

ORDER AND CONTINUITY IN ARISTOTLE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GENEAOLOGY OF ORDER

[Aristoteles'te Düzen Ve Süreklilik: Düzenin Soybilimine Giriş]

Sercan ÇALCI

Dr., Mimar Sinan Güzel Sanatlar Üniversitesi, Felsefe Bölümü
sercancalci@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT

What is to be said of Chaos, the real step child of philosophy, today? Is it still a mythological surplus of philosophical thought to which every indeterminateness of becoming can be attributed? Or is it a major disquieting element beneath every thought of order? In this paper, I would like to shed some light on the constitution of the images of order and continuity in the philosophy of Aristotle by considering some of the genealogical themes and analyses in Nietzsche, Foucault and Deleuze and by re-touching chaos, one of the prominent genealogical operator of philosophical thought since the very beginning. Although the general view of the idea of order in ancient Greek philosophy can be presented as the symmetrical positions between macrocosmos and microcosmos, Aristotle has gained a special room in this context by introducing the problem of potential and actual levels of order. Idea of order is a junction point in which there are wealthy contents including ontological disputes as well as ethical and political matters. As a call to the genealogy of the idea of order, this text aims to make a creative close reading of Aristotle's ideas of order and continuity in order to uncover the non-continual, rupturable and swerving chaotic elements captured by the idea of order itself.

Keywords: Order, continuity, chaos, deviation, actual, potential, epistemological curtain.

ÖZET

Felsefenin hakiki üvey çocuğu olan Kaos hakkında ne söylemeli bugün? O, oluşun her belirsizliğinin kendisine yüklenebileceği, felsefi düşüncenin mitolojik bir artığı mıdır hâlâ? Yoksa her düzen düşüncesinin altındaki başlıca endişe verici öge mi? Bu yazıda, Nietzsche, Foucault ve Deleuze'deki soykütüksel temalar ile çözümlenmelerden bazılarına değinerek ve en başından beri felsefi düşüncenin önemli bir soykütüksel işlemcisi olan kaosa yeniden temas ederek, Aristoteles felsefesinde düzen ve süreklilik imgelerinin kuruluşuna açıklık getirmek istiyorum. Antik Yunan felsefesinde düzen düşüncesine ilişkin genel manzara makrokozmos ile mikrokozmos arasındaki simetrik konumlar şeklinde sunulabilir olsa da, Aristoteles düzenin potansiyel ve edimsel düzeyleri sorununu gündeme getirerek bu bağlamda özel bir yer tutmaktadır. Düzen fikri, etik ve politik meselelerin yanı sıra ontolojik tartışmaları da içeren zengin içeriklerin bağlantı noktasıdır. Düzen fikrinin soykütüğü için bir çağrı olan bu metin, bizzat düzen fikri tarafından ele geçirilmiş sürekli-olmayan, kesintili ve sapma halindeki kaotik öğeleri açığa çıkarmak amacıyla Aristoteles'in düzen düşüncesine yaratıcı bir yakın okuma yapmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar sözcükler: Düzen, süreklilik, kaos, sapma, edimsel, potansiyel, epistemolojik perde.

Introduction

What is to be said of Chaos, the real step child of philosophy, today? Is it still a mythological surplus of philosophical thought to which every indeterminateness of becoming can be attributed? Or is it a major disquieting element beneath every thought of order? In this paper, I would like to shed some light on the images of order and continuity in the philosophy of Aristotle by considering some of the genealogical themes and analyses in Nietzsche, Foucault and Deleuze and by re-touching chaos, one of the prominent genealogical operators of philosophical thought since the very beginning. In fact, it is a remarkable development of today's philosophy that the boundaries of the dominant narrative on the history of philosophy are unveiled with regard to formulating the problem of order and to articulating the rich content of chaos – a narrative according to which philosophy is a struggle against the chaos itself. However, unlike the contrast between nature and culture, hypothetical oppositions between chaos and order have still been encompassing the basic motivations in producing the images of philosophical thought and concepts. Although some different figures of contemporary philosophy have developed novel readings which are able to *de-place* the underlying modern oppositions between nature and culture, the dominant narrative still insists on excluding chaos from the frame of philosophical thought. So, what is the very reason of this deliberate exclusion? One of the answers to this question can be given by problematizing the political approaches based on *conservation of the order against chaos*. Even though this answer cannot consume the whole question at hand, it might open up a new horizon to it by disclosing the close relation of being with politics. On the other hand, the critiques of rationalist, romanticist and progressive modernist attitudes, which constitute all together a form of opposition between nature and culture, have been developing at the very heart of some avantgarde approaches in which one can try to read the culture itself as a product of the nature or to cancel out that schematical opposition by going a step further. And now, it is evident that today's philosophical thought is not obliged to be dependent on the image of order as a struggle against chaos. In this form of opposition, there lays much more swarms of paradoxes than anywhere, and one of them can be exposed in a temporal relation between order and chaos. If the following classical frame of question is posed on this relation, one of these paradoxes manifests itself irrefutably: Which came first, order or chaos? Whether former or latter is the first, the same vexed question arises: One can formulate it as *how was chaos born from order, or vice versa?* No doubt this is an ancient problem as Hesiod implicitly asked

and clearly answered: “First verily was created Chaos” (Hesiod 1908, 106-131, p. 35). But here one can find the real anchor point on which we will base a crucial difference between mythological Chaos (*mythos*) and logical chaos (*logos*). While the former does not refer to the disorder, indeterminateness and uncertainty but to the “empty space” or “abyss” because of this word chaos had signified an entity alike “chasm” in ancient Greek, the latter represents the disorder itself. If the firstly created entity was Chaos as an abyss or chasm, it would not directly related to the problem of order but to the nothingness and emptiness (Hesiod, 2010, p. 86). Thus, there would have been no paradox since the priority of the terms could not consume their relational boundaries in one circle. Hence one is not obliged to think emptiness as necessarily out of the order in that it is not opposed to the order itself but to the being, that is to say, it can gain its own form of order within its creation. However, if the anterior entity is logical chaos as the disorder, then the ontological source of order must be chaos by reason of there would be no order in beginning other than chaos itself and that concept of order would be a subordinate derivative. More precisely, this paradox shows that the idea of order is based upon the disorder itself and the passage from one to the other is problematically designed. The passage from disorder to the order presents the temporal aspect of the paradox which lies at the root of the relation of before-after. When we ask a position within the philosophy of Nietzsche, we should concern that which perspective of power desires to posit chaos as against order and which figure of thinking insist on excluding the chaos itself by classifying it as a mode of opposition that is a real element of negative determination of its own conception. Although the general view of the idea of order in ancient Greek philosophy can be presented as the symmetrical positions between macrocosmos and microcosmos, Aristotle presents a special problem in this context by introducing the problem of potential and actual levels of orders. Idea of order is a junction point in which there are wealthy contents including ontological disputes as well as ethical and political matters. As a call to the genealogy of the idea of order, this text aims to make a close reading of Aristotle’s ideas of order and continuity in order to uncover the non-continual, rupturable and swerving chaotic elements captured by the idea of order itself.

Preparatory Steps of Genealogy

Targeting foundational notions based upon the principle which imposes upon life an ontological and epistemological transcendence, Nietzsche's genealogical moves are the practices of making philosophy with the hammer. Such a transcendence has overshadowed the immanent forces of becomings by surrounding the underlying values of any moral system for which every principle is unquestionable and fixed base. Hence Nietzschean practices of genealogy has always meant that new modes of producing values in the manner of new valuations of values are the political interventions against these fixed bases too. Transcendent principles try to restrain new valuations and new experiences of life by jamming the accumulation of will to power in weak and reactive layers, and so that genealogical moves are parallel to the destructive interventions into these transcendent principles. For instance, one reason for Nietzsche's criticism on Kant's concept of *ding an sich* originates from dominative fictional boundary in which every indeterminateness or obscurity are rationalised by repressing the chaotic ocean of philosophical thought including the productivity of body and desire as a constituting element of its structure. *Ding an sich* refers to a boundary that cannot be brought to the field of experience and represents the empty space on which nothing can be written, an *unwriteable tabula rasa* of Reason, and for this reason the perspectives are covered by an epistemological curtain of transcendence. In this respect, firstly, destructive tendency of genealogy confronts us to the multiplicity of perspectives and shows that there is no room for an idea of life that is independent of the will to power other than being an abstract fiction (Nietzsche 2009, p. 98). Therefore Nietzsche's philosophical practice gains a momentum which insists on anew expression of life as the will to power and which explores the expression lines of the multiple perspectives of the forces. As Nietzsche writes:

The only seeing we have is seeing from a perspective; the only knowledge we have is knowledge from a perspective; and the more emotions we allow to be expressed in words concerning something, the more eyes, different eyes, we know how to train on the same thing, the more complete our "idea" of this thing, our "objectivity," will be. (Nietzsche 2009, p. 98-99).

Transcendent principles have a common claim based upon the idea of objectivity and neutrality as if there is no will behind their surface, which produces the basic reasons for the covering of epistemological curtain of transcendence. This is the chaotic element of abundance or outburst. This is

the real meaning of logical chaos itself, not as an emptiness or nothingness like in Chaos but as an excess or overflowing in chaos. The function of epistemological curtain is not only to cover this excess but to conceal the fact that there is nothing other than the will itself which constitutes the real content of this excess. However, the will is not an origin, it refers the impossibility of the origin itself. This is one of the foundational attitude of genealogical approach concerning the problem of origin. Not in the manner of arriving an origin but bringing the problem of value into question, genealogy has a twofold structure. As Gilles Deleuze stated in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, genealogy is related to the *origin of value* on the one hand and it refers to the *value of origin* on the other (Deleuze 1992, p. 2-3). If genealogy is restricted to the origins of values it would be that genealogical study is paralel to Rousseauan study of the origins as could be understood from his first and second discourses. But from the moment Nietzsche introduces the problem of value no one can disregard its irresistibility. What is to be done is not to create a schema by mapping the absolute or relative and utilitarian values (Deleuze 1992, p. 3). Although the perspectivism is confused to relative approaches, one cannot overlook the differences between them. Nietzsche distinguishes the problem of value from the levels of absoluteness or relativeness and place it onto the perspectives, which are constituted by the accumulation and consumption dynamics of will. A perspective has never been independent from its historical burden and onto-psychological codes that are written onto the tabula rasa of the unconscious as a material organisation of the life itself.

Thus, when the radical genealogical moves demand us to uncover the contingency at the source of the necessary, they attack the hierarchy between the contingent and the necessary as well as every dichotomy united in an economy of the terms. And this comes from twofold structure of the genealogy itself. To demand a genealogy of order is to consider both the origin of the order and the value of it in order to show the impossibility of a pure origin and the perspectival valuations beneath it. This means that which seems to us as ahistorical and essential is actually organised in the perspectives of historical and temporal forces which are themselves immanent compounds of the will to power and its world of contingency. Foucault follows these line in order to develop the political potential of Nietzsche's genealogy and focuses on the impossibility of origin itself. Foucault writes:

“A genealogy of values, morality, ascetism and knowledge will never confuse itself with a quest for their “origins,” will never neglect as inaccessible the vicissitudes of history. On the contrary, it will cultivate the details and accidents that accompany every

beginning; it will be scrupulously attentive to their petty malice; it will await their emergence, once unmasked, as the face of the other. (Foucault 1977, p. 144).

Centralising the present in the temporal aspect of being, the metaphysics continues to bind itself to the teology with which it connects a pure Origin to an eschatological End in a one and the same structure. The role of genealogy in this structure is to carry every accumulation of the will to power in one individual entity into its perspectival existence in which every beginning has an accident like the swerves of the atoms that make possible the beginnings of the universe in Lucretius' cosmology. At the source of the Nietzschean differences between reactive and active, master and slave or noble and vulgar, there lays a perspectivist approach which seeks for the accidents of the beginnings in the context of the impossibility of origin. The dominance of present time imposes various monuments and statues of the values upon the open process of valuations and closes the another possibilities of the expression lines for the will to power. Under these circumstances, the first strategy for genealogist is to determine how these values have been produced and how might underlying accumulation of desire organize itself differently. Therefore, initial aim of first level of genealogy is to detect the contingency beneath and behind the every seeming ahistorical entity by bringing the accidental beginnings of them in a historical context. Now we can pose our genealogical question for the problem of order: If one consider that the idea of order has firstly a contingent and historical organisation, what perspective try to constitute that idea in such a formation and why it form its idea as a struggle against chaos? In dominant narrative of philosophy, the idea of order has generally been organised in an assemblage of historical conditions which sublimates the origin as well as end in order to capture the excess of chaotic elements in the frame of origin-end metaphysics. However, uncovering moves of genealogy shows us that the worldview in which chaos and order are opposed each other produces other dichotomies between culture and nature, masculine and feminine by privileging one of the terms of the oppositions. For me, Aristotle has gained a crucial role in this genealogy by proposing a basic measure about how the *polis*, government and constitutions should be organised by the very connection between natural and political orders. In Aristotle's system, the idea of order includes its opposite elements as the constituting blocks and this idea along the concept of continuity pushes his system over the top of Greek philosophy. Order has deep meanings both in ontology and politics. For example, in some passage of Aristotle's *Politics* in which political order is considered in the context of forms of the governments, we encounter a prominent theme of the

political order including its threatening factors of deviation-forms, which are the immanent and indivisible elements of constitution of order. Is this a deviation from a normative order in a current manner or a deviation from the order of nature? The crucial aspect of this question is related to the order of nature in Aristotle's thought. Well, how one might think the idea of order with regard to political ontology? This idea of order requires an ontopolitical approach to the question.

We have to develop the given conceptual patterns in order to emphasize the distinctive and special aspects of Aristotle's concept of order. To what context Aristotle refer when he thinks the idea of order in politics, metaphysics and ethics? He never puts the problematic in terms of chaos or cosmos but the logical chaos shows itself as an unbridled and uncontrollable element of the system. It is a worthy question to be raised that whether there is a contradiction between logical chaos and mythological Chaos, as well as between mythological cosmos and logical order. In ancient Greek philosophy, dominant narrative of the concept of order is dependent upon the organic and transitional symmetric relationship between macrocosmos as the universe and microcosmos as the human being. Here we can determine a radical reversal in Aristotle's thought on the relationship between the mythological and the logical. Sure this is not a categorical distinction that disseminates itself in every conceptual and imaginative expression of philosophical thought. Firstly we should identify the reversed system therein. According to the classical system of Greek thought, cosmos was born from the Chaos itself and this relation had coloured several systems of Greek philosophy asserting a symmetrical relation between macrocosmos and microcosmos. Explicitly defended by Pythagoras and his followers this conception asserted that the moral and physical cosmos of human being is parallel to the physical and astronomical order of universe, which means that there is a gradual correspondence between these two series. For example, Pythagorean idea of "harmony" expresses not only the accord and congruity in musical series but also an harmony of human being with the universe because s/he had the micro form of the cosmos itself in her existence. In Pythagorean system, the numbers were thought as the final constituting real truths without which neither being and its forms nor the harmony and cosmos were possible to come to being. The conceptual and physical forces bringing the idea of order were presented in the immanent laws of the being. In this respect, pre-Socratic world was encoloured by the idea of Pythagorean harmony, which can be comprehended as the condition of the true life as well as its moral obligations and ultimately cosmological order itself – an harmony that remains in the field of mythological Chaos and therefore

in the field of mythological cosmosin ordr that human being has a symmetric relationship with nature of which s/he occupies the central positions. This symmetrical harmony between macrocosmos and microcosmos presupposed that there are the rules for human being in advance. Although they remain in a radical disagreement each other on the *arkhe* of the universe, pre-Socratic philosophers had no doubts about there is an established cosmos which governs all being and relations. In Democritus one can find a parallelism between moral order and the material order of the universe, just as he can determine a hierarchy of symmetrical harmony in Empedocles and Pythagoras. But every symmertical structure can be threatened by its opposites, namely asymmetrical lines in an assemblage of the ideas. So, who did bring along these asymmetrical elements into Greek world? Those who had problematized the political systems, moral judgements, supposed harmony and the power of the logos defined as keeping the different beings all together were Sophists. They were both the poduct of this asymmetrical elements and the producer of a radical type of disharmony. Even though it is difficult to find a collective attitude of these philosopher, their common inclination can be defined as radically destruction of basic values of ancient Greek culture by refracting the established symmetry of cosmic harmony. Basing his ontological refutations of the fixed and absolute forms upon Heraklit's principle of becoming, Protagoras had a pioneering role in this intervention to the Greek cosmology and ethics. Following expression formulates the problem in a way that whether this man is an individual or universal: "Man is the measure of all things: of things which are, that they are, and of things which are not, that they are not." As Hegel asserts that Protagoras had gained the powers of reflective thinking as distinct from his contmporaries and therefore this subject "Man" cannot be considered as solely individual just as it cannot be thought as only universal (Hegel 1995, pp. 373-378). If we suppose that this subject refers to the individual human being, the measure itself would find its foundation in a single individual and there would be an element of erosion affecting the idea of order which is based on cosmological symmetry. This leads to deepening of distinction between moral order and natural order by placing the human being individually onto the focus. Even though the subject refers to universal being or human species, this distinction keeps its position but its political interpretation may change. In this case, human being, as a species, is completely swallowed in the asymmetry of distinction. Two ideas of order correspond to the distinction between nature and law in both cases. Emerging asymmetrical paradigm is radicalized by the arguments of Gorgias including nothingness of being, obscurity of knowledge and impossibility of its transfer. While harmonic order is ruptured by the argument of nothingness of

being, the argument concerning obscurity of knowledge or un-knowable nature of the being invalidates the distinction between *episteme* and *doxa*, which is re-considered by Plato afterwards. Finally Gorgias' third argument that asserts the impossibility of transferring the content of knowledge, even though it can be gained by some adequate techniques, shows the boundaries of both the quest of truth and Socratic method and dialogues. This new climate in ancient Greek philosophy that is produced by Sophists can be named as an *asymmetrical rupture* in the idea of order. From now on they cannot be overlooked and philosophy on the concept of order must be done without ignoring their radical arguments. This attitude can be explicitly seen in Plato's dialogues against sophistic arguments. According to Plato the sophist is talking about the non-being, in fact s/he is the inventor of illusions and false notions; that is to say, sophist is an illusionist whose basic vocation is not to *know* but to *imitate* (Plato 1997, *Sophist*, 268b, p. 292). This power of imitation is determined as dangerous by Plato, a power to show non-being as being and to induce one to throw herself into the rhetoric. Even Aristotle had been forced to use some of Plato's arguments against Sophists in order to overcome their arguments, which could be seen in his distinction between imitation and false. In this general view of the idea of the order in ancient Greek shows that established idea of the order had been shaken by germination of the sophistic reasoning affecting radically both the political environment and the moral and ontological principles of the era in which common harmony and symmetry were broken down. From that moment on, defence of the order could not be realized by the metaphysical harmony between macrocosmos and microcosmos or another doctrine of *eudaimona* or a concept of life in keeping with the nature itself. It requires Plato and Aristotle after Socrates in order that this defence could be done.

Here one can see that there is a map functioning as the basis for a genealogy of order. S/he can discover the real moment of crisis in the genealogy of order with regard to its twofold questioning, that is to say, value of origins and the origin of values. In this way we have come to this point of crisis which we have named as the *asymmetrical rupture* in which there is no room for the absolute beings as well as predetermined existences or established values and pure origins. In the background of these argumentation, I plainly claim that Sophistic modes of thinking is a historical answer to the problem of cosmological symmetry based on the metaphysical harmony. Even if it is impossible for this paper to tell the story of the order from the formation of political order to the cosmological vision of order, the weight should be given to the moments of the rupture and crashes of the

established systems according to genealogical thought. In parallel to this perspective, one can analyse the concept of order on the axis of its discontinuities. Let's focus on the philosophical scene in which every crisis manifests itself as a problem that cannot be consumed by its answers in order to detect the lines of asymmetrical rupture with the moments of transformation affecting the established politics of being which have opposed cosmos and order to the chaos over the centuries. If we think the relationship between problems and answers in Gilles Deleuze's terminology, we would get a new view of the philosophical scene where every folded repetition is unfolded by the differences and where every repetition means another move for renewal at the same time. Deleuze asserts that there is neither a quantitative passage between virtual and actual nor a imitative or representational relationship between them that lead the problem of identity/difference into the reductionism of dogmatism. Thus there is such an asymmetrical relationship between virtual and actual that one does not have to presuppose there are two distinct realms of virtual and actual where the two terms consume each other in order to complete itself. The idea of order is shocked by the idea of creation here. Firstly one should avoid the dualisms such as possibility and reality. In Deleuze's philosophy, problem and answer has a relation just as that of virtual and actual. Both virtual and actual are the accumulations of reality in which the category of possibility is dethroned because of its dominance based on temporal priority (Deleuze 1994, pp. 211-212). Therefore the conditions of the determination of any order can be never bound to negation and transcendence in this philosophical scene. Now we can place the cosmological symmetry and metaphysical harmony in the scene of the crisis from the viewpoint of genealogy. In this respect we should consider the concept of order in relation to that of continuity in Aristotle's system in order to uncover the chaotic elements captured by dominant narrative of philosophy.

Continuity and Order

What does it mean to claim that there is a desire to continuity beneath the Aristotle's conception of order? The concept of continuity is one of the constituting and determining axis for the idea of order in Aristotle. Firstly let's look one of the constituting role of continuity in *Metaphysics*:

And if a thing is continuous, it touches, but if it touches, it is not necessarily continuous; and in things in which there is no touching, there is no organic unity. Therefore a point is

not the same as a unit; for contact belongs to points, but not to units, which have only succession; and there is something between two of the former but not between two of the latter. (Aristotle 1984b, *Metaphysics*, 1069a17-1688, p. 167).

The problem of continuity has a special role in *Metaphysics*. I mean that even though it seems to a mathematical argument it has also ontopolitical and political connotations affecting all the conceptual development of the image of order. Here what is to be explained is the inner relationship between being and politics as a transitive one. The claim that “if a thing is continuous, it touches” forces an argument according to which continuity does not come from the touch, rather, it makes touch possible. The way we imagine the nature of the things and their power relations between them determines the way we think the relations between politics and being. For Aristotle, who problematizes the conditions of being, first principles and causes –in every real conceptual distinction– refers to the politics of being too. In fact we get involved in the field of politics as soon as we think an order determining the positions of the beings and the principles of their order. Therefore we should make a conceptual move in order to describe this approach; in other words, we use the concept of *ontopolitics* to show how the twofold structure of genealogy can be used in determining the way political and ontological orders are interlocked in Aristotle’s system. I would like to present some problems of ontopolitics which can be defined here and now. After that presentation I will return the investigation of continuity in Aristotle’s system. Firstly ontopolitics will question the hierarchies that consolidated the order, whether are they necessary for the idea of order and its relationship with the continuity. This questioning leads to that: Is it possible to think an image of order between beings without any hierarchy whether it is vertical or horizontal? Therefore the central aim of the ontopolitics is to uncover the relationship between the being and politics by questioning the problem of order and hierarchy as well as continuity and its idea. In relation to this, it explores the temporal contradictions between becoming and being. Finally ontopolitics tries to reveal the chaotic elements that is repressed by the order and its constituting forces. As one could clearly see that the basic questioning modes of ontopolitical perspective is dependent upon the problem of how the continuity and order are possible modes of the historical hierarchy, despite there are real swarms of disorder and discontinuity of non-hierarchical assemblages; in other words this is the problem of excess of the chaos which manifests itself as disorder, discontinuity and non-hierarchy. Against the hierarchical structure produced by orthodox theories by referring central positions which

capture the void between the being and meaning, ontopolitics opens up a new field of thinging without which it is impossible to break the problem of order away from hierarchical frame of thinking. If we examine the equation Aristotle made of continuity and its relation to touch, we would gain an interesting connection that is different from our current reasoning modes; in other words, Aristotle does not say that *if a thing is touched it continues* but that *if a thing is continuous it touches*. Here is one of the radical differences between modern and ancient modes of thinking. Our habit of subject-oriented modern thinking does not begin to think the concept of touch by starting with continuity; on the contrary it starts with touch and thinks continuity as a relation of identity. This is an imposed preconception by means of fiction of atomised individual. However, Aristotle is theoretician of dynamism, his theory of motion is based upon the continuity of potential and actual levels of reality. Even if a theory of motion comprehends the possibility of movement in things themselves, it can solely assert that touch is necessary but not sufficient in order to establish the real order of the things. The distinction between point and unit refers to this argument that is deepened by Aristotle who went further by saying that there is another condition of touch: “And plainly the successive is primary for the successive does not necessarily touch, but that which touches is successive.” (Aristotle 1984b, *Metaphysics*, 1069a17-1688 pp. 167-168). Unit is a term of measuring; for example I can speak of a triangle of three units edge and by doing so I divide the one into three equal parts. But there is no continuity in this stage. If I divide one into distinct parts I cannot get any continuity between these parts but an isolated equality of them. In this respect Aristotle’s politics of being places itself on the continuity against the asymmetrical rupture in order to reconstitute the symmetric harmony of being which is threatened by the discontinuity of the nature, i.e., the chaotic elements that are deviating the established order of One. Ontopolitical perspective shows that there opens up a new sense-layer and the axis of the problem of order is dislocated which is accompanied by a new repertoire of concepts. One of the crucial couple of this repertoire is the opposition of continuity-discontinuity. When one thinks that the substance is continual and there is no rupture or loss and surplus inside its structure, it is evident that the frame Aristotle seeks is including a description of universe as the continual cosmos as such. Some elements such as contingent, swerving, chance, spontaneity and encounters remain at the level of accidents, by posing a problem that rises the question of whether there is any possible cosmos without these chaotic elements: Is there any possible image of order without these elements of disorder, any possible image of continuity without these elements of discontinuity?

Spontaneity and chance, therefore, are posterior to intelligence and nature. Hence, however true it may be that the heavens are due to spontaneity, it will still be true that intelligence and nature will be prior causes of this universe and of many things in it besides. (Aristotle 1984a, *Physics*, 198a5-198a13, pp. 29-30).

For Aristotle the necessary should be radically distinguished from the contingent in order to establish the real hierarchical order of things. This distinction does not only show the alliance between the necessary and the continual but also the problem of priority/posteriority haunting the image of order. Spontaneity and chance cannot come first according to this order and hierarchy and therefore their ontological status are remained at the secondary. This is the real problem of ontology of subaltern which springs from the hierarchies of established order and the fiction of symmetrical harmonical cosmos. The place and status of subaltern in this cosmos is nailed on the secondariness that is necessary for the production of substance, the central concept of the politics of being depending upon a rigid hierarchy. Primary and uppermost is the necessary and unchangeable that is continual and actual. Aristotle would think the relationship between actual and potential according to this temporal priority, which eventually leads Aristotle to posit *primum movens* that which moves without being moved. In other words it is the *first mover* itself whose ontological status keeps the final point of priority in this hierarchy, although its conceptual development is posterior to the order as such (Aristotle 1984b, *Metaphysics*, 1049b17-1049b29, pp. 130-131). In Aristotle's philosophy, it is not Chaos or chaos that firstly created; Chaos is obscured under the hierarchy of order and the logical chaos is reduced to a controllable element of the world of politics. This is the isolation of being from politics or a politics of isolation that which our ontopolitical perspective tries to overcome this by exposing the contaminant chaotic elements for which it is possible to destruct the hierarchical order. According to Aristotle's physics, there are no generation and corruption in the realm of celestial bodies but the motion is there. Well, what is the difference of this mode of motion? Motion of celestial bodies continues as to the perfect form of the circle and this is a continual movement. Perfectness cannot be placed into the spontaneity and chance. Chance is the unpredictable which cannot be known about when and where it takes place and therefore the order of universe cannot be based on chance or spontaneity and deviating factors according to Aristotle's system. In fact he has never disregarded these phenomena of chance, spontaneity and even deviation-forms but he gives them the position of the subaltern by placing them into the secondariness of the addition in the hierarchy of being. The essential is the continual or that is to say the substance itself. The

relationship between form and material that Aristotle addressed in *Metaphysics* in detail is an inseparable part of the idea of continuity in his system. It seems to me Aristotle describes the lost symmetrical harmony of the universe in which the essential and accidental are divided at the expense of the latter's subordination. In the passages where he points out that the accidental is not really a cause, the real problem springs from the claim concerning the disorderedness of the accidental as such:

“As to that which is in the sense of being true or of being by accident, the former depends on a combination in thought and is an affection of thought (which is the reason why it is the principles, not of that which is in this sense, but of that which is outside and can exist apart, that are sought); and the latter is not necessary but indeterminate (I mean the accidental); and of such a thing the causes are unordered and indefinite.” (Aristotle 1984a, *Physics*, 165a26-1682, p. 160).

Temporal mode of the accidental is neither *too frequently* nor *always* but *sometimes* and therefore it is excluded from the boundaries of continuity. From the perspective of ontology, the idea of order requires its continuity in the temporal mode of *always*. Accidental is the subaltern-other of substance; that is to say, this separation is one of the required conditions of the hierarchical organisation of being. If the *sometimes* of contingency and chance is impossible, universe would be filled with the *always* of the unchangeable beings and so there would be no room for the separation of being into two realms. Hence, the hierarchy of being is composed of two meanings of being, one that is contingent, full of chance and spontaneity and the other is imposed by the substance and its limits. In fact, Aristotle attempts to criticize transcendent being in the manner of Plato's ontology by exposing the problem that springs from this cosmology and the image of hierarchical order. Instead of Plato's hierarchy of being, Aristotle embedded the essence into the thing itself by binding it to its form vertically. Therefore he needed to present the accidental-others more than Plato did, because the main relation between separate realms of being, in Plato's system, is the partake of subaltern which left the other as such in the shadow of partaker. But in Aristotle's system, the relation between universal and singular is an organic one that which is mediated by the particular in the name of universal itself. Plato's hierarchy of being is based upon the separation of being in such a way that Form and the appearance cannot be comprehended in the same meaning of the being, which was questioned by Aristotle because of this partaking and the imitation as one of its logical conclusions. But imitation does not need to be placed as the relation of two realms, or more precisely, as the

condition of existence of appearing singular thing. It means that just as one cannot creating a gap by asserting two similar human beings, one is partaking other, in the world of becoming, it is nonsense to posit two realms of being one is partaking other. On the other hand, for Aristotle, Plato's Forms has neither explained the problem of motion nor posited the nature of the movement and change in the realm of becoming. Thus, one can turn her face away from the transcendent Forms because there is room for explaining the phenomena of becoming. In addition to this, mathematical objects are another target of Aristotle's criticism, which are posited as intermediary realities by Plato in order to strengthen the hierarchy of the Forms. But for Aristotle one of the main problems comes from this separation and its logical foundation. In Plato's cosmology, the order of the beings is encoloured by an image of reality lacking of an organic unity of the things and therefore it transfers the hierarchical model to theory of politics. Organisation of ideal state leads to overlook the real necessities of the city as such. Plato's image of order was an answer to the destructive asymmetrical rupture created by Sophists too. But it need to be developed because asymmetrical rupture had extended its scope from philosophy to tragedy and law as well as other established institutions in ancient Greek. From now on the problem for Aristotle was to develop new strategies in order to create new ontological foundations for the order by means of a renewed conceptual repertoire which have dominated the European culture and philosophy over centuries.

Orders of Potential and Actual

The relationship between potential and actual, which is one of the crucial themes in *Metaphysics*, is a part of the constitution of continuity and its connection to the order. This temporal relationship needs to be interpreted from the perspective of continuity in the axis of matter and form. One of the striking examples of Aristotle can be presented here. Aristotle speaks of the temporal priority by describing a scene in which there are an adult and a child, both are male. From the perspective of matter and becoming or of the growing process of child, it is evident that adult is preceded by child. It is the perspective of generation and destruction or corruption that tells the story as such. Similarly the seeds of oak precedes the oak tree itself. But here Aristotle reverses that relationship by making a crucial distinction from the viewpoint of form and definition. From the perspective of form, adult precedes the child just as oak tree precedes its seeds. Well, what makes possible this reversion for

Aristotle? What kind of thinking lead to this conclusion of priority bestowed upon the form? When Aristotle begins to question the first causes in his metaphysical investigations he always keeps his eyes open for the traps of some illogical reasonings. One of them is infinite regress which separates the causes from the origins. If one thinks with infinite regress s/he conclude that evreything has a cause of its existence and even the foundational *substratum* owes its existence another thing. However, Aristotle's reasoning answers to this illogical reasoning by developing an understanding of substance as the cause itself, and therefore first cause must be the power to which no cause could be added because it is the cause of all other things. Here, at this point, the idea of first mover gets on the stage as a specific concept of Aristotle's philosophy in order to provide the necessary logical and cosmological foundations of the order. One can analyse this kind of reasoning both logically and grammatically in Aristotle for describing the position of subject in general order and its relation to continuity. From the viewpoint of infinite regression and infinite causation, every subject could be the predicate of another subject or it can be attributed to the other; so that this kind of infinite regression does not require any *substratum* or any concept of substance and therefore the concept of subject as such because of the genealogical association of these two terms, subject and substance. But, for Aristotle, there must be such a principle that which cannot be attributed to any other subject and has its cause just in itself. It is nothing other than first mover that is the first cause or first principle: "There is always a first mover, and the mover already exists actually" (Aristotle 1984b, *Metaphysics*, 1049b17-1049b29, p. 131). Preventing the chaotic elements appearing themselves on the stage of universe in order to make the order impossible, first mover constitutes the active beginning by establishing the very foundations of logical order. In other words it provides the preconceptual basis for both subject and the substance. This system of order would be lacking of its inherent consistency without first mover, and also one cannot explain the source of motion in general, which may lead one to think a universe deprived of substance. But there is another remarkable feature of first mover that is crucial to understand the concept of continuity: First mover exists actually not potentially. This is one of the vital points for Aristotle's concepts of order and continuity because it is able to solve the temporal paradoxes such as prior/posterior as well as capable to expose why the relationship between actuality and potentiality seen from the perspective of matter is different from that of form. When Aristotle asserts that those who are in the act of building precede those who are in capability of building with regards to definition, he uses a mode of reasoning which is based upon the claim that actuality of first mover precedes all the other things in

universe both as the substance and the subject, even if the act itself is preceded temporally. If we transform the subject in Aristotle's example, one can uncover the connection of priority/posteriority to the continuity by considering the differences between those who are playing guitar and those who are capable of playing guitar. From the viewpoint of *genesis* or generation, if one is lacking of capability for playing guitar he would not play the guitar; in other words if he has not the potential to playing guitar there would be no actualisation of playing. But this does not mean that if he has the potential to play he would necessarily play, because, in Aristotle's system, there is a special conception of potentiality that can be defined *potential-not-to* as Giorgio Agamben remarked (Agamben 1999, pp. 183-250). This is one of the prominent elements of chaos in the order of potentiality and there is an inner tension of teleology of Aristotle's system. In classical view of this teleology, every act has its end in itself. Just as the end of the seed of oak is to be an oak tree and for the child it is to be an adult, the concept of end is deeply related to the act as such in a way that potential-to-play-guitar has its end as the act of playing guitar; that is to say, the concept of potentiality needs to be completed by the actuality by its definition. Here, it is nothing other than the end itself that determines the order of continuity, because, if there were not an organic connection between the act and end no one would have assumed any determination of potentiality for itself. However, every potential-to-do is extended to the actuality with the end that is attributed to it. One can see the continuity between potential and actual both in *praxis* and in *poiesis* whose sense-layers are strengthened with the idea of *telos*. If the end is annulled by some conceptual interventions in this system, it would lead to deconstruction of the order itself that which the concept of potential-not-to has a potential to do. In Aristotle's system, if the continuity of actual and potential is covered by other components such as the deviations-forms or other chaotic elements, all the logical foundation of order would be ruptured by the disorder itself. For example, one of the important arguments of Megara school in ancient Greek period presents a risk which is tried to prevented by Aristotle in *Metaphysics*. Aristotle claims that according to philosophers of Megara school, potentiality exists if and only if an act exists in present time (Aristotle 1984b, *Metaphysics*, 1048a25-1048b9, p. 128). When we use his own example, it is nonsense to say that, for Megara philosophers, those who have not been building have not any capacity of building. One can find the foundation of continuity in Aristotle's thought against the Megara's approach to the relationship between act and *potentia*. If one thinks those who have not been building as those who have not any capacity of building, potentiality would have been jammed in the present time and parallelized to action which would be the main

determiner of the order in that case; but, in Aristotle's understanding of order, there is an axiomatic acceptance of the priority/posteriority relationship asserting the priority of potential from the viewpoint of the becoming and generation. To say that potential of those who have the capacity of playing guitar can only be proved by the actualisation of this potential is to destroy the nature of continuity and therefore it is to describe the nature of the things against their original order by means of excluding the potential-not-to. In doing so, Megara school rigorously separates the actual from the potential and forces to submit the latter to the former; or more precisely, they make the former as the real condition of the latter. However, having the act of playing guitar as its final telos, a potentiality can only be continual both its affirmation and negation by means of the realisation process in temporal and spatial determinations, and even as in the case with *poiesis*, potentiality becomes persistent in the product itself, where one cannot separate the product from its production process. When the relationship between material and the form activates the continuity to constitute anew idea of order, the genealogical approach opens up a new geography of thought. As Aristotle writes: "Further, matter exists in a potential state, just because it may attain to its form; and when it exists *actually*, then it is in its form" (Aristotle 1984b, 1050a4-1050a16, p. 131). Here, I think, one of the important reference point is embedded in the expression of "may" that which one should emphasize with regard to the concept of capacity and power. In Aristotle, this grammatical auxiliary verb refers to the twofold nature of potentiality, that is to say, potential-to-do and potential-not-to-do. It is clear that matter has a pure potentiality without which it would have lacked of the *telos* itself. To think actuality without potentiality, as philosophers of Megara did, is to confuse a conceptual distinction with a factual one. It is plain that actuality and potentiality can be distinguished by conceptual analysis of their intertwined relationship in the order of things. The actual carries the form necessarily and matter takes the potentiality as its own implicit expression. Now we can expose the new constitution of the idea of order by putting some elements of the order: As a matter of fact, Aristotle has recognised neither the cosmological symmetry as such nor the rupturable disorder surrendered to the chaos itself but he gives an alternative solution to the problem of order/disorder in which the twofold nature of potential is centralised. To make a genealogy of the idea of order we have encountered with the themes of teleology, relationship of priority/posteriority and the first mover (*proton kinoun ou kinoumenon*). But there is one more theme that should be mentioned in detail which would make possible to think the passage from metaphysics to politics ad ethics in Aristotle. I will present this new axis as the theme of deviation.

Aristotle's Mule

What is the deviation? A swerve *of* the order or a swerve *from* the order? From the viewpoint of ontopolitics, the answers one can give to these questions depend on whether the conception of swerving and deviation refer to the order itself. Firstly we should understand this conception not as a metaphorical sense but as one of the real material elements of the order itself. In the eighth chapter of sixth book of *Metaphysics*, Aristotle gives a very interesting example of the disorder in nature. Here is an animal, the mule. While human beings generate human beings and cats generates cats, mule cannot generates mule and even his parents are not mules. This a point of crisis for Aristotle with regards to the order of nature. Is the mule a deviation or a swerve from the order of nature or an indivisible part of the order. The case is whether the first or the latter, an inevitable question arises here: What is the source of deviation, if it is not the nature itself? Aristotle regards the mule as against the order of nature:

In some cases it is even obvious that the producer is of the same kind as the produced (not, however, the same nor one in number, but in form), e.g. in the case of natural products (for man produces man), unless something happens contrary to nature, e.g. the production of a mule by a horse. (Aristotle 1984b, *Metaphysics*, 1033b20-1034a8, p. 99).

In fact, according to Aristotle the mule is an accident of nature, whose temporal existence is not bound to *always* but to *sometimes*, that is to say, the mule is the existence of spontaneity and chance. However, this determination of order and disorder leads to another view of the order both as ontological and political in Aristotle's system. The first question coming to the mind can be so: Where the being of deviation or accidental nature of swerving find their roots and origins if it is against the order of nature? But these questions open such a road for genealogy that it can study the origin of order by going a step further. Therefore, the problem is not restricted to the origin of disorder but it is extended to the origin of the order itself and finally that of the possibility of an origin from the viewpoint of genealogy.

In *Metaphysics*, Aristotle gives another crucial example in order to introduce the connotations of the deviation. This is an comparison between straight line and the bent one with regards to converging to

be One: “And the straight line is more one than the bent; but that which is bent and has an angle we call both one and not one, because its movement may be either simultaneous or not simultaneous; but that of the straight line is always simultaneous” (Aristotle 1984b, *Metaphysics*, 1015b35-1016a17, p. 65). What Aristotle understands “to be One” is both being in unity and to be. The bent or curved line is a geometrical expression of the deviation to which every other deviations coming from the supposed order are axiomatically related. This is the *episteme* that is used by Aristotle to constitute anew idea of order. But the same inevitable question arises here too: A deviation from what? As it is known that the straight line represents the continuity and to be One finds its absolute meaning in the continuity of the substance; however, the continuity in straight line does not refer to the perfect movement. In the world of becoming, movement has a complex features of duration which is consisted of ruptures, discontinuities, destruction and corruption, all these elements of becoming take place in the material world which is immanent to the field of movement as an actualisation of the potential. This is the order of becoming. But the circle as the perfect form of the celestial bodies represents the continual movement that which prevents the deviations of the celestial bodies from their axis. From this paradigm of continual movement, both mule and the bent line are the deviations that where they come is still unknown. In fact, Aristotle classifies them under the political and ontological deviations without presenting an elaborative explanation on the origin of deviation. This is why the problem of impossibility of origin appears in Aristotle’s system, although he insistently avoid this problem under the mask of order and continuity. Although Aristotle describes the conflict between the deviaton-forms and the order in *Politics*, he continues to avoid the problem of origin. However, the unrepressible elements of chaos presents themselves in the forms of deviation both in ontology and politics against this avoidance. Now this is the right time to call Aristotle’s witness in order to examine the source of the deviation-forms and if there is anything at the source of deviations other than natural order itself. Aristotle writes: “But there is none naturally appropriate to tyranny, or to any other perverted form of government; for these come into being contrary to nature.” (Aristotle 1984b, *Politics*, 1287b37-1288a7, p. 71). And there is a crucial connection this “being contrary to nature”, or the disorder, and the discontinuity of tyranny which is called as the worst of the deviation-forms in *Politics*: “In fact, tyrannies generally have been of quite short duration.” (Aristotle 1984b, *Politics*, 1315b23-1315b22, p. 126). Here, we should distinguish the deviation coming from the order of nature and deviation that does not come from nature itself because of the connotations from Aristotle’s system and his theory of order.

The first kind of deviation finds its ontological roots at the heart of the order and therefore it produces the idea of order as soon as it completes the ontological gaps immanent in the constitution of order, although it has the potential to destroy the order itself from the viewpoint of chaos. The bent line can be taken the example of first kind of deviation. As for my foundational claim is that Aristotle have set the stage with the first kind of deviation, a deviation from order, and forced himself to refer a more radical concept of deviation than the first one in order to develop another idea of order which cannot be reduced to symmetrical harmony and the asymmetrical rupture. Thus Aristotle opens up a new way to think the second kind of deviation which is assumed to come from nothing. This “nothing” makes impossible to refer to any origin and carries anew conception of deviation as the expression of chaotic powers. Thus, our question of the ontological source of deviation has lost its sense so that there would exists a new sense-layer for which the question of source and origin is nothing other than an epistemological curtain that covers the surface of logical chaos. Aristotle’s mule leads us to think both an exception and a law which are related to each other reciprocally. Mule can be seen as an accident from the viewpoint of the first kind of deviation, i.e., an exception, but, according to the second kind of deviation, that is to say, it is the *deviation as such*, or the law itself that is able to repeat itself without any limit. In fact, while other mammals produces their generation in their own kind and species, the mule cannot produce any generation and therefore it is an uncomparable being of potential-not-to. It is not a production of deviation, it is an embodied deviation. One of the crucial difference between first and second kinds of deviations can be comprehended by this concept of embodiment. First kind of deviation cannot be embodied but represented by the subject itself, but in the second kind of deviation subject is nothing other than the process of embodiment of its components. Therefore, embodied deviation precedes the One and the Subject or the Order itself by placing itself at the constitution of origin and paves the way for anew active principle of beginning. While one of the imaginary conclusion of this move is its occupation of the special place of the first mover, the other is related to Aristotle’s theory of politics. There is an oscillation of the concept of deviation in Aristotle’s theory of politics, which cuts across both a deviation from the natural order and deviation as such. It is clear that first kind of deviation is a negative move because it refers to the order as its own negation and represents itself as the negative of the order. This twofold negation is the real determination of deviation from order, i.e., dogmatic conception of deviation. However the second kind of deviation cannot be translated into the order because it refers to nothing other than itself and it represents the order as its own negation and

therefore it cannot be reversed into its opposite, which means that deviation as such is the productive or creative deviation leading to the formation of subject and the order itself. From now on, one can analyse how the creative deviation haunts Aristotle's *Politics* in the manner that the distinctions between the forms of government and the deviation-forms. As it is known that tyranny is presented as the deviation form of kingdom in Aristotle's *Politics*, i.e. it is a deviation from order. If we represent the first kind of deviation with the bent line and the second one with the mule itself, a crucial question comes to the mind: What kind of deviation does tyranny include in itself? Bent line is able to become a straight one but the mule cannot be transformed into horse or donkey. It is the impossible synthesis of the two and therefore it cannot be analysed into its components. Tyranny can be translated into its straight line or to the kingdom again because every deviation (of the first kind) can be translated into the order it belongs. According to Aristotle's *Politics*, oligarchy is the deviation from aristocracy and democracy is the deviation of the constitutional government of many, which are three corresponding perversions (Aristotle 1984b, *Politics*, 1289a28-1289a39, p. 75). However, there is an irreducible difference between the deviation that can be attributed to democracy and the deviation of tyranny, which is considered by Aristotle as a difference in degree as well as in kind. One can see this inclination of Aristotle, who thinks that there is "more" and "less" in the natural state of the things, in *Nicomachean Ethics*: "Democracy is the least bad of the deviations; for in its case the form of constitution is but a slight deviation (Aristotle 1984b, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1160a32-1160b22, p. 130). Here, the degree of the deviation is the crucial point of its quality and the source. The radical deviation is not necessarily at the limit or at the origin but in the middle and this "slight deviation" is the most affective element of the active beginning of the deviation as such, which can be analysed by examining the theory of middle state and the principle of measure in Aristotle.

Other Components of Order

Theories of middle state and the measure are the *achilles' heel* of the Aristotle's analysis levels on the constitution of order. Order of continuity presents itself with the continuity of the order here. One can follow the traces of the effects of these theories from Aristotle's theory of music to ethics and politics. Although theory of middle state is generally exemplified in the context of the virtues, I

would like to present an alternative approach to this theory with regard to the constitution of order by considering Aristotle's theory of music in the last book of *Politics*. It is remarkable that Aristotle's theory of middle state is not restricted to the determinations of virtues and is related to the essence of music as well as its relationships to education. In the last book of *Politics*, Aristotle deals with three musical scale played in ancient Greek music, which are the modes of Mixolydian, Phrygian and Dorian (Aristotle 1984b, *Politics*, 1341b33-1342b18, p. 174). When Aristotle tries to classify these three modes in terms of principle of middle state, he comes to the apparent expression of the order of middle which is discovered by means of determination of the excessive edges. In this direction, Aristotle compares relaxing and nice tunes of Mixolydian mode with excessive enthusiasms coming from Phrygian mode (Aristotle 1984b, *Politics*, 1339b11-1340b19, p. 171). On the one hand there is Mixolydian mode that leads one to inertia and passivity, and on the other there is Phrygian mode that creates an excessive expression of amorous and exciting emotions. However, Dorian mode is, for Aristotle, an example of the middle state, which is encoloured by the balance of the two perversions. This musical mode does neither leads one to an excessive enthusiasm nor any kind of passivity.

Middle state is a kind of balance which is the foundation of the theory of virtue in Aristotle, although its effects and scope cannot be reduced to this theoretical frame. It is a crucial sense-layer of the order that needs two basic others as the constituting elements of the order. While one of these others presents itself as the excess and abundance, the other expresses itself in the form of lackness or deficiency. Thus Mixolydian mode appears as the lackness by producing an organisation of sounds that leads one to passivity; on the contrary, Phrygian mode presents an excess and leads one into excessive poles of the excitation and even into unconscious intemperance. Now, one of the vital components of the continuity is linked to the order of the middle state and it is symbolised by the balance of the two vices belonging to the poles. In *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle seeks to place virtue at the right point of the scale, i.e., at the intermediate or middle state when he tries to develop the difference between character virtues and the intellectual virtues:

That moral excellence is a mean, then, and in what sense it is so, and that it is a mean between two vices, the one involving excess, the other deficiency, and that it is such because its character is to aim at what is intermediate in passions and in actions, has been sufficiently stated (Aristotle 1984b, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1109a20-1109a29, p. 29).

Order of the intermediate state raises the continuity and it functions like a geometrical formula that determines the perversions and deviations. From now on, the perspective from which the deviations can be detected becomes clear: To find a state of balance against the excessiveness and the deficiencies.

Conclusion

“Hold the ship out beyond that surf and spray”

Homer

Homer’s verse is cited by Aristotle in the second book of *Nicomachean Ethics*, where the character virtues are discussed in detail (Aristotle 1984b, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1109a30-1109b1, p. 29). Presenting both of the sense of intermediateness and the idea of measure metaphorically, this citation does not only refer to the excessiveness and the deficiencies but it also expresses the basic problem coming from to be middle or mean. To be mean is a state of balance which is continually threatened by the excess and the lack and it is one of the grounding elements of the order in Aristotle’s system. Surf and spray that confronts the ship are the symbols of the excess and the lack which are the continual threatening factors for the balance. No matter ship tries to avoid surfs and the sprays by following its own route, it might be dragged by the exterior forces functioning on its organic unity and it can find itself in a place where it would never want to be set foot in. Although human being tries to follow the principle of intermediate by behaving according to the spirit of happiness, the fortune might not remunerate her efforts. Aristotle is completely aware of this unpaid efforts of human being and so that he presents his observations in order to show how the state of balance could be easily lost and how human being could involuntarily fall into the clamps of two vices. However, Aristotle thinks the virtue as the sound structure of human being and if one tries to continue that metaphorical sense, it is the port of the ship the virtue itself. In other words, no matter what happens to human being or no matter what kind of unexpected troubles haunting human beings, there is a potential to act which aims to happiness and life itself. This is to say that activity of human being with its initial aim cannot be separated from her; metaphorically speaking, even if the ship loses itself in surfs and sprays, its route is determined by its potential-to-do and its virtues. In connection with this, even the order is destroyed by exterior forces, it can be reconstructed by its immanent

forces. From this point on, order of ontological and ethical continuity would be robustly activated in order to provide the continuity of political order. In *Politics*, Aristotle gives us a clue of this kind relationship between continuity and the political order and links the constitutional continuity with the education of the citizens in accordance to the constitutional government (Aristotle 1984b, *Politics*, 1332b13-1332b41, p. 157).

Order of continuity is constituted by the theory of middle state, dynamics of deviations, relationships of before-after, teleology and the first mover. Politically speaking, for Aristotle, continuity of order is one of the foundational principles to produce a constitutional government. In this context, Aristotle brings the continuity of state into question by describing it in the manner of organic, natural and political unity. Some of the constitutional systems and the governments does not only lead themselves to their own destruction but also annul the political unity itself. For example, tyranny, as the worst deviation against the natural order, has the least continuity among the governments. In tyranny, sovereignty belongs to one and the system is actualised by the despotism and violence. This is why there is no tyrant who puts his faith in people. Tyrant is typological embodiment of the fear, who seeks the support of flunkies and lickspittles in order to express its own excessiveness. He tries to overcome the natural and moral laws and is dismissed from continuity of the order by forcing the limits of laws. This portrays the deviation, a deviation of the first kind or the dogmatic deviation for which every perversion stil refers to the order in order to destroy itself. After all, Greek tragedies expose the extraordinary narratives of disasters happened to tyrants in the face of social memory of the era. In *Antigone*, what happened to tyrant Creon describes his desperation against the ethical attitude of Antigone based on the higher moral value that shakes tyrant's authority. Tyrant Creon disrespects the natural order and hits his head to the limits of the divine law. In the first period of Greek tragedy, especially in the tragedies written by Aiskhylos and Sophocles, there are two conflicting forces, one is the fate and the other is the will of hero. One of the Aristotle's theme in *Nicomachean Ethics* presents itself in relation to this context, that is the theme of preference. In tragedy, when one see the conflict between the law of fate and the will of hero, the problem is overcome by verification of the impassable character of the fortune in the end. Divine law and the natural order realize the justice without drawing any attention if the subject confronting the law is a tyrant or a king. In this whole conception of tragedy, tyrant Creon's oppression and Oedipus The King's desire are predetermined by the fate of their will as one can see from the fact that latter is

informed by a blind oracle on the truth of his life. However, Aristotle's conception of preference opens up a new road on which one can achieve another comprehension of the order and the law, which provides him to avoid the conflict between two vices as well as two conflicting elements of tragedy. Aristotle defines the concept of preference in a rational manner and points out the crucial role of preferences in determining one's course of life. It is the rational activity by which one escapes two vices and two conflicting elements of tragedy in order to reconstruct the decisions of his life. Although the course of the ship can be shaken by surfs and sprays, its route can be re-oriented by means of sound preferences and right decisions of the steersman whose ethical potentiality cannot be separated from her existence. This potentiality is included in the process of actualisation and the center of continuity is related to ethical life of human being. For example, when the theme of friendship is considered, Aristotle distinguishes different kinds of friendship by considering their permanence and continuity as well as their basic motives such as love, mutuality and reciprocity (Aristotle 1984b, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1156a22-1156b7, p. 122). Just as the image of fate without preferences, the modes of friendship without continuity and permanence becomes senseless. Preferences of human being are the real elements against the disorder which springs from chance, fortune and spontaneity, they are the foundational conditions in order to re-orient the ship beyond the surfs and sprays, i.e., a synthesis of real elements and foundational conditions that provide the continuity of ethical order. Order of moral life can be taken as parallel to the order of beings and the political order; that is to say, these three levels of order are three expressions of the same logic of order: hierarchy. From the viewpoint of ontopolitics, order of beings was born with the politics of continuity and image of political order was inscribed into the continuity of the beings. But it is neither tyranny nor democracy, which is the least deviation from order for Aristotle, that is able to provide the continuity of order. There is a universal condition for every image of order in Aristotle's thought, which is clearly emphasised in *Metaphysics*: "For how is there to be order unless there is something eternal and independent and permanent?" (Aristotle 1984b, *Metaphysics*, 1060a26-1675, p. 152). This is the crucial question that reveals the axiomatic foundation of order and this foundation is nothing other than a very complex formation of hierarchy in Aristotle.

Our genealogical study concludes that there are unrepressible elements of logical chaos in Aristotle's conceptions of order and continuity without which any other ethical, political and ontological hierarchies can be established and that there are twofold appearances of these chaotic

elements. Named as the dogmatic deviation and symbolised by tyranny and bent line, first kind of deviation is employed to complete the order itself by giving its ontopolitical energy into continuity of order and order of continuity, which are the two foundational conditions of formation of hierarchy; and the other, which is embodied in Aristotle's mule and democracy, expresses itself as the second kind of deviation like a creative swerving that threatens every formation of hierarchy.

REFERENCES

- Agamben G. (1999). *Potentialities*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Aristoteles (1975). *Politika*. Trans.: Mete Tunçay. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi.
- Aristoteles (1996). *Metafizik*. Trans.: Ahmet Arslan. İstanbul: Sosyal Yayınları.
- Aristoteles (1997). *Fizik*. Trans.: Saffet Babür. İstanbul: YKY.
- Aristoteles (2011). *Nikomakhos'a Etik*. Trans.: Saffet Babür. Ankara: Bilgesu Yayıncılık.
- Aristotle (1984a). *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. Volume I. Ed.: Jonathan Barnes. Princeton and New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Aristotle (1984b). *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. Volume II. Ed.: Jonathan Barnes. Princeton and New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Badiou, A. (2009) *Theory of Subject*, Trans.: Bruno Bosteels, New York: Continuum.
- Bloch, E. (1971) *On Karl Marx*, Trans.: John Maxwell, New York: Herder and Herder.
- Deleuze, G. (1990) *The Logic of Sense*, Trans.: Mark Lester ve Charles Stivale, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Deleuze, G. (1992). *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. Trans.: Hugh Tomlinson. London: Continuum.
- Deleuze, G. (1994). *Difference and Repetition*. Trans.: Paul Patton. London: Continuum.
- Derrida, J. (1973) *Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs*, Trans.: David B. Allison, Northern University Press, Evanston.
- Derrida, J. (1982) *Margins of Philosophy*, Trans.: Alan Bass, Sussex: The Harvester Press.
- Foucault, M. (1977). "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*. Ed.: D. F. Bouchard. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Guattari, F. (1992). *Chaosmosis*. Trans.: Paul Bains And Julian Pefanis. Indiana: Indiana University Press.
- Hegel, G. W. F. (1995). *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. Volume I. Trans.: E. S. Haldane. University of Nebraska Press.
- Hesiod (1908). *The Poems and Fragments*. Trans.: A. W. Mair. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

- Hesiod (2010). *Theogony and Works and Days*. Trans.: Catherine M. Schlegel, Henry Weinfield. Michigan: The University of Michigan Press.
- Lucretius (1969). *On the Nature of Things*. Trans.: Martin Ferguson Smith. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company.
- Marx, K. (2010). *Difference Between Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature. Marx&Engels Collected Works: Volume 1, Karl Marx (1835-1843)*. Trans.: Richard Dixon, Clemens Dutt, Jack Lindsay, Alick West, Alex Miller, Dirk J., Sally R. Struik, Alick West. Lawrence&Wishart.
- Nietzsche, F. W. (1968). *The Will to Power*. Trans.: Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Vintage Books.
- Nietzsche, F.W. (2009). *On The Genealogy of Morals*. Trans.: Ian Johnston. Arlington: Richer Resources Publications.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich W. (2002). *Beyond Good and Evil*. Trans.: Judith Norman. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Plato (1997). *Complete Works*. Ed.: John M. Cooper. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
- Ross, D. (2007). *Aristotle*. London and Newyork: Routledge.
- Sophocles (1973). *Antigone*. Trans.: Richard Emil Braun. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Turetzky, P. (1998) *Time*, London, New York: Routledge.
- Yovel, Y. (1986) "Nietzsche and Spinoza: *Amor Fati* and *Amor Dei*," *Nietzsche as Affirmative Thinker*, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- Whitehead, A.N. (1948) *Science and the Modern World*, New York: Pelican Books.
- Whitehead, A.N. (1968) *Modes of Thought*, New York: Free Press.
- Whitehead, A.N. (1979) *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology*. Ed.: David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne, New York and London: The Free Press.
- Whitehead, A.N. (2012) *The Concept of Nature*, Createspace Independent Publishing Platform.