

THINKING WITHIN THE ENCOUNTERS

[Karşılaşmalar İçinden Düşünmek]

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ÖZET

Bu çalışmada, düşünme ile karşılaşmalar arasındaki içkin ilişkinin irdelenmesi amaçlanmaktadır. Karşılaşmalar içinden yaratıcı düşünmenin sahil bir analizini yapabilmek için, antik dönemden modern döneme kadar düşünce tarihi içinden bir güzergah izlenecektir. Bu anlamda, temel amaç olarak, içinde kritik düşünürlerin düşüncelerinin karşılaşarak hep *biraz fazlasını* açığa vurarak ilerlediği düşünsel bir patikanın izi sürülecektir. Buradaki, *biraz fazlası* ifadesi önemlidir. Çünkü o, *biraz fazlası*, kendini hep daha fazla kritik ve üretici karşılaşmalar içinden devam ettirmek isteyen yaratıcı düşünmenin edimsel gücüyle ilgilidir. Bunu açığa çıkarmak adına, trajik diyaloglarda köklenen ve devam ederek Deleuze düşüncesine ve belki de ötesine uzanan eleştirel düşünmenin bir yolu takip edilecektir. Bu yönüyle, iki trajik yazar olan Sophocles ve Euripides' in düşüncesinden, Nietzsche, Heidegger ve Deleuze düşüncesine kadar kritik düşünürler arasında gerçekleşen her bir kritik karşılaşmanın, yaratıcı düşünmenin edimsel gücü olarak kendini hep yeniden açığa vurduğu iddia edilecektir. Bu iddia ortaya konulurken, öznellik temelli ve akılcı bir ekseninde hareket eden ve yaratıcı düşünmenin gücünü zayıflatan geleneksel düşünce, Platon düşüncesi merkeze alınarak eleştirilecektir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Karşılaşma, yaratıcı düşünme, trajik, diyalog, kritik düşünür.

ABSTRACT

In this work, my attempt is to uncover the inherent connection between the thinking and encounters. In order to diagnosis a genuine path of creative thinking within the critical encounters, I will

navigate across the landscape of the history of philosophy from Ancient times to the Modern times. In doing so, my primary purpose will be to follow the inherently interrelated encounters, and to claim that in such encounters not only the thinking of the critical thinkers encounters with each other; but also is some more offered in order to keep the link working in between. Here is the '*some more*' is significant, since it is related to the impetus of the creative thinking wishing to sustain itself within the more critical and productive encounters. In order to reveal this, I will pursue a line of the creative thinking rooting in the tragic dialogues and proceeding until reaching the thinking of Deleuze and perhaps beyond. In this respect, from the thinking of the two tragic authors, Sophocles and Euripides, to the thinking of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Deleuze, it will be claimed that each critical encounter occurring between the creative thinkers reopens from within itself as the inducement of the creative thinking. In progressing such a claim, the traditional thought decreasing the power of the creative thinking will be criticized by means of focusing on Plato's thought.

Keywords: Encounter, creative thinking, tragic, dialogue, critical thinker.

1. TRAGEDIES AND THE HORIZON OF ENCOUNTERS

1.1. Introduction

This paper is an attempt to explore the inherent relationship between the thinking and encounters. In order to diagnosis a genuine path of creative thinking within the critical encounters, I will navigate across the landscape of the history of philosophy from Ancient times to the Modern times. In doing so, my primary purpose will be to follow the inherently interrelated encounters, and to claim that in such encounters not only the thinking of the critical thinkers encounters with each other; but also is *some more* offered in order to keep the link working in between. Here is the '*some more*' is significant, since it is related to the impetus of the creative thinking wishing to sustain itself within the more critical and productive encounters. In this respect, on the excessive horizon of each critical encounter hovers the multitudes of the dead-living images of the unsatisfied theories wishing to reside within their new inherent connections in the new genuine arrangement of things. Each critical encounter is thus revolutionary in itself, since each one not only alludes to something new but also must satisfy the lack of the previous theories inherently interrelated.

I will firstly begin by an analysis of the traits of the encounters within the Ancient tragedies. In order to do this, I will focus on some selective passages from the relevant works of both Euripides and Sophocles. In both authors, we are immediately drawn into such a scene in which the intertwined tragic questions are posed between thought, life and truth. However, they differ in some certain ways, i.e., in their views regarding Gods and conventional beliefs. Whilst Sophocles reveres Gods and suggests that we should redeem and exalt suffering caused from our violations against cosmic order, Euripides, with his unsatisfied spirit, is the one who is questioning and criticizing the established beliefs bravely. Besides, in the works of both authors, the tragic hue sustains itself within its own core creative-ethical temptation in terms of the changeable conditions arising from within new critical encounters in life.

Secondly, my endeavour will be to discuss the characteristics of Socratic dialogues in its assessment with the tragic dialogues under the title of *The Nature of the Socratic Dialogues*. In the assessment, it will be basically claimed that the tragic authors; Euripides and Sophocles, are much more on the side of life than Plato. Thirdly, I will thus undertake the inherent correlation between Nietzsche and the tragic authors in its opposition to Plato's *Theory of Forms*, or to the *Two World Theory* by means of revealing how the relationship between Nietzsche's thinking and the thinking of the tragic authors is on the side of life.

Fourthly, by being aware of the excessive horizon between each critical encounter, I will try to pursue the line of creative thinking in terms of thinking with Heidegger. By taking human being as *Dasein* instead of the modern subjective substantiality, Heidegger tries to reveal that our essential mode of being in the world is 'being in' but not knowing the world in a theoretical manner. Heidegger thus attempts to nullify all the dualities in proposing *Dasein* as the possibility of the ontological unity of human being and the world. Heidegger is the thinker of thinking within the world.

Finally, my purpose will be to elaborate the possibility of thinking within becoming-encounter by means of focusing on some relevant passages from Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition* as well as some of the related works. The following passage is actually the source of the inspiration for this work:

Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter. What is encountered may be Socrates, a temple or a demon. It may be grasped in a range of affective tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering. In whichever tone, its primary characteristic is that it can only be sensed. In this sense it is opposed to recognition (Deleuze, 1994, p. 139).

First of all, each fundamental encounter harbours a horizon in which various *countertones* come to interrelate in terms of releasing the utmost potentiality of the encounter. For instance, in tragic encounters everything is displaced and moved towards a new and more genuine order of things, and the direction of the dialogue is essentially circumscribed to the unresolved conditions of the characters. Nevertheless, the core theme is about the human condition, about the humanity rather than about individuals. The state of humanity is oscillated between appearance and reality, contempt and respect, pride and humility through which individuals are constantly drawn to be. The relationship between gods and human beings is shaped according to the fundamental question directing the laws and rules in society without offering any clear answer. This is motivated by the subtle line between reality and appearance through which the true nature of things cannot be truly judged, and gives an extraordinary tone colouring the theme of the plot within the tragic dialogues. Indeed, this might be related to the intertwined of various contingencies as the fabric of the most unpredictable content of a tragic encounter. In this respect, when Deleuze puts forward that the primary characteristic of an object of encounter ‘can only be sensed’, he might mean that only such an ‘object’ can manage to keep arousing our ways of questioning in terms of forcing us to pose the more genuine questions. Thus, the horizon of encounters within its genuine link to the property of questioning allows us to be able to experience the intensities and multiplicities through the concrete movement of life. This generates more creative thinking by means of affecting thought from within thought.

In this respect, by drawing upon Deleuzian understanding of encounter, I will attempt to articulate that the horizon of the tragic dialogues is far from the ‘recognition’ but much more close to the ‘range of affective tones’. Thus, it will be claimed and revealed that the horizon of the tragic dialogues shaped within the ‘range of affective tones’ is essentially in a prolific connection with Nietzsche’s bodily thinking, however, in a certain opposition to the Platonic way of questioning residing at the heart of his dialogues. In Platonic dialogues, what comes to speak within the Socratic voice through an analytic investigation is eventually the voice of the *idea*, form. In this respect, whereas within the Platonic dialogues the horizon of the encounters is relegated to the sphere of

reason and recognition, in the tragic encounters, the horizon of dialogues is pregnant with the rich and affective tones of life without being reduced to the modes of understanding. Thus, the main fabric of the ancient dialogues is related how they manage to keep remaining within the property of questions arising from the core of life rather from some abstract presumptions looking externally at the world. That is why, one of my attempts will be to clarify how Nietzsche defences life against Plato's dualistic view of the world by referring to the significance of art in grasping life.

In his short but effective passage quoted above, Deleuze urges us to think creatively within the encounters without relegating 'the affective tones' of the encounters to the recognition or understanding. He alludes to something arising within the encounters which cannot be captured by means of the conceptual understanding. That is why, the values assigned to human reason and subjectivity can be utmost satirized by means of the thinking arising from encounters either from within the world or from within the physiological basis. In this sense, the creative thinking harbours genuine possibilities within new encounters insofar as it pursues its own path flowing towards becoming-encounter in which the genesis of thinking is fruitfully not only explored but also redistributed. Thinking coming to happen within the encounters provide a distinctive performativity within which we are able to act and reflect upon ourselves; to make ourselves strong enough to be attuned to the flux of life and to be creative. In order to manage to think within the encounters, we must release ourselves to connect to our modes of dwelling of being within the world, or we must exercise bodily thinking by taking up all the values of life without judging them. This is the most effective way so as to de-reify and de-substantialize what subjective judgements and reason reified and substantialized.

In what follows, my primary intention will be to reveal how the impetus of the creative thinking keeps bearing itself through the critical encounters harbouring the 'range of affective tones'. In order to reveal this, I will pursue a line of the creative thinking rooted in the tragic dialogues and reaching the thinking of Deleuze and perhaps beyond. In this sense, it will be articulated that Nietzsche's bodily thinking in its inherent link with the appealing encounters in the tragedies carries out a certain opposition to the Socratic dialogues. By referring to the link between the tragedies and Nietzsche's bodily thinking, it will be taken up that the genuine horizon of encounters must be sustained within the bodily thinking. Since, Nietzsche is the one reviving the intuitive content of thinking underlying the tragic dialogues by means of emphasizing on bodily thinking within its indissoluble movement in life. Thus, I will firstly draw on Nietzsche's critique of Platonic reason

blaming the power of body and initiated the death of the tragic age. Moreover, Platonic metaphysics initiates the nihilism in which life is profoundly denied, and the meaning, the true value of ‘this’ world are carried to a realm beyond ‘this’ world.

In this respect, in terms of de-substantializing the subjective substantiality, as one of the partial purpose of this work, it will be claimed that the creative line of thinking can be utmost explored by means of the critical encounters of *Dasein*’s being within the world as Heidegger says; of the bodily thinking as Nietzsche claims; of the depersonalization, of being opened to the multiplicities and to the intensities, and to the radical encounters within the world as Deleuze articulates. Thus, the common theme of all these creative thinkers is to let thinking be, is to release it from within itself. Within the immanent itinerary of creative thinking derived from such creative thinkers, thinking is profoundly linked to its tragic roots free from the substantial thought of the philosophers such as Plato, Descartes and Kant. Whereas, in the former line of thinking the world is undertaken to be understood from within the movement of the critical encounters of being in the world, in the latter line of thought the world is treated as if it has already known by us within the subjective limits, especially as it is shown in terms of the Kantian subject. Since, in Kant, we are supposed to know the world merely as we construct it, according to our ways of knowing it in terms of some a priori, universal, and necessary laws of reason related to each other within the correlation between sensibility, imagination and understanding.

1.2. The Basic Traits of the Encounters in the Ancient Tragedies

Once there was chaos. We can see the hints of this within the Greek Tragedies. For instance, in the plays of Euripides and Sophocles. In the tragic plays of both authors, it is improbable not to see the dramatic encounters in which the traces of their culture are portrayed. They were relative and pantheists. Their culture was full of paradoxes. Thus, the fundamentals of their culture are derived from chaotic circumstances. In tragedies, not only the fate and the relationship of human beings with Gods are questioned but also their positions in the universe, their connections to the powers which rule their life. The core theme of these tragedies is thus fulfilled with human beings’ encounters with the external powers which arise to rule their life, and the activities human beings take within such encounters. Nevertheless, the relative harmony in society through which everybody’s fate is interrelated harbours the dangers as well lurking everywhere. Moreover, we see no judgment in tragedies, they are inherently composed out of life as whatever life is within its own movement and encounters. Usually, each tragedy, in its own style, captures the experience of

ordinary people caught in extraordinary circumstances. Thus the characters are identified as irremediably tragic. They are always unprepared for the change coming like a thunderbolt. The kings, warriors, mothers, wives, sisters and daughters all are captured by an immediate disease and the tremendous abundance is immediately replaced with scarcity. Accordingly, the characters in tragedies anytime might confront inevitable concrete problems arising from within life such as contempt, insecurity, poverty, death, and of course the recurrent theme, exile. However, they always have to bear through all this as Oedipus says:

OEDIPUS [now speaking]

You that live in my ancestral Thebes, behold this Oedipus, him who knew the famous riddles and who was a man greatest. It was I alone put down the murdering power of the Sphinx. Now it's I who go dishonoured in sad exile from the land. Yet why do I lament these things and mourn for them in vain? The constraint the gods lay on us we mortals all must bear (The Complete Greek Tragedies, Euripides IV, 2012, p.275).

In Sophocles, the same theme recurs:

OEDIPUS

Speak before all; the burden that I bear

Is more for these my subjects than myself (Sophocles, 1912, p.5).

...

Dark, dark! The horror of darkness, like a shroud,

Wraps me and bears me on through mist and cloud.

Ah me, ah me! What spasms athwart me shoot,

What pangs of agonizing memory? (Sophocles, 1912, p.49).

Furthermore, at the heart of the tragic dialogues, the voices of various characters are disseminated within the consistent themes recurring as the bewilderment, loss, regret, anger, blame, disappointment, violence, and endemic diseases. This essential axis of the tragic dialogues can be also observed within the concrete conditions in Sophocles' *Antigone*, *Oedipus The King*. In this

Sophocles' dialogue, we witness that the characters seek the revelations through their terrible fate, pursue their boon and happiness by means of facing the horrors awaiting them:

CHORUS

Best of daughters, worthy pair,
What heaven brings ye needs must bear,
Fret no more 'gainst Heaven's will;
Fate hath dealt with you not ill.

ANTIGONE

Love can turn past pain to bliss,
What seemed bitter now is sweet.
Ah me! that happy toil is sweet.
The guidance of those dear blind feet.
Dear father, wrapt for aye in nether gloom,
E'en in the tomb
Never shalt thou lack of love repine,
Her love and mine (Sophocles, 1912, p.116).

Unless we manage to learn how to get through all the tones of life in terms of questions, we will never manage to see that the question of truth is essentially conditioned by life within its urgent moral temptation as it is tragically revealed in *Oedipus* case. Since each encounter and character in tragedies carries its own unique ethical temptation not only in order to get rid of the bad circumstances but also in order to essentially confront and take the lesson out of it for the sake of the life. This keeps characters in a distractive-temptation turning them into self-critical human beings in their life. In this respect, the traits of tragic dialogues are basically shaped within the critical encounters in which characters are basically expected to stand by their responsibilities imposed upon them by their tragic destiny but not free from their relationships with Gods. Moreover, within these critical encounters we are able to uncover some genuine hints of how they grasp the link between life and the truth. Truth is to be enthusiastic for life, to both confirm and affirm life: The life and truth are already inherently linked; they need each other. Only whatever thrusts life per se is the truth. This means that truth can arise out of the various tones of life but never out of the blind humiliation and conceptual rhetoric as Socrates does in his dialogues.

Therefore, the object of the encounters within ancient tragedies runs on a much richer horizon of encounters contrary to the object of the Socratic dialogues. Whereas the content of encounters in Socratic dialogues is shaped within an analytical enquiry, in ancient tragedies the element of encounters is sustained within an intuitive thinking arising from the sense of life. In contrast to the Platonic characters, the characters in tragedies are already immersed within the life in terms of their tragic destinies. Whereas Platonic characters act within a conceptual frame in which they judge and confine life within the conceptual frames in alluding to the supreme world of forms, the tragic characters are always ready to confirm life within all of its sufferings. Thus, in Platonic dialogues, Socrates is the one reducing the genuine horizon of encounters to the axis of reason in his speech ceremonies and weakens the power of the intuitive thinking. Interlocutors of Socrates are desperately ensnared within the network of his ironic and satirist language. Since, “the ironist is a vampire who has sucked the blood out of her lover and fanned him with coolness, lulled him to sleep and tormented him with turbulent dreams” (Kierkegaard, 1966, p.86).

However, in the tragic dialogues, theme itself echoes from within the fruitful encounters in life, and characters do not judge life but inherently intuitively live their life. Encounters reopen the ground of revelations in which intuitive thinking flourishes. In each encounter what is at stake is always our intuitive grasp rather than the conceptual thinking, and conceptual thinking can arise from the intuitive thinking but not vice versa. In this sense, encounters provoke us to think more creatively. That is why, Deleuze refers to the itinerary of creative thinking from within the range of affective tones, i.e., wonder, love, hatred, suffering, etc. The primary characteristic of tragic dialogues is coloured with all the tones of life that can only be sensed. This is not only what we can see at the core of the tragedies, but also what Socrates reduces and even corrupts within his conceptual language.

1.3. The Nature of the Socratic Dialogues

In Athena, there was an economy of values predetermined within the structure of society itself to which everybody gives credit in order to be appreciated. Thus, to some extent, the limits of social

values limit the horizon of the encounters within the society. Socrates is a very famous figure for his speech ceremonies with his interlocutors in Ancient Greek. He tries to enlighten the underlying rules of the values of his culture. He always seeks the ground on which all beliefs and opinions of his interlocutors are dependent in his every act of speech. However, while speaking to his interlocutors Socrates cannot see the ground for their beliefs and opinions, i.e., *doxa*. For him, “belief is a different state of mind than knowledge (or ignorance) and has a different field of objects” (Plato, 1937, p. 477d). For Socrates, the ground is reason, but beliefs and opinions come out of instincts and common senses. We cannot draw theories from the beliefs and opinions, since *doxa* is deprived of reason, it has actually no ground to be depended on in order to deduce assumptions for theories. On the contrary, for Socrates, reason is the ground, gives the foundations to our thoughts.

In this respect, in the dialogs, Plato always applies to the distinction between *doxa* and reason: ungrounded and grounded. This is the basic trajectory of Platonic thought. The movement of thought from intuitive to abstraction is mediated by means of reason. Thus, Plato considers *doxa* as being a belief which is unrelated to reason, as the superficial meditations of conventions. However, when the reason is taken to be the ground for the derivation of theories concerning life, the way is opened to dry the rich horizon of encounters taking place within the movements of life. Socrates is thus a mood killer. His attitude is ultimately discomfort and it is not for the sake of the goodness of life, but for the sake of imposing his ideas upon his interlocutors. He does this ironically though. He is always ready to seduce somehow whoever he encounters. He is already immersed within his presuppositions by searching the essence of his ideas. In this sense, in Platonic encounters, we must see how a disturbing dimension always comes to enter into the stage in the certain moment of the dialogues. This dimension comes from the realm of forms and navigates all the hidden substance of each character and shakes them up until make them feel guilty and finally makes each interlocutor feel how they are lack of using their own reason well enough. Even though, sometimes Socrates makes his interlocutors feel good and noble, nevertheless, ultimately, whole Socratic praise of his interlocutors is for opening the way to instil his doctrine, the doctrine of forms.

That is why, for Deleuze “it was Plato who discovered, but also restricted, the true nature of philosophy as spiritual ordeal. Socrates leads his interlocutors into the dizzying perplexity of a seemingly interminable dialectic” (Ramey, 2012, p.113). Thus, what we see in Socrates’s case is

the failure of the written word to describe, explain, or cope with the disasters that happened to ordinary people as it has explicitly shown in the ancient tragedies. Socrates pushes his interlocutors in the middle of a dilemma, and depreciates, weakens people's moods. Even I will claim that the Socratic method based on the frame of reason is ultimately driven by both a kind of sarcastic investigation, and a cynical theory of annoyance. Thus, "...it is also Socrates' discourses that are very like those images of Silenus which open up. If you let yourself listen to them they all seem utterly ridiculous at first hearing, because he wraps everything up in words and phrases which are indeed like the hide of some rude satyr" (Plato, 2008, p.221e). Moreover, in each encounter, Socrates is mainly both ironic, and satirist; and he talks neither explicitly nor implicitly. The axis of his dialogues thus always runs the risk of corrupting the true essence of the encounters and confining them into a sort of impasse. Socrates has embodied his attitude through a certain outlook on life, or more precisely an outlook on the way in which the affairs of his interlocutors; either political, personal, or moral, are implicitly expected to be rearranged according to his expectations ultimately bounded to the realm of ideas or forms. For instance, as it is revealed in the *Symposium*:

This, gentlemen, is what I have to say in praise of Socrates, but in order not to exclude his faults I have also told you how he insulted me. And I am not the only one he has treated like this. Charmides, son of Glaucon, and Euthydemus, son of Diocles have suffered similarly, and so have many others. They have been deceived into thinking that he was their lover, but then have found that they were in love with him instead. So what I say to you, Agathon, is: don't you too be deceived by this man and like the fool in the proverb have to learn by your own bitter experience. Learn from us and beware (ibid, pp.62-1).

As it is explicated in the last verse of the above passage, in order to learn and understand things we have to firstly undergo through our experiences. Thus, the key way of nullifying the Socratic presumptions concerning both his interlocutors and various subjects in life, is to keep experiencing and living life from within the concrete movements of life. Moreover, if one has an ontology of ideas or forms that prioritises the reason over the multiplication of senses, experiences and life, then it means that one is already committed to the abstractive thinking. In other words, in prioritising the conceptual abstraction, order or identity over the differences residing at the heart of life then one is already confined herself/himself within the schema of reason. However, considering from Deleuzuan perspective, tragic encounters harbour more creativity by staying within the antagonistic

forces of life. In this respect, what I have tried to do so far is to reveal how the axis of tragic dialogues is close to Nietzsche's view of bodily thinking but is far away from the Socratic dialogues. In such dialogues, thinking and life are undertaken to be understood through a conceptual frame based on the theory of forms. As we will see in the following pages, Nietzsche's essential attempt against such a metaphysical, dualist way of thinking, is the revaluation of all values. Nietzsche, with his attempt of the revaluation of all values, I suppose, carries out a very significant passage of the creative thinking opening up to new ways of thinking and to new thinkers.

2. NIETZSCHE AND THE BODILY THINKING

2.1. The Critique of the Traditional Metaphysics

The history of traditional philosophy can be seen at the same time as the history of the repression of the body and its instincts; and thus it can be seen as the loss of any sense of depth or as the loss of any significance to life as well. To understand Nietzsche's attempt of overturning Platonism, one therefore must firstly understand the perspective from which the traditional metaphysics understands life. The traditional metaphysics subsumes the multiplicity of life under the horizon of reason. In other words, life is relegated to the trajectory of reason. On the one hand, Plato privileges reason to reach 'truth', and as a transcendent philosopher, he denies and negates life by carrying it to an "Apart, Beyond, Outside, Above" (Nietzsche, 2008, p.5) the world; on the other hand, according to Cartesian dualism, mind and body are two distinct substances i.e., *res extensa* and; *res cogitans*. However, for Nietzsche not only 'truth' is a just delusion, and a deception that human beings create in order to survive but also both the mind-body dualism and the gap in thought are never acceptable. There is no division in thought, it is in a constant unity and flux, and neither Cartesian dualism nor can Platonic reason capture the flux of thought. Beyond Cartesian dualism, Nietzsche thinks that there is an underlying physiological unity in which thinking opens itself to the possible transfigurations within new encounters.

For Nietzsche, beyond "the highest value judgments that have hitherto guided the history of thought" (ibid, p.5), philosophy "has been no more than an interpretation of the body and a *misunderstandings of the body*" (ibid, p.5). Nietzsche maintains that all the metaphysical questions related to the value of existence must be seen as the symptoms of certain bodies; its success or failure on the one hand. (ibid, p.5). The whole metaphysical schema is, on the other hand,

inadequate to uncover the role of the bodily forces in thinking, for the metaphysical schema confines the movement of thinking into premises and conclusions. Life is, however, a phenomenon which is always already beyond the conceptual schema of metaphysics. In this sense, what is the problem with metaphysics? The problem is this: Metaphysics involves a division in Being and attribution of values to these two realms of Being. Plato's 'two-world' view implies that all true Being, reality and truth lie in another world. They are not here in 'this' world with us and are not in 'this' life. Accordingly, Plato's ontology of human being involves a dualism of body and mind as well. Our senses, i.e., our bodies, are not legitimate sources of knowledge. On this account, the senses are illusory, deceptive and untrustworthy which comes to mean that our bodily being, our lives are not real either. Our feelings, emotions and bodies are irrelevant in the search for truth, according to the western metaphysical thought. Truth lies in the domain of the mind.

In Plato's philosophy true being is timeless, there is no change in it. This is also the religious understanding of the 'beyond' as a place or time without time, change and becoming. This view of time is related to our feelings in the face of the disintegration of our bodies. It is such a comforting thought anticipating to surmount our fear of death. Plato undertakes the body as the tomb/grave of the soul. According to his view, the soul was free, whole and complete before it inserted into the body and will be so after it has left it. In the interval that is called life, the soul is supposed as to be buried in the body. The philosophical tradition ignored that fact and assumed us as to be physical beings. Nietzsche undertakes this as the hallmark of the metaphysical thinking. Such ideas are anticipated to get rid of the pain and suffering of human being. But for Nietzsche, pain and suffering are the main part of life and must be celebrated just as life is to be celebrated, i.e., as the ancient Greek (*Homeric*) way of life. Thus, in order to nullify this nihilistic attitude of metaphysics, the first step Nietzsche takes is the trans/revaluation of all values. Deleuze undertakes that Nietzschean transvaluation radicalizes the critique itself.

2.2.The Overcoming of Platonism

As I touched upon above, in his critique of Platonism, Nietzsche rejects the 'Two World Theory', since this distinction is the first essential example of a metaphysical structure. With this distinction, Plato takes all meaning from 'this' world and places it in another, in an ideal world. The ideal world is the world of true being and meaning absolutely rests in that world. 'This' world, however, is not real and only contains the imitations and the copies of true Being. In other words, according to

Plato's theory of the forms, forms reside in another, 'higher' realm and they are thought to be the origins of phenomena. Whereas the world of forms or ideas is eternal and free from becoming, 'this' world is the world in flux, is full of pains and as such it has no eternal existence. However, the division between 'this' world and the ideal world overshadows the true value of life. Metaphysical dualism privileges the role of reason while depreciating the significance of the body and the instincts. Whereas artistic creation and the bodily experience of the world are placed at the lowest level of reality, reason is assigned a superior status in understanding of 'truth'. What is worthy of being understood can only be reached by means of reason. Thus, reason is portrayed as being 'higher' than the instincts, art and artistic creation.

As Plato articulates in *Timaeus* "knowledge is not located in immediate experience but in reasoning about it which makes it possible to grasp being and truth" (Plato, 1997, p.186e). On the contrary, what Nietzsche tries to do is to reveal how physiology is the genuine basis of thinking in attempting to explicate the world even though the aesthetic or the bodily experience of life is registered as the weakest and poorest relationship in understanding the world. In this sense, Platonic metaphysics initiates the nihilism in which life is profoundly denied, and the meaning, the true value of 'this' world are carried to a realm beyond 'this' world. In this respect, in order to understand what it means to look at anything from the perspective of life, it is significant to understand how Nietzsche undermines the dualistic perspective of metaphysics which finds its highest expression in Platonism.

First of all, Nietzsche calls the division in being as the first manifestation of nihilism. In the history of the Western metaphysical tradition, Nietzsche perceives a hatred of life. Metaphysics is life-denying. Furthermore, Nietzsche identifies the division in being as a metaphysical operator, since he explicates that insofar as there is a division in being, values are attributed to each realm and thus hierarchy arises. In this sense, if metaphysics is understood in this way, it cannot be overcome by opposing it, for opposing metaphysics by attributing negative value to it reproduces the metaphysical schema again and again. Staying in such a way of thinking still operates in the relations to metaphysics. That is why, Nietzsche attempts to disrupt the metaphysical schema from within, without opposing it. One example of such demystification may be found in *Twilight of the Idols*. Nietzsche asserts that the so-called 'higher' values always grow out of the 'lower' values. The distribution of value among 'higher' and 'lower' values is only symbolic and there is no

intrinsic hierarchy in the first place but only difference. It is therefore significant to reveal that de-hierarchizing and immanentizing are the patterns of Nietzsche's thought in his essential attempt of overturning Platonism.

For Nietzsche, in fact, there is only one world. Nietzsche is, therefore, interested in the Pre-Socratics, in their tragic dialogues since they regard all Being as one, without any ontological divisions. Nietzsche's ultimate goal is to get rid of all sorts of 'two-world' thinking or theories. Platonic metaphysical structure attributes all meaning to reason to the highest mathematics. In its inherent relation to mathematics, science, as a new source of authority, is thought to be above life. However, for Nietzsche insofar as we believe in science, we still adhere to a metaphysical structure. Nietzsche thinks that such a way of thinking is life-denying or, in other words, nihilistic. Nietzsche's practice of the complete affirmation of life is his ultimate response to metaphysics. He responds the traditional metaphysics from the perspective of life. Nietzsche's purpose is to reveal the proper ways of affirming life in order to annul the assumptions of the metaphysical thought by applying to the physiological basis of thinking. For Nietzsche, art is more truthful than conceptual thought in order to connect to the values of life. Art liberates thought from the frame of the concepts. Therefore, the physiological thinking and art are inherently interrelated in explaining the values of life. Beyond the traditional concepts of metaphysics, and morality; the 'rule of art' and the physiological forces reveal us the true value of existence and life. Nietzsche diagnoses the ill-grounded thought of the metaphysics by revealing how the perspective of life is superior to all the metaphysical structures that attempt to understand the reality of life.

2.3. Bodily Thinking and the Rule of Art against the Morality

At the beginning of the Preface to "*The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner*" (Nietzsche, 1967, Hereafter, BoT). Nietzsche's intention is to reveal that the value of life is superior to the metaphysical dualism, for the perspective of life is to say 'yes' to life, to confirm life itself with everything it implies. Thus, he seeks to uncover the connection between pessimism and the value of existence. In ancient Greece, tragedy is the art form of affirmative pessimism, and the pessimism of strength is a suffering from the fullness, overflowing and well-being health of existence: "Is there a pessimism of strength? An intellectual predilection for the hard, gruesome, evil, problematic aspect

of existence, prompted by the *fullness* of existence?” (BoT, p.17). On the contrary, the value of existence in Platonism is based on the pessimism of weakness, and thus the question regarding the value of existence raised. This is related to the division in being, since Platonism and Christianity begin from the supposition of deficiency and lack in existence. Therefore, the idea of suffering from abundance is completely different from what Platonism and Christianity portray. In Platonism and Christianity, this idea of deficiency is essentially related to the view that everything in ‘this’ world is deficient and nothing has true being. Metaphysics denies meaning in ‘this’ world, and thus it is life-denying.

However, in ancient Greek culture, within their tragic dialogues, the perception of life operates within various echoes of myths from the “synthesis of god and a goat in the satyr” (BoT, p.21) to “the Dionysian enthusiast and primeval man as a satyr” (BoT, p.21). Nevertheless, what was the underlying experience that constituted the Greeks’ perception of life? According to Nietzsche, in the ancient Greece, the body flourished, the soul was highly excited with life, and both visions and hallucinations were mostly shared in culture (BoT, p.21). Nevertheless, Nietzsche maintains that there would be an enemy of this style of life: “The Socratic morality, the dialectics, frugality and cheerfulness of the theoretical man” (BoT, p.18). Socrates came on the stage as the anti-tragic figure of the time, and thus became the symbol of “decline, of weariness, of infection, of the anarchical dissolution of the instincts” (BoT, p.18). The “big question mark concerning the value of existence had thus been raised” (BoT, p.17). Nietzsche, therefore, expounds that the Greeks in times of weakness and dissolution became not only more optimistic, superficial, and hypocritical, but began to have a lust for logic and the rational understanding of the world, as well as to be more scientific (BoT, p.21). Does this “triumph of optimism” (BoT, p.21) bring with it the theoretical conformism, and does it turn to be one of “the symptoms of decline of strength, of physiological weariness?” (BoT, p.22). Thus, Nietzsche ultimately reaches a critical question: “What, seen in the perspective of life, is the significance of morality?” (BoT, p.22).

Nietzsche privileges art, since art harbours a significant potentiality in affirming life, and art is “the essential metaphysical human activity, and the existence of the world is justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon” (BoT, p.22). Once life is essentially justified by means of the aesthetic or artistic creation, the significance of morality from the perspective of life sounds just like an immediate destruction. Nothing is left behind, except the provisional effects of it. That is why,

Nietzsche not only declares that “the whole book knows only an artistic meaning, and crypto-meaning behind all events” (BoT, p.22). but also underscores how we owe all this to an “amoral artist-god, who wants to experience, whether he is building or destroying” (BoT, p.22). This amoral creative and artist-god standing behind everything is the ultimate fact that Christian morality always avoids seeing, since it is the creator of art, and uncovers the true value of life. Therefore, Nietzsche diagnoses the problem of morality by looking at science from the perspective of the artist, but at art from that of life (BoT, p.19).

Even though both science and art claim to understand life, they reach different conclusions. Whereas the emergence of science has no significance since it is just used as the shield against life, art transforms life and looks for new ways to comprehend it further. For Nietzsche, whereas life in itself is a creative, transformative and an artistic phenomenon, Christian morality as “a will to negate life” (BoT, p.23) is always hostile to this character of life, since Christianity craves for nothing but to reach “the sabbaths of sabbaths” (BoT, p.23), the eternal rest postponed to an another world. Christian morality privileges the hatred of ‘this’ world and condemns the passions. It harbours the “fear of beauty and sensuality” (BoT, p.23). Thus, in Christian morality life turns against itself and this is the greatest danger as “the danger of dangers” (BoT, p.23). The only way of getting out of this danger of morality is to affirm life. Undermining the roots of Christian morality from within the perspective of life, Nietzsche attempts to reveal how his purely artistic instincts are always affiliated with the valuation of life itself as an anti-Christian.

3. HEIDEGGER AND THINKING WITHING BEING IN THE WORLD

3.1. The Task of Thinking and Being in the World

Heidegger is an essential thinker who firstly posed the question of thinking from within the world. According to Deleuze, we must accept and undertake Heidegger’s question of ‘What does it mean to think?’ as an arrow send to us and must carry it to the further. In his last-famous interview in *Der Spiegel*, Heidegger says that neither himself as a philosopher nor philosophy itself can help us in order to get rid of the deteriorations of the cybernetics age. Thus, he maintains that no one knows what will be the destiny of thought in the future. In his Lecture, *The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking*, Heidegger clarifies that even though thinking itself is easier than philosophy, nonetheless, it is much more difficult to be accomplished. To achieve thinking we must return to the

primordial content of language which is already deteriorated in our age. Furthermore, language as the mode of appropriation of being in the world is related to the essential claim of Being upon us. Thus, the claim of Being, at the same time, must be appreciated as the calling of language, nonetheless, not within the set of imperatives or directives. Insofar as we do not completely understand how the revealing of language is essentially related to our modes of being within the world we will never get out of the egoistic subjective presumptions regarding the world.

Heidegger is the essential thinker of thinking from within the world. He encourages us to think within the world, within the encounters in the world. Moreover, in the *What is Called Thinking?* (*Was Heisst Denken?*, 1951)¹, Heidegger profoundly contemplates on the notion of thinking, and tries to problematize how we can think genuinely. In this sense, the most significant question, for Heidegger, is what it is that calls on us to think. The call that claims on us to think, Heidegger contemplates, must refer to the very nature and origin of thought itself; namely, that from which thinking awakens originally toward us. This origin is obviously Being and “thinking, in contrast, lets itself be claimed by Being so that it can say the truth of Being. Thinking accomplishes this letting” (Heidegger, 1998, p.239). However, in addition to our wish for thinking we must prepare ourselves not only to hear the call of Being; but also to respond to its essential call in an appropriate manner as well. To learn how to think does not free from the discovery of thinking itself, of the truth of Being, and of the discovery of our own essence: They are always already interrelated:

Thinking accomplishes the relation of Being to the essence of man. It does not make or cause the relation. Thinking brings this relation to Being solely as something handed over to it from Being. Such offering consists in the fact that in thinking Being comes to language: Language is the house of Being. In its home man dwells (ibid, p239).

It should be thus seen that what is at stake here is to understand that thinking is something that can be essentially reached on the way to thinking in itself which is already inherently interrelated to the essence of human being of being-in-the-world. Therefore, in contrast to the traditional-metaphysical understanding of the human essence as *essentia*, Heidegger takes up the essence of human being as

¹ *What is Called Thinking?* is a course of university lectures. Heidegger delivered these lectures during the winter and summer semesters of 1951 and 1952 at the university of Freiburg.

ek-sistence meaning ‘standing out’, to be out in the world.

Besides, in uncovering the essential role of thinking within encounters in the world we must firstly undermine the subjective substantiality². Insofar as the basis of subjectivity is undertaken as being substantial, subject itself is determined to be divested of its own acts raised from its finitude and temporal character. However, such a substantial character of subject is opposed to *Dasein*'s constant acts of projecting itself towards itself within its ‘ecstatic’ essence as ‘standing out’ of itself in order to render itself possible as the projection of possibilities within the world. However, as opposed to the encounters of *Dasein* within the world, the essence of the modern of subjectivity is a disavowal of the encounters of being within the world. That is why, by carrying a critique as a philosophic *ethos* targeting the imposed limits upon us, Foucault attempts to free himself from the substantiality of the transcendental. For him, meaning should not be investigated from the horizon of a transcendental subject; rather from within the historical context itself: “I try to historicize to the utmost in order to leave as little space as possible to the transcendental” (Foucault, 1989, p.79). In this respect, one must nullify the acts of subjectivity, and unfasten the ego cogito, and let beings be in terms of a releasement from within as *Gelassenheit*, letting-be. For what is at stake here is the *Gelassenheit*, is to release Being from within itself.

3.2. The Critique of the Subjective Substantiality

What Heidegger seeks at the end of the philosophy is to explore new horizons of thinking as an essential way of leaving the subjective language of the metaphysics behind. The nature of thinking cannot be reduced to the binary metaphysical concepts such as body/mind, good/evil, *res extensa/res cogitanz*, etc. Metaphysics cannot connect to the clearing of Being, for its assumptions are relying upon an absolute presence without noticing the self-withdrawing nature of the truth of Being as the interplay of un/concealment. Thus, Heidegger wishes to retreat into the clearing of

² Whilst explaining the substantiality of subjectivity, I should basically remind here the notion of transcendental subjectivity in Kant and Husserl. In both thinkers, the notion is undertaken as the source from which all the possible absolute knowledge must be derived. In this manner, whereas, according to Kant, in terms of the transcendental subject, we can know the world merely as we construct it, according to our ways of knowing it in terms of the *a priori*, universal, and necessary laws of reason related to each other within the correlation between sensibility, imagination, and understanding; according to Husserl, in order to reach the inner life of the transcendental subject we must reduce the physical world through *epochê* and open the door to the absolute consciousness as the source of the absolute knowledge. Thus, Husserl focuses on the transcendental aspect of the truth since, for him, the truth can be solely derived from the constitution of the transcendental consciousness. In this sense, “Husserl's basic contention is that the known as known is constituted in subjective processes. Therefore, a theory is a genuine elucidation and a strictly scientific solution to the problem of knowledge only when it takes into account the totality of subjectivity” [SYNTHESIS AND INTENTIONAL OBJECTIVITY: ON KANT AND HUSSERL BY NATHAN ROTENSTREICH, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel, Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V. 1997.p.3].

Being to which we always already exposed in our being in the world. However, by privileging the presence of beings, in the traditional philosophy, thinking is removed from its genuine link in undergoing the truth of Being, i.e., thinking is undertaken to be the work composed out of the propositional contents.

Besides, Caputo articulates that "...[p]hilosophy is subject to the jurisdiction of "fundamental propositions..." (Caputo, 1986, p.256). However, "from the idea of truth as the "correspondence" (adequatio) of mind and thing, Heidegger moves back into the more fundamental conception of truth as the unconcealment of Being itself, which is the original meaning of the Greek *aletheia*" (ibid, p.260). Thus, Heidegger's endeavour is to go beyond the propositional limits and thus is to reveal a non-limit of thinking related to the event of the clearing of Being sustaining itself between the interplay of *aletheia*. In this respect, in his critique of subjective substantiality, Heidegger attempts to give heed to the temporal human experience in terms of the interplay of the self-concealing of the being of beings encountered in the world by *Dasein*. Thus, *Dasein* is never an isolated human creature from the world, but always already inhabits in a specific environment made up of other things and other human beings. Moreover, the things encountered by humans are events, and this essentially means that there is always more to say about beings than anything we can see or assume about them. In this sense, the discovery of the nature of beings is one of the originary dimension of Heidegger's thinking. Since things can neither be reduced to phenomena reflected on our mind, as assumed by Husserlian phenomenology, nor be reduced to the perceptual capacity of the subject or to the limits of the cogito. Therefore, what is essential is to be within the world but not to portray the world in terms of subjective projections.

In this sense, all the subjective postulations undertaken to depict the world is always already an incomplete mission because of the fact that they all take the priority of being-within-world for granted. Human beings firstly have to go through things within encounters; rather within the predetermined universal principals assuming how things must be. Since, human beings are already claimed by the claim of the openness of Being to which they are exposed in terms of being within the world. Thus, thinking is essentially related to fall for the encounters of *Dasein* within the world in terms of the clearing of Being. That is because, "[F]orgetting the truth of being in favour of the pressing through of beings unthought in their essence is what "falling" [*Verfallen*] means in *Being and Time*" (Heidegger,1998, p.253). The word *falling* here "...designates an essential relationship of humans to being within being's relation to the essence of the human being" (ibid, p.253). The

poignant theme here is to see that *falling* in the world means to be already circumscribed to the truth of Being under the projections imposed upon us by our ‘thrownness’ into the world. To fall means to let both ourselves to be changed and things to happen within the temporary passage of our life.

In this regard, only thinking within the encounters of being in the world can reveal that our creative modes of thinking are already bounded to our attempt of releasing ourselves from within. Thus, to encounter is to explore, to explore is to release whatever is assumed to be based on the fixed basis of the presumptions out of which the world is undertaken to be externally described. On the contrary, this approach is far away from our existential structure of *being in* as the care for the world and the being of beings. Therefore, we must think free from the limits of subjective frame, for the urge of thinking, thinking within encounters as an essential claim, requires us not to dominate or suppress the world, but to be essentially care about it, about the being of beings in their connection to the clearing of Being. Thus, Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, portrays the being of *Dasein* as ‘care’ (*Sorge*) and says that “*Dasein*, when understood *ontologically*, is care. Because Being-in- the-world belongs essentially to *Dasein*, its Being towards the world [*Sein zur Welt*] is essentially concern” (Heidegger, 1962, p.84). By being already ‘thrown’ in the world, and thus being ‘ecstatic’; i.e., standing-out of itself into the truth of Being, *Dasein* is not a self-enclosed entity; rather it is the profoundest way of opening to the world, of being within the world (*In-der-Welt-Sein*). Thus, *Dasein* already means to be care for the modes of its being in the world, is as it is within its own ‘ecstatic’ ek-sistence under the claim of Being. However, this necessitates to cultivate a site of the revelation/disclosing carry us beyond the limits imposed upon us in this technical age and provoke us to be transformed accordingly. French philosopher Michel Foucault, in his short article, *What is Enlightenment?* articulates that

The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them (Foucault, 1978, p.)

In reflecting upon ourselves, and in exploring our *ethos*, dwelling, abode in Being, poetic clearing

offers a unique possibility. For through such a 'clearing' we are able to be profoundly transformed. As Celan articulates that "I write poems in order to speak, to orient myself, to find out where I was, where I was going, to chart my reality" (Celan, 1986, p.34). In this sense, what comes to thinking through encounters and through poetic investigations is something that always escapes from the frame of the subjectivity. Since, this something is something without substance, and it can be comprehended neither in terms of the conceptual, scientific or phenomenological investigations nor in terms of the normative-moral investigations, but by means of an investigation carried out through encounters of being within the world. Thus, within the encounters the possibility of thinking already re-directed towards itself as a creative claim ultimately motivated by what is un-thought in thought yet, and so it requires us to keep being watchful about our modes of being in the world in its inherent link to the thinking of Being as the tension sustaining itself within the interplay of un/concealment. The creative temptation of such a thinking is already claimed by this *interplay* itself already happening beyond the subjective limits and keeps calling for what is un-thought in thought yet. Deleuze himself is essentially interested in Heidegger's allusion to what is un-thought in thought yet as one of the main essentials of his own ontology.

4. DELEUZE AND THINKING WITHIN BECOMING-ENCOUNTER

Deleuze's texts enact what they often claim: genuine thought unfolds through a discourse that runs counter to prevailing images of rationality, enlightenment, and truth. Philosophical discourse, for Deleuze, does not emerge without provocation, elicitation, and a certain forcing. Thought for him is a kind of passion, an excess manifest as creation as much as critique. Thought is a critique of cliché and habitual forms of thought, and a creation of modes of life, even evoking an entirely transformed sensibility (Ramey, 2012, p.112).

However, from Plato to Hegel, Deleuze argues that "the will of philosophy, with its quest for truth, is to establish (or re-establish) identity, order, and continuity against the forces of difference, chaos, and discontinuity" (ibid, p.113). On the contrary, what Deleuze tries to reveal is that difference precedes identity, and thus we must reject the ontology of identity which has been initiated by Plato. If one, therefore, attempts to think upon what Deleuze means by means of 'becoming', s/he

should firstly look at his understanding of identity. For Deleuze, identity is always in motion sustaining itself within the restless conditions, since the identity of the individual subject is constantly determined by means of the external forces ranging from governmental, environmental to social forces. Thus, individuals can carry out a real possibility by opening themselves up to the multiplicities and intensities happening through concrete movements of life. This movement always keeps each individual identity in motion determined within the various powers. What Deleuze seeks is to reveal that the conditions accelerating the diversity, multiplicity and the destruction of identities are inherently related to something that always happens in between borders. He, therefore, emphasizes that

...it's always in between, between two things; it's the borderline, there's always a border, a line of flight or flow, only we don't see it, because it's the least perceptible of things. And yet it's along this line of flight that things come to pass, becomings evolve, revolutions take shape. "The strong people aren't the ones on one side or the other, power lies on the border (Deleuze, 1990, p.45).

Moreover, in Deleuze, difference and identity are related to the constructions within the reactions we get from life and the encounters rather related to an essence. Thus, in pushing the concepts of difference and identity to their limits Deleuze attempts to think within the encounters taking place between borders, things and individuals. Identity is always in motion and coming into being within a never ending process of becoming. That is why, Deleuze takes each encounter within its concrete process of movement through which events take place and thinking is endangered itself in order to engender new possibilities for itself: To think is to encounter.

In this respect, I want to construe that from a Deleuzian perspective, becoming-encounter might be related to something that wishes to sustain itself within such movements of various conditions of life in which thinking is underway as the acts of the creative-dangers as its own inherent possibility of re-creating itself from within itself. In other words, it is the lines of the creative thinking themselves which "produce or encounter their own dangers, a threshold crossed too quickly, an intensity become dangerous because it could not be tolerated" (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987, p138). Moreover, by rejecting any substantial reading of history, Deleuze undertakes 'becomings' as something which is quite distinct from history, since he clarifies that "to say revolutions, turn out badly is to say nothing about people's revolutionary becoming... If we've been so interested in nomads, it's because they're a becoming and aren't part of history; they're excluded from it, but they transmute and reappear in different, unexpected forms in the lines of flight of some social field"

(ibid, pp.152-3). In this sense, for Deleuze, every mode of life is a form of becoming that actualizes virtual potencies, creating new assemblages of bodies and senses (Deleuze, 1994, p109). Thus, this must be related to “the plane of immanence: multiplicities fill it, singularities connect with one another, processes or becomings unfold, intensities rise and fall” (Deleuze, 1990, pp.146-7).

In terms of its intrinsic connection to becoming through multiplicities and intensities, thinking wishes to explore more encounters. This aspiration of thinking arouses all the encounters coming to render themselves possible. In other words, insofar as the encounters keeps happening, thinking will keep flourishing within the extensive and intensive encounters. Thinking is not a theoretical issue, but a matter of encounters. In this respect, becoming as the trace of the encounters will never reach its ultimate object in comprehensive terms, but that will continue to render itself possible insofar as the more encounters can remain alive within our everyday life and can circulate within the world. In this respect, “to appreciate becoming as a fact of life, a stage of critical self awareness, or even an ethical response is to appreciate how identity itself is formed through opposition, alterity and difference” (Sutton&Martin-Jones, 2008, p.46). However, the transcendental assumptions “freeze living, makes it coagulate and lose its flow; it seeks to capture the vital difference that outruns all thought and submit it to the judgment of a single perspective, a perspective that stands outside difference and gathers it into manageable categories” (May, 2005, p.27).

In this regard, in rejecting substantiality of identity Deleuze attempts to reveal how the notion of identity is constructed through the courses of life. Moreover, questioning and thinking through encounters provokes the most efficient possibilities for uncovering the multiplicities in the world. What is at stake thus is to reveal that the question of thinking through encounters cannot be confined into the presumptions as intending to reach certain and positive conclusions as it is done in the Platonic dialogues. In the Platonic dialogues, each argument ultimately claims an overall purpose connected to the world of forms. However, the creative thinkers who assign a deep comprehensive realm for creative thinking attempts to release thinking from the supremacy of such overall purposes.

Thus, the efficient way of getting out of such imperative claims of substantial thoughts, we must learn how to think creatively within a self-critical attitude towards ourselves. The creative thinkers urge us that thinking within the critical encounters in the world firstly requires to encounter ourselves. For instance, Nietzsche urges us that “the worst enemy whom you can encounter will

always be yourself; you ambush yourself in caves and woods” (Nietzsche, 2006, p.47). Moreover, “to say we each have ‘a life’ and to say that we each have *an* unconscious thus amounts to the same thing. It means that there is always something outside our ‘identifications’ as subject or persons, which we play out through complexifying encounters . . .” (Rajchman, 2000, p.89). In this respect, the way we construct, understand and criticize ourselves cannot be separated from our connections residing within in the world as Rainer Maria Rilke concisely unveils it: “I live my life in widening circles that reach out across the world/I may not complete this last one but I give myself to it” (Rilke, 2005, p. I-2).

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In my attempt through this work, I have tried to reveal the possibility of how the creative thinking can be inherently released from within by means of thinking within the encounters along with some creative thinkers engaged to the notion of the creativity in thinking itself across the the history of thought. In this sense, contemplating on the thinking within encounters along with creative thinkers, first of all, requires to release thinking from within itself by distancing the thinking from the trajectory of reason. The conceptual frame creates a lack sense of creativity in thinking and keeps it away from the genuine sense of life. Therefore, in my attempt, I try to initiate my discussion by referring to the origin of the creative thinking in its connection to the inherent essence of life. That is why, I firstly go back to the ancient tragedies in which the main theme of the dialogues runs within the true sense of life. Secondly, I endeavour to debate the characteristics of Socratic dialogues in its assessment with the tragic dialogues under the title of *The Nature of the Socratic Dialogues*. In my evaluation, I claim that the tragic dialogues are so close to the core of the movement of life than the Platonic dialogues. In this sense, in the line of the critical thinkers, from Sophocles, Euripides, to Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Deleuze, thinking is already underway with all of its genuine encounters of being in the world. Thinking is not removed from its genuine sources and relegated to the realm of forms. The line of the critical thinkers undermines the substantial thought of tradition by means of reopening new forms of thinking from within the world.

Thirdly, my attempt is to reveal the inherent connection between Nietzsche’s thinking and two tragic authors, Euripides and Sophocles. In this respect, in clarifying Nietzsche’s critique of Platonism, I try to reveal that for Nietzsche, what flows beneath and gives rise to the contents of thinking is the dynamic flux of physiology. All our judgments and the sense of consciousness are

constantly under the attacks of unconsciousness flux, since physiology unconsciously affects all the transformation of our thinking. We are closest to life by means of physiological process from which thoughts arise spontaneously. In order to uncover how the possible transfigurations of thinking is at stake, we have to pay attention to the role of physiology in thinking beyond the metaphysical schema in which thought is framed in concepts. Thus, the whole metaphysical schema is inadequate to uncover the dynamism of life because of the fact that metaphysical schema confines the movement of thinking into premises and conclusions. However, life is a phenomenon which is always already beyond the conceptual schema of metaphysics.

In his attempt of overturning Platonism, or the dualistic approach to life, and Christian morality, Nietzsche regards the phenomena such as art and creativity in order to reveal how life in itself is the creator of everything. If it is the artistic creation that uncovers the forces of life, and brings us the illumination of life, then the scientific and moralistic approaches to the world are undertaken as merely devices for self-protection. There is no hierarchy in thinking based on the faculties of reason or based on Plato's 'Two World Theory'. Thus, I try to reveal how for Nietzsche, art is the only creative act of exploring the mediums or channels in nature in which physiological thinking can affirm life. Based on this line of thinking, the underlying drivers in which life transforms itself are the instincts that are able to be closest to life. The transvaluation of values constantly at stake by means of the physiological flux. The true value of existence is related to constant symptoms of certain physiological constitutions and the rule of art which cannot be comprehended with the frame of the conceptual thought.

Fourthly, I tried to explicate how Heidegger in his critique of metaphysics aims to step back into the clearing of Being. In his attempt he wishes to initiate a new genuine beginning going back to the Pre-Socratic times. In its intrinsic connection to the truth of Being, thinking is released in terms of the encounters of being in the world rather in terms of the subjective substantiality. Thus, being-in-the-world is the ground of the theoretical objectification. Hereby, Heidegger's goal is to display how truth primordially arises from the the *interplay* of *a/letheia* as the ground of the theoretical presumptions as well. Finally, in explaining Deleuze's critique of identity and order, I try to reveal how for Deleuze to think creatively is to become within the intensities and multiplicities meaning to runs counter to usual ways of rationality and conceptual thought. Thinking within the encounters,

transformations, intensities, passions and diversities is the most efficient way of displacing and staying away from the substantial thought based on the ontology of identity.

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