

TO DECIDE IN UNDECIDABILITY: DERRIDEAN CRITICISM OF SCHMITTEAN POLITICS IN THE MOMENT OF CRISIS

[Karar Verilemezlikte Karar Vermek: Kriz Zamanlarında Schmitt’çi Politikanın
Derrida’cı Eleştirisi]

Efe BAŞTÜRK

Assoc. Prof. Dr., Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Üniversitesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi
Bölümü

efebasturk83@gmail.com

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to make a Derridean criticism of Schmittean conception on politics through the term of *crisis* and *decision*. In Schmitt’s political theory, these two notions are evaluated as foundational concepts of the political since they determine the meaningful being of the politics. According to Schmitt, the political can emerge within a *crisis* through which the constituent *decision* distinguishing the friend from the enemy can be possible. This idea is criticized by Derrida, who argues that politics cannot be reduced to an absolute distinction between friend and enemy. Although Derrida approaches Schmitt by considering the crisis as a foundational manner of the political, he understands the fact of crisis as an “unjustifiable moment”. While Schmitt thinks that the political is only possible through a sovereign decision that establishes the radical distinction between the friend and the enemy, Derrida argues that the political can only be understood as an ethical experience in

which the absolute judgement is postponed until an indefinite moment. Schmitt evaluated the crisis and decision within the possibility of thinking the political within the framework of a defined integrity, whereas Derrida tends to deconstruct the pre-assumptions on the political. So, the notions of crisis and decision are either understood as the opportunity to deconstruct the pre-assumptions about totality and integrity, or they are evaluated as a constitutive action that restores the totality. This article aims to discuss the different forms of the term of *crisis* and *decision* by a careful comparison between Derrida and Schmitt.

Keywords: The Political, deconstruction, difference, friend-enemy, crisis, decision.

Introduction

In today's era of globalization, the basic forms and possibilities of thinking about politics have gone beyond the modern paradigm. In the modern period, while there was an inclusive domination of established identities and judgments, the post-modernity, as a culture and as a historical moment, severely changed the modern paradigm by bringing a new perspective on the society, politics or humanity. In the postmodern period, the general and universal concept of truth has firstly been questioned and negated since the postmodern culture has strongly focused on the exact being of the singularity that cannot be mediated according to the pre-determined norms or judgements. So, in the post-modern period, historical singularities have been considered instead of the pre-determined judgments which encircle the world within the assumption of a totality. The singularity here means the irreducible form of a being; an externality that cannot be judged according to the present norms. The singularity therefore reveals a shift occurring within the present; so, it therefore requires a re-evaluation of the judgement or norms.

The moment, in which the *singularity of the event* can be noticed, may therefore be called a *crisis* which forces us to make a *decision* within the moment of the historical break. So, it does not seem a paradox to remember Schmitt in this post-modern period, since Schmitt put the notion of decision at the center of political philosophy (Zizek, 1999: 18-20; Müller, 2003: 10). However, what should not be overlooked is the absolute difference between Schmitt's decisionism and the post-modern paradigm on *decision* in which the absolute *possibility to decide* is always postponed cause of the being of the singularity. So, what needs to be done to realize today's crisis is to focus on the difference between the pre-determined definitions and foundations of the concept of *the decision* and the current facts and aspects that manage the context of the possibility and capacity *to decide*.

The difference between Schmitt and Derrida is therefore critical: both thinkers approach the political through a notion of a certain decision that only may be valid and necessary in an inevitable moment, that is crisis. For both of them, the political is essentially based on the decision to be held at a moment in which the historical continuity becomes interrupted. Schmitt, for example, returns to the absolute distinction, which is the ontological core of the

politics, to reconstruct the political at such a historical discontinuity. Derrida, on the other side, aims to show that the assumption of historical continuity is essentially an illusion, even a fantasy. What Derrida aims to reveal is, actually, to demonstrate the impossible context of the political which is thought around an identity based on a unity or an integrity. For Derrida, Schmitt overlooked the essential context of the decision, as Schmitt handled the political within a unity fantasy in which any kind of inconsistency or disagreement could be resolved. However, Derrida therefore argues that the sole context of the decision should be understood as the informing of the discontinuity. So, while the concept of the decision is a founding action that will re-establish the political in Schmitt's thought, in Derrida, the decision is a demonstration of the existence of historical discontinuity. A comparative reading between Schmitt and Derrida therefore creates the possibility of a critical discussion on whether the political has an ontological unity or discontinuity. The comparison between Derrida and Schmitt is also important because it reveals a critical distinction in the embodiment of the decision in their philosophies. Derrida, for example, reveals the deconstructive effect of the decision, rather than the reintegrative force of it; but Schmitt, on the other hand, aims to develop an ontology where integrity is restored through the decision and thus the political can regain a full comprehensible meaning. In summary, the context of the decision plays a central role in both Derrida's and Schmitt's thoughts; however, there is a substantial distinction in the functionalization of the decision. This article aims to make a comparison between the two philosophers over their judgments about the concept of decision.

1. Decision Making in Exceptionalities: Schmitt and the Concept of the Political

According to Schmitt, the political has lost its genuine meaning in the liberal societies. This loss is revealed within the overlooking of the existential context of the political (Ulmen, 1996: xi) and in a process in which the political is reduced to the calculable and technical issue as well (Marchart, 2007: 43).

Schmitt was especially interested in the crisis that was created by the modern developments. According to Schmitt, the void created by the disappearance of religion and traditional social structure in the seventeenth century could not be fully filled by modernity (Scheuerman, 1993: 81). Schmitt therefore emphasizes that the modernity gave full attention to the politics

and the state in order to fill this gap. In Schmitt's thought, then, what is expected of the state and politics is the role that was played by religion, or the church literally, in the classical age (Gottfried, 1990: 58-59). At this point, the questions that should be asked are: what was the function of religion in the classical age, and how did the politics take the church's place by performing this function in the modern age? This way of questioning may help us to comprehend Schmitt's thoughts about the political, and the meaning and function he attributes to the politics as well. So, it may be necessary to mention a source, or an essence, which is stated in the ontology of the politics and is connected with religion. So, it might be argued that this is where Schmitt joins politics and theology. However, according to Schmitt's understanding of the political theology, the political has never replaced religion itself (Schmitt, 1985: 51-52). Instead, the political exists by adapting itself to the function of religion. This argument is very important since it points to a paradigm differing from a classical understanding of political theology that means sanctifying the political. Schmitt states that the modernity replacing religion makes its existence visible through the political, which resembles the religious but is wholly secular. So, what needs to be done is to demonstrate how the politics, which is both secular but similar to the religious at the same time, can exist consistently.

This question can be answered by a critical intervention, in Schmitt's point of view. As a secular entity, but one that is also similar to religiousness, the political transcends its contradictory being through the decision making which brings together the irreconcilable elements. In other words, the things that come together and harmonize in the decision-making process are religion and secularism, which are actually incompatible with each other. So, the making decision refers to an extraordinary power that resembles the almighty belonging to a divine power, such as creating a new consistency among the present contradictions. The decision, in this sense, is ontologically formed of the being from nothing. The nothing, here refers to a *chaos* in which neither the consistency nor the meaning can exist. The chaos, as a state of undecidability, is a sign of a moment in which no meaning can be established in any way, and so, everything is left in ambiguity.

The concept of the decision – or, literally, decision making, should therefore be evaluated as an act of saving the being from the ambiguity existing within the nothingness. In Schmitt's

ontology, the concept of the decision does not refer to the *choosing*; rather, it is a kind of prerequisite for making a choice or making any judgment. Schmitt's theory on exception is therefore based on the decision which is the founding act occurring within the ontological level. Schmitt explains this theory with two parameters: on the one hand, there is an exception that is the basis of the current norm, while on the other hand, there is an exception that can suspend the current form of the norm. Schmitt's theory on exception is therefore not about the singular existence of the exception, but its actualization context. Schmitt defines this process as "decision making" and he frames the concept of the decision with a purely political meaning (Schmitt, 1985: 7). The political, as it can be seen in Schmitt's thought, is formed by an ability to establish a foundation that constitutes the prerequisite context of any judgment. As Schmitt notes, the political is an institutional representation of the distinction between the friend and the enemy, which is the condition of possibility of any decision making (Schmitt, 1996a: 26).

The decision expressing the constitutive context of the political implies the beginning of the era of states. According to Schmitt, in the classical European era, the state was able to both establish the principle of the political and create the condition for its continuity, as it was able to provide the absolute distinction between the inner order and the outer (Schmitt, 1996b: 30). The concept of the decision as a distinction between the friend and the enemy, or the very possibility of making this distinction, does not only refer to a judicial context in this sense. For Schmitt, the decision is the main criterion for states to be able to design the existential elements continuously and systematically, such as ensuring their internal order and determining their relations with the outside (Rae, 2016: 129; Feldman, 2010: 143). There is an essential reason why Schmitt sublimed the classical age of the states: for him, the possibility of the existence of norms such as war, peace, law, etc. depends on the fact that the ability for decision making is embedded in the political that actualizes itself as a founding context. The ability and the authority for the decision making belonging to the states is the condition of both evaluating the behavior of the states within the conformity with the normativity and considering the behaviors as the most authentic form of power.

Schmitt's point of view allows us to make the following conclusion: the state itself is not a singular reality; it exists only when it can perform a certain founding action. The relation of

politics with theology can be understood precisely by this argument: for Schmitt, political theology is the searching for the union of authority and power. However, this statement does not refer to the principle of *plenitudo potestatis* which is the argument of the medieval Church power. Schmitt did not affirm this kind of a power since this medieval paradigm was based on a constant power thought. From Schmitt's point of view, it can be argued that this kind of power structure cannot refer to the political since it does not express autonomous action belonging to the power, such as the ability for decision making.

Schmitt's views on the notion of the decision are essentially based on a theological content. However, there is a critical aspect that must be emphasized to understand Schmitt's argument: theology, here, refers to the field of an absolute and infinite might rather than a metaphysical explanation. What Schmitt meant by theology is a form of the almighty that can actualize the concept of the decision placed on the basis of the political. Schmitt especially criticizes the modern era, which he calls the age of de-politization, because of a theological lack within the modernism. What Schmitt sees in the modernism is an absolute neutralization based on the domination of the technique. Neutralization is an expression of the absence of an absolute decision that promises to overcome the current crisis in which no judgment can be possible. Neutralization is therefore an absolute passivity in which the ability for decision making regarding the given situation is invalidated. Schmitt therefore defines the *modernization* as neutralization and de-politization, since both of them neutralize the concept of the decision, which is the condition and possibility of the political.

For Schmitt, neutralization and de-politization can only be overcome through a power having an absolute ability for decision making. This is where Schmitt puts theology into politics: sovereignty, in the words of Schmitt, decides the state of emergency. The term of state of emergency in Schmitt has a dual meaning: firstly, it refers to an absolute crisis that requires a decision making; secondly, it refers to the crisis itself created by a declaration which manifests that the currency cannot be overcome with the usual and regular functioning. Both of them point to an image of a transcendent power that can act in an absolute crisis that is beyond man's power or capability. However, the modern form of the state, namely the rule of law, remains silent about what the qualification or mission of the political should or can be in an extraordinary situation, namely the crisis. The assumption of rule of law is only a

regulatory power which reduces the political to technique. According to Schmitt, the paradox of liberal theory based on the assumption of rule of law is that it misunderstands the ontological origin of the political. Since liberalism reduces the political to the sovereignty of the pre-determined principles, it inevitably designates a form in which the political shall be impotent at the time of the crisis. Thus, the inaccuracy of liberalism lies in its designation of the political within the given situation. However, for Schmitt, the political is an experiencing beyond the limit, since it is the extreme and absolute act that can be put forward in case of invalidity. The political therefore resembles the divine might: just as the divine judgment shall appear at the time of the apocalypse, the political emerges at the time of the secular crisis. So, for Schmitt, the exceptionality is not only the actualization form of the political, but also the possibility of its being.

The political is always understood within a founding function in Schmitt's thought. This argument can be followed in a hypothetical dominance of the distinction between the friend and the enemy. For Schmitt, the distinction between the friend and the enemy offers a conceptual criterion through which any judgement or decision could be possible. This kind of judgement differs from the morality, since the distinction between the friend and the enemy does not consist of permanent or pre-determined components. In other words, it is entirely unclear who the enemy or the friend is; that is, it depends on a contingency in which the components of the distinction are determined by a decision. In moral thought, the frame and criterion of the distinction between good and bad are perfectly constructed; however, in the politics, the distinction that establishes the possibility of the political has not been pre-determined, or, it cannot be independent from the humanity. In other words, the political is an activity that is formed with an aim of establishing or keeping the order related to the secular form of living; so, the political and its possibilities can only be performed within a secular context. This secular context can be understood as the frame of the decision that refers to a performing which ensures the objectives of preserving or establishing an order in the human world.

Schmitt thus shows the concrete form of the distinction between the friend and the enemy, which is the conditional context of the political, in the conceptualization of the *nomos*. The *nomos*, according to Schmitt, refers to the traditions about formation and order of things on a

particular piece of land, a concrete collective life that is legitimated by this traditional culture and the rules that are contained within the collective culture of the living. The nomos, in Schmitt's sense, is a collective subconscious that manages the thought and the behavior. For this reason, the source, the criterion and the principles of any written law (positive law), and the political in a general sense, are determined or framed by the nomos. As Schmitt argues, any positive law that is not based on the nomos is just a heap of meaningless rules. The nomos therefore does not only mean a written law, rather, it is the political embodying the collective will which is the basis of the law.

Schmitt, through the context of the nomos, considers the political itself within an assumption of the totality. Since the nomos is evaluated as the total form of a particular collective entity and its unified will, the inside of the political (land of the friends) is also formulated in the context of a collective totality. The nomos, in this sense, is the preliminary meaning from which the sovereignty can emerge; moreover, the nomos becomes the ontological boundary of the decision that establishes or re-establishes the political order. So, Schmitt considers the concept of the decision not as a constitutive power, but, on the contrary, as an act that must be performed in order to return to the founding principle that determines the origin. The exception, and the decision belonging to the concept of the exception, then, is an applying to return the political to its initial assumption, but not to envisage the political according to the *current* form of the crisis. This point is crucial because this is where Schmitt's argument on the political is criticized by Derrida.

2. Derrida and Deconstruction of the [Schmittian] Political

In Schmitt's thought, the political derives from the most extreme radius of antagonism which is based on the determination of the distinction between the friend and the enemy. From this point of view, it can be argued that demanding to redefine the principles of political life and to open up an investigation of the current institutional and legal process through which the political can be reframed, may be evaluated as Schmittian. However, it can be also recognized that this claim is disproved by Derrida's deconstructive intervention in Schmitt's theory on the political. Although Schmitt's thought on the political refers to a metaphysical context, it can only be actualized through a concrete and an existential indicator. In other words, the

distinction between the friend and the enemy can only be embodied within a figure that can be experienced in a concrete context. The enemy, then, is not a metaphysical externality that exists at the root of the political, but, on the contrary, appears in the immanence that establishes the political. This means that if the enemy implies a threat to the existence (the being occurring under the indicator of “the Friend”), then the enemy must obtain an absolute difference that is irreconcilable with the existence. So, the enemy is not the constituent element of the abstract meaning of the political, but is the absolute externality through which a certain and consistent collective identity can be established. The metaphysical definition of the political therefore requires deconstruction, because the metaphysical origin of the political is based on an assumption in which the identities are assumed as consistent and complete.

This is where the deconstruction becomes a useful and necessary tool for criticizing the metaphysical explanations about the identities, structures or any kind of generalized meaning through which the scope of the social and political fantasies are envisaged. Derrida, one of the leading philosophers of contemporary philosophy, tried to deconstruct the meta-narratives derived from the integrity fantasies. Derrida’s deconstruction therefore has important possibilities, especially for re-evaluating Schmitt’s theory on the political, because Schmitt’s theory is based on metaphysically derived categories, which are the friend and the enemy, but which can only be understandable in a concrete form of existence. So, what Derrida tries to do with deconstructive politics is to reveal the inconsistency and the arbitrariness between the concrete forms and the metaphysical judgments attributed to them.

Derrida begins deconstructive criticism by re-formulating Schmitt’s description of the political. According to Derrida, the reason for the sovereignty crisis today is that states are unable to fully exercise sovereignty, despite the fact that they are still considered as the only legitimate autonomous actors (Derrida, 2005a: 105). According to Derrida, there has been a new era corresponding to an extraordinary period in which absolute differentiation – the friend and the enemy – between the sovereign political forms (namely, the States) becomes impossible (Derrida, 2005b: 144). So, why is the return to Schmitt important? It is because, for Derrida, today’s crisis corresponds to the becoming ambiguity of the political, and therefore it is necessary to remember Schmitt, who criticizes de-politization. In Derrida’s

words, the becoming ambiguity of the political enables its deconstruction (Derrida, 2005b: 104).

According to Derrida, there are two options for encountering this de-politization: the first, re-establishing the political by creating an absolute enemy (as Schmitt did once); second, searching for a new existential figure who resists being absorbed within the concept of a foundation (Derrida, 2005b: 151). Derrida thus reads the relationship between the political and the decision very differently than Schmitt. Unlike Schmitt, Derrida sees the notion of the decision as an attempt to expose the irreducibility of the singularity. It means that the decision corresponds to a historical time when return to the foundation becomes impossible. In fact, this impossibility is due to an inconsistency which is inherent to the sovereignty. In this context, Derrida re-reads Schmitt's definition of sovereignty through a new conceptualization of selfhood (*ipseity*). In Schmitt's thought, the sovereign justifies himself with his decision-making power. Derrida defines this autonomous movement, which comes out of itself and returns to itself, and which is the reason of its own movement and legitimates itself, as the ipseity (Derrida, 2005a: 10). The ipseity is formed with a primordial and a performative narrative that demonstrates the sameness or the identification of the cause and the end. In this narrative form, the political sovereignty is understood as an autonomous movement that does not rely on anything other than itself. Ipseity of the sovereignty, as Schmitt actualized it within the concept of the political, therefore refers to a power that legitimates itself; so, the paradox in the sovereignty is the retrospective of the power. As the sovereignty gains its authority from nothing but itself, then it becomes both legitimate and illegitimate. In other words, since sovereignty has no other reference than itself, there is no need for it to be responsible for anything.

The deconstruction of Schmitt's way of understanding the political is thus important because it shows the reducing of the political to an absolute almighty. Derrida therefore implies the similarity between Schmitt's conceptualization of the political and the divine power. Derrida states that the sovereignty deriving from nothingness is similar to the God who is the absolute power over anything (Derrida, 2005a: 14). Brown therefore claims that the sovereignty is actually deliberation from the deconstruction as it can contain self-sufficiency, center-being, sameness, homogeneity, unity, uniqueness, etc. (Brown, 2009: 114). So, this understanding of

sovereignty, which makes itself legitimate without relying on anything, is nothing but God's holiness that is transformed into the political forms. According to Derrida, sovereignty must be handled as a theological concept as long as it is assumed as unique, the only, absolute and indivisible (Derrida, 2005a: 154). For Derrida, Schmitt therefore had to see the political under the conceptualization of the theological, as the exception, in Schmitt's paradigm, does not refer to the autonomy of decision making, but the actualization of a transcendent and insuperable absolute power (Cassatella, 2015: 15).

For Derrida's thought, it can be assumed that the sovereignty as an absolute authority derives from an onto-theological dream (Derrida, 2002a: 55). What is meant by onto-theology is the creation of the political with a theological assumption of origin. The essence of all existing notions is represented within the idea of "first cause" (prima causa) through onto-theology (Schrijvers, 2011: 6). According to Derrida, the indivisible and absolute fiction of sovereignty is nothing more than an illusion inherited from the image of God - as in "monarch, people, state or nation-state" (Derrida, 2005a: 154). So, Schmitt's idea of sovereignty is an omnipotent power that can "create everything from nothing" and in whom the ability for decision making is established with a reference to the image of God. From Derrida's point of view based on the deconstruction, it can be argued that there is an inconsistency in the idea of sovereignty itself, which is envisaged as self-sufficient and absolute uniqueness. Derrida's use of deconstruction here attempts to reveal that the assumption of the consistency or the completeness implied by the conception (here, Schmitt's formula on sovereignty) does in fact carry a fundamental problem within itself.

This fundamental problem, or the paradox that the concept carries within itself despite being assumed as a consistent and unified structure, is in fact a context where deconstruction can be associated with ethics. Since deconstruction reveals the inconsistency in the concept, it is indicated that the present that is experienced corresponds to a crisis that makes decision making necessary. Here, it can be seen how Derrida differs from Schmitt: unlike Schmitt, Derrida claims that the decision cannot be understood as a return to the inconsistent origin (Derrida, 2009: 74-78). According to Derrida, Schmitt still follows the Platonic dream that has determined the entire Western philosophy. This philosophical tradition, for Derrida, has always recognized the existence as "being-present" (Derrida, 1998: 47). As Derrida mentions,

since Plato, the “metaphysics of presence” has been constructed as a universal truth for anyone, that does not change and is valid for all (Bradley, 2008: 6). As the being always coexists with a fiction mediated with the origin, it is expected to be the same and identical with the fictive assumption that pre-determines the whole temporality in the future (Söderbäck, 2013: 254). So, as it can be noticed in Derrida, when the political constructs itself with a reference to a transcendent understanding of existence within the framework of the *metaphysics of presence*, it becomes a universal, precise, stable and absolute form. The absolute power of sovereignty, which ensures the return to origin in a crisis, becomes an undisputed truth (Sluga, 2014: 127). So, the political, when based on a metaphysical assumption, always produces a *metaphysics of violence*, as it has to comprehend itself as absolute, unique, indivisible and consistent. The metaphysics of violence, as Derrida suggests, occurs in every case, when the being is called within the conceptualization of the center. Since the center refers to an invariable and absolute context, all the notions outside the center are reduced to manageable forms. Derrida therefore claims that the fantasy of unity, or consistency, always establishes itself in the othering and negating of the diversities and differences, because the metaphysics of violence is an assumption based on the sovereignty of the one that naturally tends to expand its sovereignty to the otherness which differs from the center.

The Derridean concept of deconstruction here points to a critical issue: when the being is perceived as an absolute and highest level of normativity, it becomes the sovereign rule that determines the scope of the political. The sovereignty, in this sense, is the supreme form of the metaphysics of violence, because the constant and consistent being can manifest itself only in the sovereignty (Sluga, 2014: 43). Since the political as the visible form of the absolute is an indicator where the fantasy of consistency is embodied, it thus becomes the place where the differences and diversities are exposed to the metaphysics of violence (Marder and Vieira, 2012: xiii). Derrida therefore tries to reopen the ontology of the political because thinking the political on the level of absolutism inevitably produces the metaphysics of violence. He therefore seeks to consider the possibility of re-understanding the political in a new and different context. In this context, Derrida recommends using the word of *différance*¹.

¹ Différance is pronounced in French in the same way as différence. Différance with an ‘a’ is noticeable only in writing (Derrida, 1973: 132). In this case, the ‘a’ in différence refers to something that does not exist.

Différance is based on an assumption that the inconsistency can never fully solve the difference. Différance, in this context, is an indication of an immanent inconsistency in the being as the absoluteness can never be possible for the being. As différance claims that the being is incomprehensible in itself, so it can only be understood with the externality, or the other beings that cannot be interiorized within the absoluteness (Derrida, 1981: 26). Thus, différance indicates the infinite existence of a deferred relationship between the assumption of the origin and the being that exists in the present. In other words, through différance, absoluteness can be noticed as an illusion, since the being can never reach the assumption of the completeness that is attached to the origin (Ormiston, 1988: 47).

So, for Derrida, thinking on the political therefore necessitates thinking on différance, since différance shows the limits of the assumption of the absoluteness that is attached to the political (Derrida, 2005a: 39). The différance is therefore based on the idea that the political should be comprehended in a context which radically differs from the search for an absolute consistency that tends to modulate anything according to its centric being.

At this point, Derrida aims to deconstruct the seeking of the absoluteness in the political by highlighting the ethics of responsibility. To do so, Derrida does not imply that the given limits of policy should be re-questioned; rather, he aims to prove that the radical distinction establishing the political essentially consists of the undecidable notions. This Derridean proposition takes us back to the relation between the crisis and the decision. Derrida once handles the crisis as a *krinein* (Derrida, 1992a: 31) which means a moment that makes it necessary “to decide”. With this statement, Derrida, like Schmitt, tries to express the existence of an irreversible moment in which “to decide” is handled as an imperative command. However, unlike Schmitt, Derrida proposes considering the notion of the decision in a deconstructive context and not at an absolute level. Derrida therefore changes the question of “what to do” (in order to answer the crisis) to create an existence in which the otherness can be invited despite the fact that it contains a radical differentiation from the present. The question of “what to do” thus becomes a critical phrase that aims to deconstruct all sorts of fantasies seeking to re-establish a new absolute. Derridean deconstructive criticism therefore aims to create a space for the singularity that the Schmittean political excludes from the “inside” which refers to the consistency of the identity. For Derrida, the identity implies a

totality in which the singularity is erased. As the identity is thought of as the essence of being, then it becomes the absolute reason that makes the existence eternal. Erasing of the singularity is thus a political matter since the singularity here means the outer form of the being which must be negated.

Thus, deconstruction replaces the fantasy of the completeness with a new political form that prioritizes the irreducible reality of singularity (Derrida, 1992b: 23). Deconstruction therefore implies an ethical task in order to reveal the inconsistency within the political that corresponds to an absolute meaning. The ethical obligation here means an invitation which calls to remove the political from any metaphysical judgment, because the political is an opportunity to publicly determine the formal principles of the coexistence; however, the tendency of evaluating the political in a metaphysical way forces us to negate and exclude any difference or diversity that may disagree with the present situation of the normative order. However, if the political is to explore the possibility of living together, then it must always tend to open itself to the limits of the present that is given. Here, the political function of the decision emerges very differently than that of Schmitt. While Schmitt uses the concept that the decision when returning to the origin is necessary, for Derrida, the decision is a deconstruction that both reveals the inconsistency in the origin, and thus invites the singularity – or the exteriority – to the inside. In other words, in Schmitt, the decision means creating the identity as completeness in order to determine the absolute distinction between the inside and outside. However, in Derrida, the decision means affirming the otherness by blurring the distinction between the inside and outside. As Newman claims, since dualities are always established hierarchically in essentialist identity conceptions, this identity refers not only to a unity that is shared, but to an authoritarian perception of the self that legitimates itself to negate the otherness (Newman, 2005: 85-86). The position of the otherness here is determined by hierarchical supremacy of the present that corresponds to the absolute reality. As the otherness points to an unpredictable contingency, then, it implies something that needs to be modified by the present. In the Schmittian sense, the function of the decision is to determine what needs to be excluded from the “inside” that has been determined by an absolute and consistent identity.

Identity, then, corresponds to a hierarchy where the present is privileged because of its relation with the origin that pre-determines the possibility and scope of any judgment or decision. However, for Derrida, this implies an experience of the impossibility (*aporia*): Derrida stresses that the decision making in the future, or in a time in which to decide becomes necessary, must be impossible, because the decision once made for establishing and determining the essences (such as the friend and the enemy, inside and outside, norm and out-of-norm, etc.) makes it impossible to make a new decision. The decision, by its context, is not to act according to pre-determined guidelines, but rather, the decision is an act that will invalidate all established and pre-determined judgments. For Fritsch, this marks the aporetic context of Schmittian sovereignty (2008: 185): in Schmitt, the sovereign can never actually decide, because the sovereign must follow the determined instructions in order to be able to preserve the absolute form of the being which is established on a distinction between the friend and the enemy. What Fritsch wants to say is that once the identity (of the being) is decided, the identity of the otherness is also inevitably decided; so, all subsequent decisions will be made according to this initial, or original determination. The crisis, also called “exception” in Schmitt, requires a constitutive decision and therefore does not fully denote a break within the determined historical process. Derrida therefore says that the only possibility for the decision making is the condition of the *undecidability*, according to which pre-determined instructions can no longer be followed (Anderson, 2012: 40-41).

For Derrida, the undecidability does not indicate an impossibility in which the decision cannot be possible; on the contrary, the undecidability shows the inevitability that forces us to make a decision (Theau, 2013: 28). However, Derrida marks a critical distinction within the conception of undecidability: undecidability, in this context, is not to choose between two decisions, but rather, it is a demonstration that the criterion of making a reasonable and correct distinction between two forms of decisions cannot be valid. In other words, Derrida here connects the decision making with an ethical mission that does not exclude the otherness which cannot be affirmed within the present (Derrida, 2010a: 72). For Derrida, the possible reason that the political corresponds to the idea of democracy, which seems impossible at the present time or in the near future but yet is expected to come, is that the political always consists of democratic negotiations which question the current limits of the political (Derrida, 2002b: 179-180). The political thus appears as the possibility of a limitless openness

established between the present (zone of norms, procedures, etc.) and the future ideal (zone of ambiguity among the identities), which cannot be pre-determined. This is an indication of an effort to think the political from outside of the determined assumptions and of any metaphysical jurisdiction.

Conclusion: Future of the Political: From the “I” - “Other” Distinction to the Hospitality

In today’s world, there are some special cases that make Schmitt’s description of the political impossible. As Derrida once emphasized, the indicators of today’s crisis correspond to special situations in which the present borders, distinctions and, generally, sovereign perceptions are eroded. Derrida interprets the situation of the political and cultural conflicts that are attached to minorities, immigrants and terrorists in this context (Derrida, 1994: 153). According to Derrida, new sub-national conflicts and problems simultaneously cause cynicism and racism worldwide. In such an international atmosphere, returning to the familiar descriptions of politics should therefore be considered impossible, because binary opposites have been replaced by multiple differences. In the world of multiple differences, it is impossible to determine the exact boundaries and distinctions.

For Derrida, a situation where discrimination-based notions such as distinction and difference cannot be decisive is the possibility for deconstruction to appear. Derrida finds the possibility of deconstructive politics, which is developed as a critique of Schmitt’s description of the political, in the ideal of “coming democracy” and in the “hospitality”, as the concrete form of this ideal. From Derrida’s perspective, hospitality provides an ethical-political response to today’s political crises in the world, because in an era of xenophobia, the identity of “We”, which was once described by Schmitt, tends to become increasingly authoritarian and to exclude what is different. Hospitality, in this context, introduces an ethic through which the otherness would not be viewed as “different”. Hospitality, in other words, is the lack of the subjectivity, identity or space, or the absence of the self-perception which can be seen as “master” based on this ownership. According to Derrida, there is a need for a rootless definition of the political that would invalidate the distinction between “I” (ego) and the “other” in the present when a clear – or Schmittian – distinction cannot be established. Derrida therefore considers hospitality with democracy, which is the possibility of an eternal,

and therefore an unconditional, openness to the otherness (Moazzam-Doulat, 2008: 79). The Derridean term of democracy attached to the conception of hospitality includes an independence from the idea of the “essence” in the Platonian sense (Glendinning, 2016: 195-196). Democracy within hospitality, in this context, is the deconstruction of the – Schmittean – political, because it aims to re-design the political not through creating new limits, hierarchies and distinctions, but through featuring the *différance*.

REFERENCES

- Anderson, N. (2012). *Derrida: Ethics Under Erasure*, London & New York: Continuum
- Bradley, A. (2008). *Derrida's Of Grammatology*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Brown, W. (2009). "Sovereign Hesitations", in *Derrida and the Time of Political*, (ed.) S. Guerlac and P. Cheah, London: Duke University Press, pp. 114-132
- Cassatella, A. (2015). "Jacques Derrida on the Secular as Theologico-Political", *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, Vol. 42 (10), pp. 1-23
- Derrida, J. (1973). *Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs*, (trans. D. B. Allison, & N. Garver), Evanston: Northwestern University Press
- Derrida, J. (1981). *Positions*, (trans. A. Bass), Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Derrida, J. (1992a). *The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe*. (trans. by Pascale Anne Brault and Michael B. Naas). Indianapolis: Indiana University Press
- Derrida, J. (1992b). "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority'", in *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice*. D. Cornell, M. Rosenfeld and D. G. Carlson (ed). New York: Routledge, pp. 3-68
- Derrida, J. (1994). *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International*, (trans. P. Kamuff), New York & London: Routledge
- Derrida, J. (1998). *Of Grammatology*, (trans. G. C. Spivak), Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press
- Derrida, J. (2002a). "Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of 'Religion' at the Limits of Reason Alone", (trans. S. Weber), in *Acts of Religion*, G. Anidjar (ed), New York: Routledge, pp. 40-102
- Derrida, J. (2002b). *Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews, 1971-2001*. (trans. E. Rottenberg), Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Derrida, J. (2005a). *Rogues: Two Essays on Reason*, (trans. P.-A. Braut and M. Naas), California: Stanford University Press.

Derrida, J. (2005b). *Politics of Friendship*. (trans. G. Collins), London: Verso

Derrida, J. (2009). *The Beast and the Sovereign Vol. 1*. (trans. M. Lisse, M.-L. Mallet, G. Michaud, G. Bennington), Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Feldman, L. C. (2010). "The Banality of Emergency: On the Time and Space of 'Political Necessity'", in *Sovereignty, Emergency, Legality*, (ed.) A. Sarat, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 136-165

Fritsch, M. (2008). "Antagonism and Democratic Citizenship: Schmitt, Mouffe, Derrida", *Research in Phenomenology*, (38), pp. 174–197.

Glendinning, S. (2016). "Derrida and the Philosophy of Law and Justice", *Law and Critique*, Vol. 27 (2), 187-203.

Gottfried, P. (1990). *Thinkers of Our Time: Carl Schmitt*, London: The Claridge Press

Marchart, O. (2007). *Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Marder, M., & Vieira, P. (2012), "Utopia: A Political Ontology", in *Existential Utopia: New Perspectives on Utopian Thought*, M. Marder, & P. Vieira (ed), London: Continuum, pp. xi-xv

Moazzam-Doulat, M. (2008). "Future Impossible: Carl Schmitt, Jacques Derrida and the Problem of Political Messianism", *Philosophy Today*, Vol. 52 (1), pp. 73-81.

Müller, J. W. (2003). *A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought*. New Haven: Yale University Press

Newman, S. (2005). *Power and Politics in Poststructuralist Thought: New Theories of the Political*, New York: Routledge.

Ormiston, G. L. (1988). "The Economy of Duplicity", in *Derrida and Différance*, (ed) D. Wood and R. Bernasconi, Evanston: Northwestern University Press pp. 41-49

Rae, G. (2016). *The Problem of Political Foundations in Carl Schmitt and Emmanuel Levinas*, London: Palgrave

Scheuerman, B. (1993). "Modernist Anti-Modernism: Carl Schmitt's Concept of The Political", *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, 19(2), pp. 79–95.

Schmitt, C. (1985). *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, (trans. G. Schwab), Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Schmitt, C. (1996a). *The Concept of the Political*, (trans. G. Schwab), Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Schmitt, C. (1996b). *Roman Catholicism And Political Form*, (trans. G. L. Ulmen), Westport: Greenwood Press

Schrijvers, J. (2011). *Ontotheological Turnings?: The Decentering of the Modern Subject in Recent French Phenomenology*, New York: Suny Press.

Sluga, H. (2014). *Politics and the Search for the Common Good*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Söderbäck, F. (2013). "Being in the Present: Derrida and Irigaray on the Metaphysics of Presence", *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, 27(3), pp. 253-264.

Theau, B. (2013). *Derrida's Deconstruction of the Subject: Writing, Self and Other*, Bern: Peter Lang.

Ulmen, G. L. (1996). "Introduction", in *Roman Catholicism and Political Form*, (trans. G. L. Ulmen), London: Greenwood Press, pp. vii-xxxvi.

Zizek, S. (1999). "Carl Schmitt in the Age of Pos-Politics", in *The Challenge of Carl Schmitt*, C. Mouffe (ed), London: Verso, pp. 18-38