DESIRE AND INTER-SUBJECTIVITY, 
AN ANTHROPO-GENETIC APPROACH TO HEGEL

Cihan Camcı*

ABSTRACT

In this article my aim is to deal with the Hegelian question: How does thought determine itself in its relation to the object? from an anthropo-genetic point of view that leads us to the problem of self-consciousness and inter-subjectivity respectively. I will try to show the relation between, the logical necessity of the deduction of categories and the attribution of this necessity to inter-subjectivity from A. Kojève’s point of view.

Key Words: Dialectic, inter-subjectivity, Hegel, self-consciousness, recognition, master-slave.

ÖZET

Bu makaledeki amacım, Hegel’in düşüncenin nesnesiyle ilişkisinde kendi kendisini nasıl belirlediği sorusuna antropo-genetik açıdan bakmak. Böylece, A. Kojève’in ortaya attığı bakış açısının özbilinç ve öznel-arasılık problemine getirdiği yorumu, Hegel’in kategorilerin mantıksal çıkarımında öngördüğü zorunluluğun açılından tartışmak istiyorum.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Diyalektik, öznel-arasılık, Hegel, özbilinç, tanınma, efendi-köle

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In this paper I’ll try to expose the relation of life and logic from an intersubjective point of view due to the Hegelian attempt to put the pure concepts of Kant, as the first principle of the world and the transition from logic to nature. In order to do so, I’ll try to focus on the logical necessity of the deduction of the categories from each other, the dialectic method as the identity in difference and finally the dialectic between human begins with regard to Kojève’s interpretation of Hegelian desire. To discuss the deduction of categories and the Hegelian attempt to go further than the Transcendental Aesthetic of Kantian epistemology which delimits the condition of the possibility of knowing external world by virtue of an unconditioned transcendental subjectivity, I will try to show how this subjectivity is constitutive for the objectivity of objects. I will transmit this dissatisfaction of self-consciousness with desire and inter-subjectivity with reference to Kojève. By doing so, I will try to show that, Hegelian phenomenology, when it has been read so as to replace the contemplative and passive transcendental subject with a desiring consciousness, gave rise to remarkable implications on intersubjectivity. Hegelian intersubjectivity, based on mutual recognition, took over the Kantian identical subject, a self-conscious being. The self knowledge, different from the knowledge of the objects, is not immediate and automatic. In this respect Hegel put the identical subject in a historical and intersubjective context. The self knowledge presupposes the experiences of desire, fear and labor. That is possible only through relating self to another self, intersubjectivity. Hegel puts the difference of his thought from the conditions of the certainty of the actual impressions of the objects as follows:

...self consciousness exists in and for itself when and only by the fact that it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged…
Each self consciousness is the mediating term to the other, through which each manifests and unites itself with itself. Each is to itself and to the other as immediate self existing reality, which at the same time exists thus for itself through this mediation. They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing each other (Hegel, 1977).

Firstly, I should put briefly what Kant’s project was to pass to the Hegelian critique. What Kant founded, was an underlying discipline. Philosophy shifted from primacy to foundational. It is this
foundational function that makes philosophy a critical criterion for the question: How is our knowledge possible? That is to say: what are the unconditioned conditions of the possibility of experienceability? Categories are the conditions of the certainty of the actual impressions of the objects. The objective validity of the categories of the understanding was transcendental deduction. However, the intuited objects are not known by the subject in themselves. Kant says:

The object in itself always remains unknown; but when by the concept of the understanding the connection of the representations of the object, which are given by the object to our sensibility, are determined as universally valid, the object is determined by this relation, and the judgment is objective (Kant, K., p. 42)

Kant was concerned about the objectivity of the judgments which are universally valid on the representations of the objects. He clearly distinguished the appearances and the objects in themselves. There is a gap between the categories and the things in themselves. That is dissatisfaction from a Hegelian point of view. If we try to understand how Hegel establishes a synthetic link between the categories and the object in itself through Kantian epistemology, we should notice that the transcendental unity of apperception is the original principle of experience. The unity of the objects of empirical consciousness depends on the logical, possibility of “I”, its becoming conscious of the unification of data. “I” must be an identical subject. All experiences belong to that same “I” provided that subject affects, unifies them actively. That subject also knows itself as unifying the representations actively. This subject is identical in itself in the sense that it is the ground of the cognitive intentionality. It is self-consciousness in itself but not for itself. That it to say, the constitutive activity of consciousness does not take itself as a different, non - I which is in the unity of itself. That is the dissatisfaction of self-consciousness.

In this paper, what I aim to do is to discuss this dissatisfaction as a possibility, or a necessity to put knowledge as a function of human interest and self-consciousness as the satisfaction of desire. That is to replace Kantian cognitive intentionality with a living subject. A living subject has an acting, desiring and purposive nature. It is identical with a self-differentiating subjectivity. Living subjectivity is simply and immediately for itself in its relation to objects, to another. Being for another is based on the
dialectic logic as opposed to the Kantian concern of the objectivity of the experienceability. Hegel must show the objective validity of the pure concepts in contrast to Kantian aim that was concerned with the objectivity of the experience ability of the external world. Kantian concepts were empty without the intuitions. In this respect they were mere means for the knowledge of the external world. In order to show the objective validity of the pure concepts Hegel must answer the following question. How does thought determine itself in its relation to the object?
OBJECTIVE VALIDITY OF THE CATEGORIES AND ANCIENT IDEALISM AS THE BASIS OF IDENTITY OF DIFFERENCE

The Hegelian project can be understood as a self-conscious subjectivity. The pure concepts, the forms of experience are not cut off from the objects in themselves but are constitutive for the objectivity of objects. Going back to Plato, the first principle he tried to explain the universe, the world of ideas as the source of the universe was consisted of all the universals. Kantian categories however can form a special class of universals distinct from all other universals.

\[
\text{Non-sensuous} \quad ---------- \quad \text{sensuous}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
A \text{ priori} & \quad & a \text{ posteriori} \\
\text{Universals} & \quad & \text{universals} \\
\text{Red, chair, horse.} & \quad & \text{ Obtained from experience}
\end{align*}
\]

The non-sensuous universals are as put above prior to sensuous knowledge and pure. The Hegelian attempt then, showing the objective validity of the pure concepts is derived from this Kantian pure non-sensuous universals. Hegelian system must be a system in which these pure non-sensual universals are the first reason, first principle of the things. The formal logic, according to which things and thought can be separated, can be this principle. This principle shall be the reason of things. Reason of things is prior to things as a first principle but this is a priority of logic, not a priority of time.

\[
\text{Cause – [time]} \quad \text{reason – [logical]}
\]

\[
\text{Sequence} \quad \text{sequence}
\]

Kantian categories, having been the epistemological principles of knowing instead of ontological of being, are prior to experience. If we force Kant’s term experience and say it means all possible experience -both the spatial objects and physical thoughts – in this sense experience is universe. So, Kantian categories are prior to world and are necessary conditions of the world. However, there is no point yet to argue that the world can be logically deduced from the categories. Although we accepted
that categories are logically prior to the world, we cannot say that world is a necessary consequent of categories. Hegelian categories are objective realities; they are prior to all subjective minds and to the world. They have realities but not existent. Any existing object is a congeries of universals, nothing more than this. Roundness, whiteness, hardness of a stone is the objective universal of a stone. To deny them is to deny the objectivity of stone. The stone is objective in the sense of existing. So, in objective idealism universals can be shown as:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Sensuous universals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>dependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective being</td>
<td>objective being</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

So, the sensuous universals are the logical consequents of the categories and deduced from the categories. That is how Hegelian transition from logic to Nature thought to be possible.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>sensuous universals</th>
<th>individual objects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reality</td>
<td>subsistence</td>
<td>existence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That is the identity of knowing and being. The subject and the object are not two independent realities but identical. They are identical because they are two different aspects of one reality. The object is nothing different than what thought makes of it. Being means for consciousness. The difference of the object from the subject is that: Subject expels the object (and that is to say the subject expels a part of itself considering the identity of them) and opposes itself to it. The object, lets say the stone, is external to the subject, to me. It is the non-I. The stone is still within the unity of thought. The difference than is a difference within the unity of thought which means monism. If we understand explanation as explaining the causal relations of the objects to universals beyond Kantian transcendental aesthetic, explanation necessarily means monism. That is to say the ultimate reality is only real in virtue of the fact that it is dependent on nothing outside itself. So it is self-determined and it must be a unity. However, the many and its relation to one remains problematic. The manifoldness of the actual world should be derived from the one; nevertheless, within the causal relation of the objects to universals and the hierarchy of the universals reaching up to the supreme universal, we cannot explain the idea in
itself. That was the case for Plato too. We can think of a schema in order to understand the relation of many to one, and the self determination of the idea of the good in Plato.

\[
\text{Idea of the Good} \downarrow \\
\text{Idea of quality} \downarrow Is there a logical necessity \\
\text{Idea of color} \downarrow between them? \\
\text{Idea of whiteness} \downarrow \\
\text{Individual white objects}
\]

Since the idea of Good cannot be explained by anything than itself it should be self-explanatory, self-determined. Hegelian alternative is that: We show that the entire world of ideas totally is such a self-determined whole that it constitutes a satisfactory first reason. Accordingly, we can deduce the category of causation from the category of substance and substance from a prior category. That is to give an account of the first reason of the world. In order to do so we are to know what the first category is. The first category, logically first and prior to others, is to be discovered by us as an objective reality. However, this objectivity is not opposed to subjective reason. The more universal is prior to the less universal, and the genus to species. We can consider the example of a horse to grasp the impasse of the objective reality and its explanation due to substantial beginning before causal relations of temporal world. If we try to understand the highest possible (conceivable) concept we see that it is being. \textit{There is a white wild horse}. If we abstract the whiteness, we are left with: \textit{There is a wild horse}. If we abstract the wildness we are left with: \textit{There is a horse}. Is (being) is the first category which is left at the end of the last possible abstraction. The opposite however is not true. We can know the being of the horse without knowing the quantity of it. The more general and abstract concept is prior to the less. That is how we discovered the first category and also the order of the subsequent categories. We can proceed from the first category to the less abstract ones and do this from genus to species. In order to proceed like that we should add \textit{difference} between them. We add a difference to genus and move to the species and than take the species as a genus and add a difference to it to convert it in to a new
species. How are we able to do that? That is how it is possible in formal logic: you cannot get something out of nothing. There isn’t anything present in the conclusion which was not present in the premise. If we are to deduce B from A, that is to say A contains B. If we can show this then this means to deduce B from A.
Dialectic method is the Hegelian solution of the problem: How is any deduction possible? Dialectic method shows that a concept contains its opposite hidden away itself and this opposite works as the different. That is to say it may be extricated, deduced from the concept. We can see how it works through looking at the first triad of Hegelian logic: **Being – nothing – becoming.** The pure category of being, which does not belong to any particular sort of being like horse, table, is the entirely abstract idea of being. There is no determination for it since it is abstracted from all determinations. It is thus, absolutely indeterminate, empty, a pure vacuum. It is not anything. Its emptiness is the absence of everything. That is to say, *it is nothing.* Nothing is contained in the category of being. As mentioned above, if we can show that nothing is contained in being that means nothing is deduced from being. That is possible and not absurd according to Hegel when we are talking about the pure abstract idea of being. It is this pure abstract idea of being which is identical to the pure abstract idea of nothing. To put it another way, we can take an individual object as a car. When we abstract the existence – is ness – of it from all its qualities or characteristics then there isn’t left anything. Say, redness, good-lookingness of the car is abstracted and there is not a car after that abstraction. There is not a car in itself in the sense that Hegel attacks Kant. There is not a car in the sense that the categories are not epistemological principles of getting the accurate representation of the external world but they are the ontological principles of being. They are prior to the external world and not only the conditions of the possibility of experienceability but as a first principle and a unity containing many is logically the reason of the external world. The first principle is the reason of the world and *there isn’t any world if it is not deduced as a necessary consequence from this first principle.* In this sense there is no car beyond the determination of its qualities and the, *is ness* of the car is identical with the, *isn’t ness.* Since they are identical the one passes into the other. They pass one another conversely. They disappear into each other and that is how the third category is involved. It is the idea of this passing, the idea of the passage of the first category to the second and the second to the third. This is the category of becoming. The third category of Hegelian dialectic method is deduced from the relations of the first two. If we think the triad respectively we can write this range:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Being} \rightarrow & \text{genus} \\
\text{Not-being (nothing)} \rightarrow & \text{different} \\
\text{Becoming} \rightarrow & \text{species}
\end{align*}
\]
Becoming is deduced from being since it is a special kind of being. It is deduced through the combination of the first-affirmative, second-negative-categories. The negative category denies what the first affirmed. However this denial, opposition is not brought from an external source but it is contained in the affirmative. Containing its negation in itself, the first category produces the second out of itself. That is how the categories are constitutive for the objectivity of objects for they are the ontological principles of being and the first category is self-explanatory, self-determined (Stace, 1955). It is not we, it is not Hegel, who deduces the categories, and they deduce themselves. Hegelian claim depends on this identical opposite in the first category. Identity claim entails that when anything is at the same time it isn’t. Now the question is this: How can the things both be and not be? The answer is in the passage, becoming. Something both is and is not when it becomes. The third category provides us a reconciliation of the contradictory first and the second as the unity of them. The third posits then itself as an affirmative category and becomes a thesis for a new triad which necessarily involves it’s opposite in itself contradictory to itself. This new contradiction is to be resolved by a higher unity of a new synthesis. The process of categories is a compulsory system due to the necessity of reason. In contrast to Spinoza’s way of considering determination as negation, Hegel thinks negation is determination (Stace, 1955).

For Hegel, negation is determination and since becoming combines both the identity and difference, the whole truth is identity in difference. Therefore, the old tension between the one and the many has reconciled through Hegelian logical possibility for two opposites to be identical yet retaining their opposition. Spinoza viewed the infinite and finite as mutually exclusive opposites. So, contrary to the opposition of finite that by no means can be deduced from the infinite, Hegel thought, the only possibility to work it out to view, infinite identical to finite in its own difference (Stace, 1955). We can figure it out as, \( A = \text{not } A \) is as real as \( A = A \). That is how the Hegelian first principle works. Being = being is indifferent to Being = not being (nothing) by virtue of the third category, becoming. This contradiction means that identity is not the whole truth; neither difference is. But the whole truth is the identity in difference (Stace, 1955).
LOGICAL NECESSITY AS ANTHROPO-GENETIC DYNAMISM

So far I have tried to expose the Hegelian attempt to put categories as the first reason, first principle of things the transition from logic to nature, the logical necessity of the deduction of the categories from each other, the dialectic method as the identity in difference. Now, going back to the problematic stated at the beginning, the logic-life relation, we should discuss the dialectic logic from the point of a social view. Hegel was a monist; a monist found the one in relation to many in a development of time. The one is not a substance but a subject. To discuss the relation between the logic and life we should focus on the social nature of self-consciousness. To do so, we should try to understand that Hegelian subject is not a contemplative and passive subject but it is romantic, self-moving concept of spirit preceded by a phenomenological orientation to desire. The Spirit, the One which is a subject not a substance, as the highest principle must be its developed result. However, if as argued before, the transcendental subject is not merely a thinking being. “I am a thinking being” is not a satisfactory answer for the philosopher for it is not distinguishing the “I” alone from the universally and eternally valid cognitive faculties. “I” used at that level, the level that I posses the knowledge of the cognitive faculties, we say very little about my self. I, myself am a man of flesh and blood who knows he is such (Kolb, 1986). He knows he does something, human work in a human world with some others. The neutral consciousness before its opposition to object is the Cartesian I. Starting from this contemplative knowledge of Being it would not be possible to reach self-consciousness. Starting point, for the satisfaction of self-consciousness, is desire. I become aware of my self when I desire something; for instance something to eat. Desire is always revealed as my desire. I’m “brought back” to myself. I see that there is not only the thing I desire but also myself as opposed to that thing. So the philosophy of Spirit starts with desire. There is a task to accomplish; to answer: who is the transcendental subject?
THE TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT IS THE DESIRING CONSCIOUSNESS

As we discussed above the objects in themselves are nothing and the objectness of them are possible only through an active consciousness. They are nothing in themselves; they are for another. Hegel says:

In the kinds of certainty so far considered, consciousness takes the true to be something other than itself. The concept of this true, however, vanishes in the experience of it. Though the object was immediately [taken to be] in itself... it shows itself instead not to be this in truth. Rather, this in itself proves to be a way in which it is only for another (Westphal, 1998).

The being for another refers to the dialectic logic in which the categories have their essential meaning in their relatedness. For self-consciousness the object was something other than itself and the intentionality of self-consciousness is somewhat indifferent to desiring consciousness. Desire is the actuality of self-consciousness. It is to experience otherness. Self-consciousness is its taking “its object to have the significance of a non-entity,” and experiencing “the independence of this object (Westphal 1998).” Through this actuality, self-consciousness is towards its own satisfaction. object is a mean to an end for self-consciousness. So, desire is self-consciousness. If desire is self-consciousness, self-consciousness can be certain of itself only through the satisfaction of desire. The satisfaction of desire is the domination (aufheben) of the other (object) for the intentionality is indifferent to interest. Desire is towards the object as its own; annihilates the independent object and self-consciousness becomes certain of itself. Through the annihilation the certainty of the self-consciousness passes to the independent object. Hegel says:

… Certain of the nullity of this other, it (self-consciousness) annihilates the independent object and thereby gives itself the certainty of itself which is true certainty, a certainty which has won objective status (Westphal, 1998).

The objectivity of the object is in the self-certainty of the subject. In other words, the contemplative I, which is less conscious of himself since he is absorbed in the object, becomes aware of himself. That is...
so because desire is always my desire. The journey is completed in the sense that the subject is aware of himself and sees that there is himself which is not the object he intended. Kojève says:

For Self-Consciousness and philosophy, to exist, then, there must be in Man not only positive, passive contemplation, which merely reveals being, but also negating Desire, and hence Action that transforms the given being (Kojève, 1991).

The necessity of the desire for philosophy is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for human existence. It is necessary as the basis of the biological action; however, it is not sufficient for humans. The human beings, according to Kojève, unlike the animals which cannot come back to themselves and cannot transcendent themselves since they don’t have any distance with themselves to contemplate, can transcendence -provided that their desire is directed towards a non-being instead of a given being-
Kojève reads Hegelian phenomenology as an anthropo-genetic opportunity in the sense that desire is directed towards an other desire: Recognition. To be recognized is to be recognized as right to act superior over the other. (Anerkennung) The presupposition of this recognition, which provides the sociality and intersubjectivity of philosophy, is the existence of several desires which can desire one another. We can read this as a shift of the tension from the rational-irrational to the biological-non-biological. The former lacks intersubjectivity in the sense that it doesn’t view intersubjectivity as a presupposition of being human. The latter seeks the condition of the possibility of being human in the multiplicity of desires. However, the lack of sufficiency in the latter presupposes a clash of the desires so as to reach satisfaction beyond biological. That is how the life and death Fight takes place between the desires. The negating action of desiring subject is towards subjugating the other desires for being recognized by them. To do so, man should risk his biological life (Kojève, 1991).

1 Ibid, page. 126.
MASTER-SLAVE DIALECTICS

To see history as a history of bloody wars is a consequence of admitting the tension and fights as the necessary consequence of this tension. Fights end in such a way that both adversaries remain alive. Otherwise there would be no history; there would be only the past of dead losers and only one winner. The adversaries remain alive only if one of them accepts to be a slave of the other. The other becomes the master of the loser. The slave recognizes the master and the master becomes human through this recognition. The slave remains stuck to his biological desire and is not recognized by the other. The master, on the other hand, passed beyond his biological desire. Thus, there is a difference between the master and slave. This difference is, according to Kojève a possibility of difference between future master and future slave. (Ibid, p. 42) There is a determination of the slave’s inferiority in his giving in the desire for prestige. The slave was anxious and afraid of risking his life. He was afraid of the victor who risked his life for a non-biological end. The victor, the master became superior over the biological life and the slave through daring death for being recognized. What is crucial here is the possibility of the difference is dependent on the existence of the master and slave. The difference is realized in the existence of both of them. The master’s superiority over the biological life, Nature, as a part of an intersubjective possibility of a historical process, depends on the realization of the Slave’s work (albeit). Work is in between the master and nature. Slave works in order to conform the given conditions of the Nature and this process of transformation of nature is the medium which exists in the tension between master and nature. Slave works in order to conform the given conditions of the Nature and this process of transformation of nature is the medium which exists in the tension between master and nature. The tension between man and Nature is mediated by the slave’s work and the master enslaves Nature through the enslavement of the slave. He realizes his freedom in Nature (Kojève, 1991). Master doesn’t work but he fights. The slave, on the contrary does not fight but he works. We have already mentioned above that the work for the satisfaction of animalistic desire is not a humanizing activity, in other words, not an anthropo-genetic possibility. However, the slave works not for his own biological desires; he works for the service of his master. Thus, the slave works for an idea, a non-biological end. The transformation of Nature in relation to a nonmaterial idea is the Work in the proper sense of the word according to Hegel. It is this sense of work for Kojève:

… That creates a non-natural, technical, humanized World adapted to the human Desire of a being that has demonstrated and realized its
superiority to Nature by risking its life for the non-biological end of Recognition. And it is only this Work that could finally produce the table on which Hegel wrote his Phenomenology and which was a part of the content of the, I that he analyzed in answering his question, “What am I (Kojève, 1991)?

The answer of the question “What am I?” is the replacement of the “Cogito” and “Transcendental Unity of Apperception” with a living subjectivity that is a possibility of history with other living subjects through a dialectical process. This possibility is the highest possible concept: being. Being, as mentioned above, is the first category which is left at the end of the last possible abstraction. The first possible concept is the possibility of the history through the dialectics of master and slave. Conceptually, Hegel discovered the logical necessity between the idea and the individual object. For Kojève, similar to this process within categories there is the history of dialectic through which we can realize the truth (wahrheit) of the human ideal only in and by slavery (Kojève, 1991). The human ideal was born in the master who won the fight of prestige. The master proved his superiority over the biological life by doing so. There is no need for master to make any effort for satisfying his biological needs. Now, what does the master want to do? Dialectic method makes us doubt that “the master realizes the peak of human existence, being the man who is fully satisfied in and by his real existence, by what he is (Kojève).” A concept contains its opposite hidden away itself and this opposite works as the different. The conceptual deduction, as mentioned above, works according to the Hegelian first triad: Being-nothing-becoming. The identity of difference shows us how nothing is deduced from being and being is nothing. Unlike the Kantian gap between the individual object and the concept which is an epistemological principle of getting the accurate representation of the external world, the concept for Hegel is prior to the external world and determines it as an ontological principle. The master cannot be satisfied by what he is. He can be satisfied by becoming (the third category of Hegelian dialectic method) what he is not. It is the death of the master. But the death is not mastery; and master is not master or anything when he is dead. So, the mastery is an existential impasse (Kojève, 1991). It is only the slave who has got the possibility of completing history through transforming Nature for the idea of desire. That is why the truth of the human ideal can be realized in and by slavery. Mastery is a necessary state for the truth of the human ideal to be realized. The slave is a possibility of a future citizen that exists as a nothingness of Being which annihilates as time. Kojève explains how Hegelian phenomenology can be read in anthropo-genetic terms as follows:
Through animal fear of death (Angst) the Slave experienced the dread or the Terror (Furcht) of Nothingness, of his nothingness. He caught a glimpse of himself as nothingness, he understood that his whole existence was but a “surpassed”, “overcome” (Aufgehoben) death – Nothingness maintained in Being. Now – we have seen it and shall see it again – the profound basis of Hegelian anthropology is formed by this idea that man is not a Being that is in an eternal identity to itself in Space, but a Nothingness that annihilates as Time in spatial being, through the negation of this Being – through the negation or transformation of the given, starting from an idea or an ideal that does not yet exist, that is still nothingness (a “project”) – through negation that is called the Action (Tat) of Fighting and of Work (Kampf und Arbeit) (Kojeve, 1991).
CONCLUSION

The priority of Kantian categories, having been the epistemological principles of knowing instead of ontological being, are necessary conditions of the world but the world can be logically deduced from them despite their authority of conditioning the objective validity of both the spatial objects and physical thoughts. In this sense the experienceability experience is universe. So, Kantian categories are prior to world and. However, there is no point yet to argue that categories. Although we accepted that categories are logically prior to the world, we cannot say that world is a necessary consequent of categories. The subjectivity in this sense is dissatisfied and lacks an anthropological basis as Kojève mentions above. There already is an implicit reflexivity of experience as Robert Pippin reminds us (Pippin, 1993). Hegel’s phenomenology is, nevertheless, further than this reflexivity in which Hegel says:

There can be no consciousness without self-consciousness. I know something, and that about which I know something I have in the certainty of myself otherwise I would know nothing of it; the object is my object, it is other and at the same time mine, and in this latter respect I am self-relating (Hegel, 1977).

The self-consciousness of for Hegel thus, cannot be understood without acting, desiring, and purposive nature of subject. The problem of objectivity, which led to a dissatisfied self-consciousness, gave rise to an understanding of satisfaction of desire logically connected to knowing as function of human interest in Hegelian phenomenology. In other words, intentionality is reinstated by a self-differentiating, organic, living whole. Living subjectivity, viewed in this relation to objects, sensing its other and itself only in desiring, means a con-fronting subject fighting other subject and see the other a necessary object of power struggle, an other to be negated, to be overcome and mastered for recognition. Hegelian conception of inter-subjectivity, as a dynamic process of becoming, remains wedged in a teleological completion of what thought to be lacking in post-Kantian philosophy. The objectivity of an object is intended as a momentary otherness of living substance, self consciousness in relation to itself, which is to say in its identical difference beyond its external, contingent, spatial relations. The otherness of the other self consciousness, in terms of this momentary objectification, is sublated through annihilation as time in its spatial being in Hegelian phenomenology means violence
and power struggle, legitimated as a part of the process of the deduction of categories. Inter-subjectivity is *nothing* but a compulsory momentary part of a system due to the necessity of objective reason, which is founded on the dynamic power of negation as determination in Kojève’s anthropogenetic reading of Hegel. A reading that has inspired many modern interpretations of Hegel in Europe; nevertheless, rendered the possible ethical facet of inter-subjectivity fight and power struggle.
REFERENCES