydana getiren analitik eksenini tanıklık imkanıyla karşılaştırmaya çalışacağım. Bunu gerçekleştirmek için Dasein'in açılma kiplerini inceledikten sonra kaygı ve vecibe sorunsallarını gündeme getireceğim.

**Anahtar Sözcükler:** İle, tanıklık, ile-tanıklık, vicdan, Dasein, çağrı, açıklama.

## Introduction

The notion of witness as the subject matter of this text is the wit(h)ness or the fundamental mode of coexistence rather than seeing an event with eyes, bearing testimony of an happening or having knowledge of the events. In other words, to bear witness is always to be together with a situation and an event. Wit(h)ness of the witness completely separates *it* from the observer. Observer sees an event and tries to produce an objective knowledge, if possible, of the event itself. Observer is the being of distance in the full sense of the word. *He* has “red lines” and the distances residing at and

between him and the thing he observes. Thus, there are some significant differences between witness and observer. Let me summarize some of them:

1. While observer is characterized by a sight field which annihilates the wit(h)ness itself within his red lines and space-time, witness appears with its intimacy that is possible by its becoming-with in the time-horizon.
2. Removal of the distance makes the witness of the becoming-with possible, but for the observer it is the conservation of the distance the crucial moment of his being.
3. Witness encounters an openness which belongs to existential nexus of Dasein; while observer remain in the context of a spatialized modes of not-original time.
4. Observer binds his being categorically to the strain of the subject-object relationship; but witness is existentially connected with the care in the context of being-in-the-world.

It is clear that observer and witness are two different modes of seeing, hearing and eventually of thinking. However, at this point, we should point out that we do neither deal with the value of these two different figurations nor their ethical valuations. Which one has more value or which one is more effective for the daily life are the question of another context that is beyond our question. Here we just try to think how we get a cartography of these two different figures and how we develop an ontology of wit(h)ness in the sense of disclosure of Dasein. It is sure that one will question why we focus on those figures that are different and opposite. In this introduction, I would like to make a determination without dealing with any quantifying value-assignment such as better or worser. In fact, following determination will show the road on which this text will walk: *Observer is not witness. For he remains at the strain of subject-object relationship and at the distance of knower-known dichotomy. So, who is witness? Sure, it is the potentiality of becoming-witness; or more precisely, it is the wit(h)ness of Dasein who is characterized by being-with without falling into the stream of the subject-object distance.* In this text I will deal with the witness of Dasein in Heidegger's *Being and Time* and develop my concept of wit(h)ness. From my perspective, this concept does not refer to a wordplay or the difference of letter "h", but to the fundamental composition of Dasein. Regarded profoundly, wit(h)ness is linked to the question of the *conscience* in the Heideggerian sense of the term. I will examine the thematics of conscience, guilty, anxiety, call and the situation in Heidegger's *Being and Time* in order to develop the basic characteristics of the concept of wit(h)ness. Also I will try to compare the analytical axis which constitutes the

thematics of conscience with the possibility of witness. In order to do so, problematics of anxiety and guilty will be brought into question after examining the disclosure modes of Dasein in *Being and Time*. I should say that all these discussions comes from the question of “Who is Dasein?”. A temporary answer to this question can be so: Dasein is being-in-the world. But we would like to think a preceding answer and add the concept of wit(h)ness as the prerequisite of all determination of Dasein or of all “is” which connects its existence to the world of language. I will try to go beyond this “is” and its world in order to show how the concept of wit(h)ness is a constituent existential for the composition of Dasein.

### **1. Dasein’s Authentic Potentiality of Being**

What does make the witness possible for Dasein, if it is not the wit(h)ness itself which is the fundamental constitution of Dasein both in the sense of being-*with* the world which it creates and the witness to the world in which it lives. It is clear that for Dasein the modes of with and witness are connected together in the concept of wit(h)ness which distinguishes it from the ready-to-hand and presence-at-hand. According to Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis in *Being and Time*, the witness is related to the call of conscience which summons Dasein towards its authentic potentiality of being. In fact the dichotomy of witness and witnessed has no sense from the perspective of Dasein’s being-in-the world. As I pointed before, for Dasein to be witness is not observing of an event but setting out a journey into the fundamental constitution of Dasein itself. What understanding can be the call of this kind of journey when we think *being-with* with *being-witness*? The first thing to be done is to identify the inauthentic modes of existence. If there is an authentic potentiality of being for Dasein, it is not possible by completely negating of inauthentic modes of being but creating an opportunity of authentic potentiality of being. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger clearly connects Dasein’s bringing itself back with its authentic potentiality of being:

Dasein has lost itself in inauthenticity. When Dasein thus brings itself back [Das Sichzurückholen] from the ‘they’, the they-self is modified in an existentiell manner so that it becomes *authentic* Being-one’s-Self. This must be accomplished by *making up for not choosing* [*Nachholen einer Wahl*]. But ‘making up’ for not choosing signifies *choosing to make this choice* – deciding for a potentiality-for-Being, and making this

decision from one's own Self. In choosing to make this choice, Dasein makes possible, first and foremost, its authentic potentiality-for-Being. (Heidegger 2008, s. 313).

We should concern this concept of *choosing* with a special emphasise. Just as I did on the concept of witness, I will differ the concept of choosing by emphasising that this choosing is not making a selection among the present-beings. Thus we can approach to what Heidegger refers by choosing the choice. For Dasein, choosing the choice is not to select, because to select needs to distance where the observer places himself and which Dasein exulcerates in order to cut across it by act of choosing. For this reason, Dasein tries to destroy the distance between the act of choosing and the thing to be chosen by means of its projective wit(h)ness. On the one hand Dasein is *with* the world of choosing where it projects all the choices and the other it is the witness of this world where it cut across the distance itself. If there are present-beings that are to be chosen, one would say that Dasein's authentic potentiality of being has already been present and is predetermined. But here we face with another conception of being which cannot be assimilated by any deterministic approach. In fact choosing the choice is to make the choosing possible. So one may ask that if there is any difference between choosing something and choosing the choose. Where should we apply in order to determine this difference? In its ordinary sense, choosing is not to make anything possible but is making a choice among the given options just as for the observer. This kind of a choosing is a combination of the options. Accordingly Dasein has to make such a choice that allows both Dasein has a potentiality for bringing itself from "they" and there can be no starting point of this kind of choosing other than Dasein's authentic self. At this point one would ask this question: Is authenticity an object of choosing or a *telos*? Actually according to Heidegger there is no room for this kind of *telos* or choosing. According to Heidegger's phenomenological analysis, the existence which sinked into the they-world is to be called to its authenticity by Dasein's choosing the possibility that makes choosing possible and with reference to Dasein's authentic self. However this choosing is also an act of decision. This is such a constituting choosing that ensure Dasein would project itself with its horizon of temporality and start to search its self within the world. When Dasein make such a decision, its being-in-the world would not be perfected by a decisive authenticity. Maybe it always cut across the boundaries between authenticity and inauthenticity, but the potentiality of authenticity would not be broken from its existence. However, what is the evidence of such an authenticity? Heidegger says: "In the following Interpretation we shall claim

that this potentiality is attested by that which, in Dasein's everyday interpretation of itself, is familiar to us as the "voice of conscience" [*Stimme des Gewissens*]." (Heidegger 2008, s. 313). It seems to me that Heidegger's answer to the question is a very difficult one. The evidence of the authenticity is the question that brings up the conscience to our agenda. Now what should be done is to differ the Heideggerrean concept of conscience from ordinary concepts of it. Bu this act of differentiation does not mean that one should overlook and undervalue the ordinary concepts, rather that one should explore and discover the common and different grounds between them. In fact what we seek is a conceptual move which has the potential to change the ordinary understanding of conscience. It should be done that the sense-layers which are fixed in the ordinary conception are to be freed from the dogmatic frames of thinking; in other words, our aim is to disclose the sense-layer which have been kept under and in the dark of ordinary and established sense-frames attributed to the concept of conscience. I will try to show how these sense-layers can be determined and disclosed throughout this text. Just remember that it is the call of conscience itself that makes possible authenticity as a potentiality. I will gradually deal with this call in its relationships with the problematics of discourse, sense and existence. Now lets turn our look to the conscience and ask: What understanding of being lead to thinking of conscience as a court of justice as in Kant's imagination and what is the real objection one can assert to this?

## 2. Kant and Conscience

As a philosopher who seeks the truth in the form of judgement, Kant deals with the concept of conscience as a court of justice which comes from the very core of his epistemological system. In his deontological approach in which moral law is a central determiner, Kant makes the basic distinctions that is between subjective judgements of experience and objective judgements of apperception, just as he did the same between *a priori* categorical foundations which make experience possible and *a posteriori* materials which come from experience. In fact, for Kant's philosophy the judgements consist of synthesizing the categories which constitutes the representations with experience and its forms that are time and space. There lies an ontological assumption behind this epistemological analysis, which tells us that thing in itself cannot be brought into the human knowledge and so that it resides beyond our boundaries. For our analysis this is the very reason of the model of judgement consisting of judicial and the judged. If it is compared with

the observer's position the real core of this model can be unveiled. Before to do so I would like to lay an emphasis on Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's conscience. Heidegger claims that Kant thinks conscience as a court of justice: "Discourse articulates intelligibility. Characterizing conscience as a call is not just giving a 'picture', like the Kantian representation of the conscience as a court of justice." (Heidegger 2008, s. 316). One should pay attention to this concept of "picture". The call of conscience which is the very evidence of Dasein's authenticity does not consist of an image or picture. Because an image or picture is a representation that is founded upon the dichotomy between representer and represented. Observer places himself on this radical distinction which allows the dichotomy itself, but for wit(h)ness there is no room for this kind of distinction other than radical differences which comes with univocal and equivocal ontological assumptions. Therefore Heidegger mentions a potentiality knitted with Dasein's being-in-the world with which equivocal ontological assumption comes. However Kant thinks conscience in the context of idea of moral law that determines the very conditions of an act to be moral. Thus he constitutes a metaphysical court of justice covering not the very preconditions of itself but the pictures and representations.

When Kant represented the conscience as a 'court of justice' and made this the basic guiding idea in his Interpretation of it, he did not do so by accident; this was suggested by the idea of moral law – although his conception of morality was far removed from utilitarianism and eudaimonism. Even the theory of value, whether it is regarded formally or materially, has as its unexpressed ontological presupposition a 'metaphysic of morals' – that is, an ontology of Dasein and existence. (Heidegger 2008, s. 339).

Although Kant achieves to going beyond utilitarianism and eudaimonism, he still thinks the idea of ethics in the boundaries of this image of judgement in which legitimacy and justification is concerned but the authenticity is not. Also Kant moves beyond the teleological approaches on morality but he does not expose the very ontological preconditions that makes this move possible and this explains why the central position of the court of justice is occupied by the problem of legitimacy and justification. Starting from this point of view, Kant thinks the conscience as a court of justice which excludes the potentiality of being-in-the world and compels reason to jump into the evaluation process of acts. We can say that Heidegger tries to give a meaning to this fundamental and constituting call of conscience not as a picture but as potentiality of authenticity, therefore he

criticizes Kant's interpretation of conscience and focuses on another perspective. For Heidegger, conscience is not a court of justice to which neither morality of acts are determined nor the measure of the values are discovered; therefore conscience must be thought in its characteristic call which summons Dasein into its original disclosure with its authenticity. Conscience does not judge but it calls and call on. But why and for whom the conscience calls on? What is the fundamental existential of call for Dasein's disclosure and its relation to the wit(h)ness.

### **3. Dasein and Conscience**

Conscience is an actual moment for Dasein, although the term moment evokes Hegelian connotations, it does not refer to the context of *Aufhebung* but to the process in which any *telos* or negation does not dominate the process of subjectivity. Heidegger never proposes a process that is bounded between negations and is bound to the fictional dialectic. And also here is no idea of *telos* that is predetermined. Conscience does not come to a conclusion by judging something or someone nor it has a role to transcending the present existence for another. There is no perfect human existence which should be arrived by such a transcending. However, conscience presents new sense-layers that are to be disclosed by Dasein's interpretation and its disclosure. One should reveal existential disclosure of Dasein as the care by starting from an understanding of temporality in order to lay the disclosing character of conscience bare. To do so, I will use the moments of Dasein's life as the the modes of disclosure, i.e. the modes of wit(h)ness instead of observer's negative distance with its world.

#### **3.1. Conscience and Understanding**

For Heidegger conscience does not judge but calls on, in other words it can be characterised by its very call. However, to what or for whom this call is given? To whom this intention is referred? Is there any determinate subject or object in this call of conscience? As Heidegger points out: "In the call of conscience, what is it that is talked about – in other words, to what is the appeal made? Manifestly Dasein itself." (Heidegger 2008, s. 317). That Dasein itself is the called shows that there is no object in this call of conscience. Knowledge may have an object but the call has a different character belonging to the summon and invitation. Therefore one cannot make categorical



distinctions between the form and matter or form and content of the call. Even these discursive distinctions are not indisputable. As Heidegger points out that there is nothing which is given voice by call of conscience. Conscience has bring us nothing about the ordinary events and occasion. From my point of view observer has no room for having a conscience, he is free form conscience as well as he has no ear to hear its call. On the other hand, wit(h)ness is an existence of the very conscience in a way that there can be no distinction between possessor of the conscience and the possessed of its calling. Wit(h)ness is a mode of existence to whom no possessing capacity can be attribute. But observer is the possessor itself and he cannot be distinguished from the possessed. He is the main stream subject of modern philosophy. Even when he mediates on himself or the other things he remains in the frame of subject-object relationship as a possessor of the things and the determinations of them. He cannot be called by conscience because he seeks to truth by the very frame of dogmatic knowledge. Actually he is an abstraction but this abstraction works in the determination of daily life and the image that is reflected upon the modern subject. When we try to look beyond and beneath this possessor we can hear all the calls of conscience that have been kept unheard hitherto:

But how are we to determine *what is said in the talk* that belongs to this kind of discourse? *What* does the conscience call to him to whom it appeals? Taken strictly, nothing. The call asserts nothing, gives no information about world-events, has nothing to tell. (Heidegger 2008, s. 318).

The call does not give any information about ordinary events nor allows us to notice our daily life and its turmoil in the they-world. Even Heidegger inexplicitly express the contents of conscience, its call pushes all of us into another field which is uncanny and unusual. This call faces us with our unfounded and thrown existence. This is such a uncanny field that undermines all dogmatic concepts upon which our life is founded and are supposed to be immovable and transcendent. But when we reveal sense-layers we can disclose the temporality in the horizon of life as the care itself. If we remove the membrane which covers these sense-layers, the link between conscience and understanding reveals itself. As Heidegger emphasises, conscience allows us to understand the characteristics of existence and it does so by disclosing them (Heidegger 2008, s. 285). The link between disclosure and understanding is immanent to *aletheia*. Here conscience makes its first disclosure in conjunction with understanding. Allowing to understanding, conscience reveals the

sense-layers and displays the core of existence of Dasein. But this does not mean that the core itself is a substance or essence and the other parts of existence are the attributes or accidents. In Heideggerrean ontology these distinction does not work beacuse of the equivocal architecture of his thinking and the disclosure modes of Dasein. At this point we encounters a right question: What is the difference of the relationship between conscience and understanding from the the perspective of the relation between knowledge and understanding, if this existential conscience does not judge and is not used to make a distinction between good and bad and cannot be reduced to the equations such as guilt-punishment and especially of revenge-justice?

The fact that relationship between knowledge and understanding is related to the ontic dimensions of *logos*. Knowledge is produced in the modes of discourse and its effects are reflected upon the *praxis* which is the habitat of Dasein. But neither knowledge nor information cover Dasein's existence as the care because their modes of explication are bounded to the hierarchy of abstractions on which universal and particular, particular and singular dichotomies depend. Heidegger's aim is not to object to reducing ontology into epistemology or ontological into ontic but to bring these abstractions and reductions which dominates the images of thinking under the *Destruktion*.

One of the characterizing dimension of modern philosophy is to connect universal with particular and particular to singular with legitimate judgements, and this leads to a subject-design which is shared by both ethico-political individual subject and universal figurations of modern subject. One of the figurations we use in this text, i.e. observer, completely belongs to this tradition because he holds not only his universal determinations of which his "I" is consisted but also his sptαιο-temporal determinations in *praxis*. Observer is the possessor in this context as having one of the characterizing dimension of modern subject. If we turn to this figuration one can say that observer may be the subject of the image of modern knowledge but consience can be only understood in the context of Dasein's existence with its constituting wti(h)ness. Observer perceives, collects, stores, makes an analysis, judges and jumps into the process that aims to get a knowledge or information about events and entities. But for wit(h)ness, there is even nothing to be witnessed. Wit(h)ness is not a witness of an event but a disclosure process of Dasein which makes understanding of being possible for it. Wit(h)ness discloses and therefore its witness is an understanding of being and becoming-wit(h)ness. Observer scans and detects, but wit(h)ness hears. Its hearing is performed in an absolute silence which forces the *sensible minimum* to transcending itself in the density of existence. The hurly burly which is produced by the talks veils the silence of dicourse and obliges

hearing to the voice of the subject or the law itself. Thus wit(h)ness must hear that which is unhearable, it must reach a point at which every hearing reflects itself as a mode and density of silence. Conscience calls just as the ocean calls its every wave with its deep stream which seems a wish to modern subject.

If in this lost hearing, one has been fascinated with the ‘hubbub’ of the manifold ambiguity which idle talk possesses in its everyday ‘newness’, then the call must do its calling without any hubbub and unambiguously, leaving no foothold for curiosity. *That which, by calling in it gives us to understand is the conscience.* (Heidegger 2008, s. 316).

What is the reason for this lost of hearing? Do our global deafness and our chronic lost of hearing come from a touch to conscience from outside? Fundamentally we do not hear but just categorize the hubbub of talks that reach our hearing scale. Maybe this categorizing is one of the crucial act of our life, because the social formation of the current world compels us to ignore every form and content which outgrow the borders of categories. But without hearing we, as observers, sink ourselves into the destructive habit of categorizing. This have been a feeling of security for us, once we do not hear this hurly burly we feel ourselves in an uncanny situation. But one cannot say that call is a weak and obscure fizzle. On the contrary, call is a very powerful summon, a vital invitation. Conscience makes understanding possible only if with its call. Although this call calls to nowhere and refers to nothing, it tinkles both familiar and strange sound of silence as a symptom of care. This tinkle performs itself in silence with call of conscience as a deep stream of understanding.

### **3.2. Call of Conscience and Hearing**

From the point of view of Heidegger in *Being and Time*, the crucial role of discourse is to open a new context in order to deal with the call of conscience. Just as hearing, silence is an aspect of it. Now the possibilities and boundaries for Dasein who is exposed to the turmoil of the talks are diversified. That characterizing conscience as a voice –a voice in silence– brings with it the possibilities towards hearing of this call. For understanding of call, to hear is not sufficient, because now the problem is to give ear to the silence itself. This means an openness to the strange and compelling possibility in which Dasein understands the call and discloses it. It does so *with* (not *by means of or through*) conscience. This is the very concept of wit(h)ness. When Dasein understands

the call he goes beyond the hearing. Heidegger says: “In understanding the call, Dasein is *in thrall to [hörig] its ownmost possibility of existence*. It has chosen itself” (Heidegger 2008, s. 334). Again the theme of choosing with an intense emphasis is on the stage in order to allow for disclosure of Dasein’s potentiality. Giving ear to the call of conscience, Dasein has made a constituting choice and chosen itself. Observer selects one of the object of its observation and scrutinizes it; even if hearing is included in this observation, it is not possible to transcend the distance which is a constituent part of him. Discourse is an instrument for observer just as the language is. But for Dasein it is the land of understanding the language itself. Therefore this is not an instrumental language that cannot be reduced to *tekhne*. For its heterogeneous variations, silence is an enunciation of the call. Like a face of the mime, this is a very special kind of enunciation which has nothing to do with the pictures or representation. Signs refers to nothing here but for example the colour red enunciates to be red and redness; therefore being enunciates time and every act enunciates its other’s possibility. For wit(h)ness conscience enunciates its call in the silence.

‘Nothing’ gets called *to [zu-gerufen]* this Self, but it has been *summoned [aufgerufen]* to itself—that is, to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. The tendency of the call is not such as to put up for ‘trial’ the Self to which the appeal is made; but it calls Dasein forth (and ‘forward’) into its ownmost possibilities, as a summons to its ownmost *potentiality-for-Being-its-Self*. (Heidegger 2008, s. 318).

Even here is a voice, but it does not belong to judge or representative. Wit(h)ness has already excluded itself from this hearings in order to hear the call in the silence. It is the outside.

### 3.3. Anxiety of Conscience

As a being-towards-death, Dasein finds a new possibility for its authenticity in anxiety of conscience to which it attaches its mortality as its own. Anxiety of death and worry of nothingness faces Dasein with the new sense-layers which are left in the shades of public opinion and of the world of commodities. But how does conscience and anxiety come together? What is the meaning of this phenomenon of anxiety in the road of Dasein’s authenticity? In fact there is no element, no principle or substance that ensure Dasein to perfectly reach its authenticity. In this journey of Dasein, it has no predetermined *telos* or occupied horizon. But it is quite obvious that Dasein, in this search,

encounters with a pure indeterminacy which is one of its own possibility. Dasein faces with the uncanny which springs from the call of conscience as well as another indeterminacy which arises from Dasein's thrownness to the world: "The fact of the *anxiety of conscience*, gives us phenomenal confirmation that in understanding the call Dasein is brought face to face with *its* own uncanniness. Wanting-to-have-a conscience becomes a readiness for anxiety" (Heidegger 2008, s. 342). Just as Dasein's choosing the choice, wanting-to-have-a conscience is to be thought as a creative act. As an existential of Dasein, this wanting which brings it into existential is not bounded to be anxious about something but is immanent to Dasein's temporality. In this temporality Dasein discloses the sense-layers which cut across its authenticity in the horizon of being and anxiety is an intensifying situation that cannot be reduced to the anxiety of something. Now it witnesses a wanting and opens the road on which Dasein discloses itself as projective and temporal being. To be ready to anxiety is not to guard against something coming or to be come but is to disclose the time in anxiety by antedating the Dasein itself. It is nothing other than the call of conscience which makes possible this potential openness of wit(h)ness. But the problem of the uncanny call belongs a sense-layer which is deeper than Dasein's thrownness to this world.

For Heidegger it is a contrary movement to disclosure which refers Dasein to the powers that are not belong to it or ontologically and ethically transcendent. In other words dealing with Dasein's existentials in the context of ontological and ethical transcendence is one of the distinctive characteristics of they-world and inauthenticity. This transcendence breaks of the disclosure and veils temporality in ordinary life by pushing the authentic sense-layers into the worlds of they and of commodity. When Heidegger writes about the transcending powers in *Being and Time*, he emphasises this: "So we need not resort to powers with a character other than that of Dasein; indeed, recourse to these is so far from clarifying the uncanniness of the call that instead it annihilates it." (Heidegger 2008, s. 323). As one can see here, by contrast with Berkeley's witness, transcendence blocks the wit(h)ness. In fact, the culture of they, the illusions of transcendence, the fetichism of certainty and the religious major narratives are involved in veiling this uncanniness. This uncanniness provides the witness of the anxiety of conscience and retains Dasein to bind itself any higher authority by making the projective movement of it possible in the time horizon. Authority is contrast to the authenticity of Dasein's life and understanding. I think this point is closely related to the some themes in the agenda of politic philosophy such as autonomy, independence and freedom but autonomy and authenticity is not contrary axis. Autonomy is not independence but a situation which makes the interdependence of beings possible. Since our

problem does not cover the political aspects of Dasein's wit(h)ness, here we will deal with just phenomenological constitutions of with and witness in the the modes of disclosure. From this perspective when Dasein is resorted to the powers transcending its habitat, there would be no room for the wit(h)ness of conscience. For example, if we put Dasein under the order of instrumental reason or translate it as an organ of *tekhne*, we cannot avoid the distances in which the looks of the observer scrutinize everything. In this situation, far from providing a projection in which Dasein tends towards itself, there stays no difference between ready-to hand and Dasein. Then, the ontological difference defended by Heidegger aiming to understand being-in-the world is swallowed up by ontic identity. If there is an uncanniness, it arises from the call itself, when Dasein faces with the witness of conscience it discloses this ontological difference as the time horizon. But uncanniness is not a difference that should be transcended or annihilated, it is a resistance point which prevents Dasein to be reduced and assimilated to ready-to-hand and presence-at-hand. Dasein is not an aggregate of identities but an assemblage of radical differences which break the borders of identity by activating the real content of conscience. This active power is nothing other than the wit(h)ness itself, who calls Dasein on itself when Dasein has already fled from itself.

#### **4. Conscience and Wit(h)ness**

It is remarkable that the witness of conscience has not been thought by way of sight both metaphorically and literally. This is seen both in the ordinary fact of voice of conscience and phenomenology of conscience to which Heidegger approaches in the understanding of the call. Nevertheless ordinary witness, in the sense of bearing testimony to an event and of witness in the court of justice, is knitted with a sense-layer depending upon the sight. But Heidegger's concept of witness is clearly related with "hearing". The projective movement, which tends towards guilty, is performed in *logos*. At this point we can ask that: Given that throughout western philosophy Law is related to the voice and sound, is there any organic connection between this Law and Heideggerrean concept of conscience. The fact is that contrary to Law, Heideggerrean conscience neither gives an order nor commands. It brings nothing with it and carries no content about ordinary life. So what is the act of it? Its act has no aim to make an action ethical. Law belongs to an ontic level and it necessitates identity, whether conscience witnesses an immanent temporality by giving its ear to being. We have to emphasise that wit(h)ness is not a subject because the subject cannot be a witness or witness, it is a being of distance and its relation to world is not "with" but "through". And also Dasein is not a subject-formation for Heidegger. Wit(h)ness cannot be reduced to the subject-object

relationship nor to the knowledge or information. Wit(h)ness arrives no knowledge and it cannot get consistent informations about outer world.

When the they-self is appealed to, it gets called to the Self. But it does not get called to that Self which can become for itself an 'object' on which to pass judgment, nor to that Self which inertly dissects its 'inner life' with fussy curiosity, nor to that Self which one has in mind when one gazes 'analytically' at psychical conditions and what lies behind them. (Heidegger 2008, s. 318).

Conscience is a phenomenon of Dasein, it accompanies and witnesses Dasein's potential of authenticity. These modes of accompaniment and witness are the fundamental basis of wit(h)ness in the sense of both with and witness. In other words, the anchor points of wit(h)ness are accompaniment of possibilities for Dasein (Dasein's being knitted with possibilities and its openness to the world) and witness of Dasein's original self. Conscience is a call from they-self to Dasein's own self but here is no court of justice that will judge the value of this kind of self and its acts. Conscience neither makes an analysis nor judges, it witnesses the possibilities belonging to the uncanniness of Dasein's being. It is the wit(h)ness since it is bunched up to the possibilities which carry an openness into the existence. It is a being of witness and witness at the same time.

## **5. Dasein and Situation**

Even when Dasein gives its ear to the call, it cannot achieve an Absolute which makes Dasein perfect with some connotations in teleology and hierarchy. At this point we should emphasize that Heidegger's understanding of process is radically different than that of Hegel. In Hegelian philosophy process is triggered by the negation and it has a development procedure in which the singular points are transcended by mediation of Geist. It is sure that Hegelian process is an organic one and it proceeds by means of mediation of the immediate onto an upper phase which is occupied by universal Geist. For Heidegger, however, process is neither an advance to the developed nor a linear or spiral development but the nonlinear chains of projections and situations which are disclosed in time by annihilations of distances. Then temporality as a process makes a phenomenon of situation in its every disclosure. Heidegger's concept of situation come into existence in the disclosure process of closure which necessitates Dasein's resoluteness on its potential authenticity:

“The existential attributes of any possible resolute Dasein include the items constitutive for an existential phenomenon which we call a “*Situation*” and which we have hitherto passed over.” (Heidegger 2008, s. 346) If being encounters truth in this disclosure which takes the time itself on its horizon, Dasein’s constituting modes have *situational* composition which is contrary to the *categorical* dichotomies. Only if Dasein understands itself in its different situations it avoids to recourse transcendent powers. Once the disclosure is blocked or closed, uncanniness finalizes and the transcendence structures itself on the core of existence, and then Dasein is referred to the powers other than itself such as the categories of presence. For example choosing the choice is a disclosure like preparing oneself to the existential anxiety and giving ear to the silence; therefore these situational modes provide the connections between sense-layers and temporality. Thus Dasein is covered by time horizon and the ontological difference that haunts it. For Heidegger every moments of these haunting is situation in which the resoluteness of disclosure encounters the uncanniness of Dasein.

## **Conclusion**

For the disclosure of conscience, there is a crucial concept that of guilty, which is a constitutive phenomena of Dasein. Guilty is immanent in the call of conscience. But what is the guilty? Is it an obligation or a judgement? Or else, does Heidegger inherit the very court of conscience in the form of guilty? On the one hand guilty is a kind of indebtedness and on the other it is a phenomenon of guilt itself. In this sense guilty remains in the interpretations of ordinary conscience. But there is another crucial point which connects guilty with existential meaning of I: “Where, however, shall we get our criterion for the primordial existential meaning of the “Guilty!”? From the fact that this “Guilty!” turns up as a predicate for the “I am” (Heidegger 2008, s. 326). How does guilty be the predicate of I? Is this guilty an obligation or task to Other to whom I bear responsibility? Strictly speaking there is no room for an ethics of task or a morality grounded on responsibility in this unorthodox interpretation of existence in the frame of Heidegger’s concept of guilty. This concept of guilty does refer neither to an indebtedness nor a guilt; it covers but goes beyond these inauthentic modes of existence. For example in Kant, task is not an existential or situational concept, it gives me the very principle of morality as a general and abstract sense. However it cannot be an existential of Dasein if it is a being-in-the world since it does not belong to *praxis* but to the transcending powers. Principles suppose an understanding which is always late for the *praxis*,



because they are posited like universal criterias or measures that try to cover all content whether belonging to them or not. On the other hand Heidegger does not bring any morality of responsibility into question. Guilty does not hold myself responsible to Other. Guilty is an ontological predicate and in this aspect it prevents any substantiality that can be attributed thought or self. In this meaning guilty presents the immanence and connects Dasein to the call of conscience instead of the modern thinking I. By guilty Dasein undertakes itself and precedes itself without recouring any power. Finally, it is the wit(h)ness itself that prevents any recouring to transcending powers and keeps the openness to the potentialities to come.

#### KAYNAKÇA

- Critchley, S. & Reiner Schurmann (2008) *On Heidegger's Being and Time*, ed. Steven Levine, London: Routledge.
- Dreyfus, H.L. (1995) *Being-In-The-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time*, London. MIT Press.
- Gorner, P. (2002) *Heidegger's Phenomenology as Transcendental Philosophy*, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 10:1, 17-33.
- Hegel, G. W. F. (1977) *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V.Miller, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Heidegger, M. (1991) *The Concept of Time*, trans. William McNeil, London: Blackwell Publishing.
- Heidegger, M. (1996) *Being and Time*, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany: State University of Newyork Press.
- Heidegger, M. (2002) *Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond*, ed. John van Buren, Albany. State University of New York Press,
- Heidegger, M. (2008) *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquairre and Edward Robinson, New York: Harperperennial.
- Heidegger, M. (2011) *Varlık ve Zaman*, 2. Basım, trans. Kaan H. Ökten, İstanbul: Agora.
- Hoffman, P. (1993) "Death, Time, Historicity: Division Two of *Being and Time*," *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, ed. Charles B. Guignon, Cambridge University Press.

- Kant, I. (1996) *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Werner S. Pluhar, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
- Kockelmans, Joseph J. (1989) *Heidegger's Being and Time: The Analytic of Dasein as Fundamental Ontology*. Washington: University Press of America.
- Nietzsche, F.W. (2009) *On The Genealogy of Morals*, trans. Ian Johnston, Arlington: Richer Resources Publications.
- Roubach, M. (2004) *Meaning, Phenomenology, and Being*, *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*, 47:2, 189-199.
- Schalow F., Alfred Denker (2010) *Historical Dictionary of Heidegger's Philosophy*, Lanham: Screech Press.
- Zahavi, D. (2003) *Husserl's Phenomenology*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.